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INTRODUCTION
Recent historic developments in South Africa signal the
potential establishment of a constitutional democracy upon the
ashes of apartheid. The African National Congress has released a
draft Bill of Rights calling for the constitutional entrenchment of
fundamental human rights I and has entered into negotiations with
the ruling National Party government in an effort to effect a
fundamental transformation in the structure of the South African
government. 2 The purpose of this Article is to bring to international attention and defend the African National Congress's
decision to attempt to include certain social rights in a new South
African constitution.' We hope to engender international academ1 See A Bill ofRightsfor a DemocraticSouth Africa-Working Draftfor Consultation,7
S. AFR.J. HUM. RTS. 110, 110-23 (1991) [hereinafter ANC WorkingDraft] (noting that
the released draft is not a final document and, by the time of this Article, will have
been subjected to scrutiny and some revision through a series of conferences and
workshops); see also Nicolas Haysom, Democracy, Constitutionalismand the ANC's Bill
of Rightsfor a New South Africa, 7 S. AFR.J. HUM. RTs. 102, 102-09 (1991) (outlining
some of the provisions of the draft Bill of Rights); Albie Sachs, From the Violable to the
Inviolable: A Soft-Nosed Reply to Hard-NosedCriticism, 7 S. AFR.J. HUM. RTs. 98,98-101
(1991) (responding to various criticisms of the draft Bill of Rights).
For further insight into the reasoning behind this document, see ALBIE SACHS,
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NEW SOUTH AFRICA (1990); Kader Asmal,

ConstitutionalCourts-A Comparative Survey, 24 COMP. INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 315 (1991).
Both Sachs and Asmal are members of the ANC Constitutional Committee.
2 On February 2, 1990, South African President F.W. de Klerk committed the
government to a process of constitutional reform involving all South Africans
regardless of race. See Excerptsfrom Address by de Klerk on Change, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
1990, § 1, at 6. As of mid-September, 1992, these constitutional negotiations had
been suspended as a result of action initiated by the ANC and allied parties to force
the incumbent National Party government of de Klerk to cease alleged involvement
in brutal and massive violence that has plagued various black communities and to
provide adequate police protection against such violence. In addition, the ANC
continues to push for a commitment to a constitutional Constituent Assembly as both
a precondition to and an outcome of any return to the suspended multi-party
negotiations. See The World, HUM. RTS. TRIB., Summer 1992, at 15, 17.
s Social rights refer, at a minimum, to rights to adequate nutrition, housing,
health, and education. See infra text accompanying notes 16-21.
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ic and political debate concerning the limits and possibilities of
entrenching social rights in a new South African constitutional
order, 4 as well as to offer thoughts that might be of broader
relevance to other societies adopting or renewing their constitutions. The goal is to demonstrate why social rights, or a select range
of these rights which best reflect the fundamental needs, aspirations, and historical experiences of the majority of South Africans,
should and can receive constitutional entrenchment, including
protection through judicial review.
Five preliminary points must be stressed. First, reference to
judicial protection of constitutional guarantees does not imply that
the courts' traditional structures, composition, procedures, and
methodologies should be left intact. This Article argues that some
creative restructuring of the methodology and procedures of the
judiciary is necessary. 5 One of the risks associated with the
entrenchment of constitutional guarantees is that these guarantees
are subject to a process of interpretation by an elite body of
individuals who are in a position to impose their political and
ideological world-views on South African society through interpretive acts of understanding. 6 One might have good reason to be
4 Recent indications suggest that the question of the justiciability of social rights
is a live and still-undecided question:
South Africa is experiencing an intensification of the debate on the
protection of fundamental rights. Although it seems as if the major political
actors agree in principle that ajusticiable bill of rights be included in a new
constitution, differences of opinion on the substance of such a bill of rights
are apparent. One issue that still has to be agreed upon, is the way in which
social, economic and cultural rights can be protected in a future bill of
rights.... Thejusticiability of socio-economic rights, or so-called second
generation rights, is the subject of wide-ranging discussion ....
Bertus de Villiers, DirectivePrinciplesof State Policy andFundamentalRights: The Indian
Experience, 8 S. AFR.J. HUM. RTs. 29, 29 (1992).
5 See, e.g., Robin West, Progressiveand Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 641, 714-16 (1990) (arguing that the adjudicative process as traditionally
conceived is antithetical to progressive constitutionalism because adjudication is
corrective and authoritarian, persistently requires a show of positive authority to
prove the truth of. propositions, and is inclined to maintain a status quo legal
ordering rather than exploring interpretive possibilities and redistributive solutions).
For this reason, we advocate a methodology of constitutional adjudication that
attempts to ensure that thejudiciary is a receptive site for the telling of human stories
of oppression.
This does not amount to a claim thatjudges intentionally favor one social group
over another, or that judges are unconstrained by their professional roles or by the
legal texts that they apply. It is, however, a recognition that the meaning of a legal
text is generally underdetermined by its own contents, and that "[no] set of legal
institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it
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wary of entrusting the interpretation of a new, socially progressive
constitution to a South African judiciary that historically has
practiced and tolerated racism in its courtrooms. 7 It is imperative
meaning." Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Cour4 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative,97 HARV. L. REV. 4,4 (1983); see also Martha Miriow, InterpretingRights: An
Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE LJ. 1860, 1893-911 (1987) (expanding upon the

interpretive approach to legal scholarship proposed by Cover). These narratives are
found in the various normative systems of society, and foremost in the normative
universe of the legal profession and thejudiciary. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Forceof
Law: Toward a Sociology of the JuridicalField, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 814-53 (1988)

(analyzing the influence of socially patterned practices upon behavior in the legal
world).
This is particularly evident in the constitutional field in which vague standards
are applied to complex fact situations. See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution:
A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2272-73 (1990) (noting the Supreme Court's
continued loyalty to the conception that affirmative obligations do not attach to
enforceable constitutional rights); West, supra note 5, at 641-42 (noting the effect of
recent appointments of conservative judges to the United States Supreme Court).
The normative world of the judiciary as a profession has tended to reflect the
homogeneous, conservative backgrounds of its members, who in western societies
have been almost exclusively financially privileged straight-acting white males. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 1 (1992) (arguing that "judges know next to
nothing about [sex] beyond their own personal experience, which is limited, perhaps
more so than average, because people with irregular sex lives are pretty much...
screened out of thejudiciary" and that this leads to uninformed decisions regarding
sexual privacy); Patrick Macklem, Of Texts and DemocraticNarratives,41 U. TORONTO
LJ. 114, 131-32 (1990) (describing the theme that thejudiciary is antidemocratic and
inimical to citizen participation); Joel Bakan, ConstitutionalInterpretationand Social
Change: You Can't Always Get What You Want (Nor What You Need), 70 CAN. BAR REV.
307,318-23 (1991) (listing the factors that contribute to the elitism of the judiciary);
see also J.A.G. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY 25-31 (3d ed. 1985)
(providing numerical breakdown of the socioeconomic backgrounds ofsenior British
judiciary); Paul Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 661,663-67 (1985) (noting that
judicial decisionmaking is inevitably affected by the individual's interest and
experience); Andrew Petter, The Politicsof the Charter,8 SUP. CT. L. REV. 473,479-502
(1986) (demonstrating that due to the nature of the judicial system, the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms has failed to advance the interests of disadvantaged
Canadians); Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of
Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 948 (1979) (discussing
howjudges' homophobia affects their understanding of the constitutional protection

of sexual privacy).
7 See DAVID DYZENHAUs, HARD CASES IN WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS: SOUTH AFRICAN
LAW IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 49-51 (1991) (discussing the
response to apartheid of the South African judiciary); L.J. Boulle, ConstitutionalLaw
in South Africa 1976-1986, in LAW UNDER STRESS: SOUTH AFRICAN LAW IN THE 1980s
55, 65 (T.W. Bennet ed., 1988); Hugh Corder & Dennis Davis, The Constitutional
Guidelines of the African National Congress: A PreliminaryAssessment, 106 S. AFR. L.J.
633, 642 (1989) (noting that "the South African judiciary over the past eighty years
of segregationist and apartheid rule has inspired little confidence as a protector of
basic rights"); M.G. CowlingJudges and the Protectionof Human Rights in South Africa:
ArticulatingtheInarticulatePremiss,3 S. AFR.J. HUM. RTS. 177, 177 (1987) (stating that
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that the process by which meaning is given to general constitutional
language be open to the multiplicity of divergent voices and views
that comprise South African society and that the composition and
methodology of the South African judiciary be sensitive 8to the fact
that judicial review is susceptible to ideological capture.
Second, we are not claiming that judicial protection of individual social and economic rights is the optimal or only way to achieve
social justice. 9 As with other constitutionalized rights, it is fruitless
"the present legal system is perceived by the majority of South Africans, and the
international community in general, as being patently unjust"); John Dugard, The
Questfor a Liberal Democracy in South Africa, in LAW UNDER STRESS, supra, at 237, 25455 (noting that the suitability of the South African judiciary has been challenged on
the grounds that all its judges are white);John Dugard, TheJurisprudentialFoundations
of the Apartheid Legal Order, 18 PHIL. F. 115, 122 (1986-87); A. Leon Higginbotham,
Jr., Racism in American and South African Courts: Similaritiesand Differences, 65 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 479, 514-21 (1990) (presenting extended examples of racist bias on the part
of the South African judiciary); Raymond Suttner, The IdeologicalRole of the Judiciay
in South Africa, in LAW ANDJUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 81, 83 (John Hund ed., 1988)
(noting "that the judiciary does play a part-ideologically and through repression-in
the social struggles over and within the South African state"). See generallyJOHN
DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER (1978) (presenting
the factors that combined to create an "apartheid jurisprudence").
For an excellent discussion of the implications of the ideological make-up of the
South Africanjudiciary for the best form of court structure for enforcingany new Bill
of Rights, see Donald Nicolson, Ideology and the South AfricanJudicialProcess-Lessons
from the Past, 8 S. AFR.J. HUM. RTs. 50 (1992).
8 The danger of an inaccessible process is not simply that the complaints of the
excluded will be ignored but that those with privileged access to the ear of the courts
will inevitably set the agenda for elaborating the normative concerns to be addressed
by constitutional rights and for developing the doctrinal content of those rights. See
Petter, supra note 6, at 486 ("The institutional barrier created by money not only
denies the disadvantaged access to our courts; in doing so it serves to shape the rights
themselves.").
9 A great deal has been written in the United States about the appropriateness of
traditional adjudicative procedures and institutions for implementing social change.
See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLmcs 244-72 (1962) (noting that the school segregation
cases demonstrate that neither the courts alone nor the federal government alone can
find and enforce workable solutions); DONALD L. HORowrrz, THE COURT AND SOCIAL
POLICY 4 (1977) ("Judicial activity has extended to welfare administration, prison
administration, and mental hospital administration, to education policy and
employment policy, to road building and bridge building, to automotive safety
standards, and to natural resource management."); MICHAEL A. REBELL & ARTHUR R.
BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND THE COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM at xi, 75-122, 147-74 (1982) (describing the role of the courts in

educational policymaking and providing an empirical analysis of holdings in New
York and Chicago); Abram Chayes, The Role of theJudge in PublicLaw Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281,1298 (1976) ("The centerpiece of the emerging public law model
is the decree [which] seeks to adjust future behavior, not to compensate for past
wrong."); Colin S. Diver, TheJudge as PoliticalPowerbroker: SuperintendingStructural
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and even dangerous to look to the courts for the first and last word
on any matter concerning the vindication of fundamental societal
values. 10 Although the judiciary can spur societal reform, the
realization of gains in the area of social justice, as South Africans
are well aware, is more often than not the result of years of
grassroots organizing by individuals and social movements committed to social and economic justice. 1 Invariably, the law reflects
the outcome of struggles in economic, social and political arenas.
Constitutional adjudication or litigation under a new constitution
should not be viewed as the only site where South African aspirations for social justice vie for realization.
Despite the fact that constitutional adjudication is but one path
available for the realization of social justice, a background assumption to our arguments is that it is as unfounded to place one's faith
entirely in the realm of constitutional politics as it is to place it
Change in PublicInstitutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 44 (1979) ("Courts have become the

principal forum for the pursuit of structural reform by many groups most disaffected
with the delivery of governmental services."); Gerald E. Frug,JudicialPower of the
Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 715 (1978) ("The most dramatic examples of this
exercise ofjudicial power have occurred in the fields of corrections and care of the
mentally ill and mentally retarded, fields in which a substantial portion of current
budgets are now mandated not by legislative choice but by orders of lower federal
courts."); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,
363-65 (1978) (discussing adjudication as a form of social ordering); Donald L.
Horowitz, DecreeingOrganizationalChange: JudicialSupervision of PublicInstitutions,
1983 DuKE L.J. 1265, 1288-302 (describing the use of litigation to effect change in
large and complex public institutions); Neil K. Komesar, A Job for the Judges: The
Judiciaty and the Constitution in a Massive and Complex Society, 86 MICH. L. REv. 657,
661-68 (1988) (presenting an overview of the general division of decisionmaking
responsibility between the political organs and the courts).
o See generally Paul Brest, The Thirty-First Cleveland-Marshall Fund Lecture:
ConstitutionalCitizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 175 (1986) (discussing the exclusion

of viewpoints and the impoverishment ofpolitical discourse resulting from continuing
constitutional debate in the courts).
"1See Hugh Corder, Crowbarsand Cobwebs: Executive Autocracy and the Law in South
Africa, 5 S. AFR.J. HUM. RTS. 1, 25 (1989) ("[L]awyers must not confine their activities
to the legal sphere, for there can be no legal form which achievesjustice in a system
whose social relations are built on injustice. The law, although a potential facilitator,
has no magical transformative quality as such."). For a particularly apt illustration of
this point in the South African context, see Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach:
Lessons From Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 699, 719-38
(describing how the villagers of Driefontein challenged the government's plan to
remove them from their homes, with a focus on how a lawyer and an organizer
worked with the community to support this effort). See generallyTONY PROSSER, TEST
CASES FOR THE POOR. LEGAL TECHNIQUES IN THE POLIrrCS OF SOCIAL WELFARE 83

(1983) (stating that "in the field of social welfare the courts alone are most unlikely
to be a useful vehicle for achieving social change").
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12
It is possientirely in the realm of constitutional adjudication.
ble, perhaps crucial, to see constitutional adjudication as one locus
of struggle in a broader constitutional politics without succumbing
to a view that equates constitutional adjudication with court-led
reform. In our opinion, progressive critiques of constitutional
adjudication have been overstated. 13 This view is supported by
recent legal scholarship illuminating the strategic and symbolic
importance of selective reliance on constitutional rights as part of
broader political and social efforts. 14 According to this line of
legal thought, even losses in the courtrooms can produce long-term
15
victories.

12 See Cass R. Sunstein, What JudgeBork Should Have Said, 23 CONN. L. REV. 205,
221 (1991) (advocating constitutional politics over constitutional adjudication in areas
such as homelessness, malnutrition, and poverty).
13 This is not to claim that they do not contain important insights. See, e.g., Peter
Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousnessand the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves,
62 TEx. L. REV. 1563, 1572-81 (1984) (describing the way that existing legal thought
both emerges from and helps to maintain the alienated character of the current social
situation); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1363-94 (1984)
(developing four related critiques of rights as discussed in contemporary American
legal circles).
14See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION,

AND AMERICAN LAw 289-311 (1990); Amy Bartholomew & Alan Hunt, What's Wrong
With Rights?, 9 LAw & INEQ. J. 1, 49-58 (1990); Joel F. Handler, "Constructingthe
PoliticalSpectacle": The Interpretationof Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in
Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 899, 958-74 (1990); Alan Hunt, Rights and
Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies, 17 J.L. & Soc'Y 309, 317-25 (1990);
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives From the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 593-98 (1986); Ed Sparer, Fundamental
Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the
CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509, 553 (1986); Lucie E. White,
Goldberg v. Kelly on the ParadoxofLawyeringfor the Poor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 861,87377 (1990).
In particular, there is also a body of work collectively referred to as critical race
theory's counter-critique of the rights critique. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, The Ethereal
Scholar Does CriticalLegal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 301 (1987); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 323-30 (1987); Patricia J. Williams,
Alchemical Notes: ReconstructingIdealsfrom DeconstructedRights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 401,406 (1987) [hereinafter Williams, AlchemicalNotes]; Robert A. Williams,Jr.,
Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of CriticalLegal Theory for People of
Color, 5 LAw & INEQ.J. 103, 103 (1987); see also Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform
and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1369-87 (1988) (expanding CLS to address the role of racism in
society).
11 See Schneider, supranote 14, at 592-93. In addition, Hunt provides an evocative
example of how a legal loss can herald a victory for a social movement. "In current
struggles over wife abuse, all those cases in which judges impose derisory sanctions
are contexts which drive the movement forward because they provide instances of a
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Third, "social rights" refer to those rights that protect the
necessities of life or that provide for the foundations of an adequate
quality of life.16 The necessities of life encompass at a minimum
rights to adequate nutrition, 17 housing, 18 health, 19 and education.20 All of these rights provide foundations upon which human
development can occur and human freedom can flourish. 2 1 In
dying discourse in which women 'deserve' chastisement by their husbands." Hunt,
supra note 14, at 320.
16 See ANC Working Draft,supra note 1, at 116-17, (Art. 10, "Social, Educational,
Economic and Welfare Rights"). Article 10.3 requires the state to "establish standards
and procedures whereby all men, women and children are guaranteed by law a
progressively expanding floor of enforceable minimum rights, with special attention
to nutrition, shelter, health care, education and income." Id.
17 See ANC Working Draft,supra note 1, at 117 (Art. 10.7) ("In order to guarantee
the right of freedom from hunger, the State shall ensure the introduction of
minimum standards of nutrition throughout the country, with special emphasis on
pre-school and school funding.").
18 The ANC's Bill of Rights would require the State to:
dismantle ... single-sex hostels and other forms of accommodation
associated with [apartheid's] migrant labor system[,] to embark upon and
encourage an extensive programme of house-building[, to] take steps to
ensure that energy, access to clean water and appropriate sewage and waste
disposal are available to every home, and to cease eviction.., without [an]
order of... court which shall have regard to the availability of alternative
accommodation.
See ANC Working Draft, supra note 1, at 117 (Art. 10.8-.10).
19 See ANC Working Draft,supra note 1, at 118 (Art. 10.12) (requiring the state to
"establish a comprehensive national health service... to provide hygiene education,
preventative medicine and health care delivery to all").
20 See ANC Working Draft, supra note 1, at 117 (second Art. 10.10) (requiring the
state to ensure the existence of "free and compulsory primary education for all,...
progressive expansion of access [to] secondary education.... progressive increase
in access to pre-school institutions and institutes of vocational training and of higher
learning,... [and] increasingly extensive [adult-education] facilities").
For an extended analysis of education in the South Africa context, see Johann
van der Westhuizen, A Post-ApartheidEducationalSystem: ConstitutionalProvisions, 21
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 111, 135-37 (1989).
21 It should be noted that the view that social rights are inalienable has been
endorsed, at times, by the executive branch of the United States. In 1944, President
Franklin Roosevelt, for example, called for a "second Bill of Rights," which would
recognize among other things, rights to work, minimum income, health, education,
and medical care. See 90 CONG. REC. 55-57 (1944) (statement of Franklin D.
Roosevelt); see also Bert Lockwood, Toward the Economic Brown: Economic Rights in
the United States and the Possible Contribution of InternationalHuman Rights Law, in
WORLD JUSTICE?: U.S. COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 149, 152-59
(Mark Gibney ed., 1991) (sketching strategies for enhancing the protection of
economic rights within the United States by reference to international human rights
norms).
More recently, see the major 1977 statement on "Human Rights Policy" by the
Carter Administration's Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance:
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addition, such basic social rights should be conceptualized in terms
of an entitlement both to be equal as humans and to be equal as
22
members of society.
A considerable number of other candidates for inclusion as
social rights lie outside the immediate scope of this paper. Those in
question are akin to the social rights reflected in the United
Nations' International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. 23 In particular, rights related to income, notably the rights
24
to adequately remunerated work and to social income security,

are both conceptually and practically critical to the realization of the
Let me define what we mean by "human ights."... [T]here is the right to
the fulfillment of such vital needs as food, shelter, health care, and
education. We recognize that the fulfillment of this right will depend, in
part, upon the stage of a nation's economic development. But we also know
that this right can be violated by a Government's action or inaction-for
example, through corrupt official processes which divert resources to an
elite at the expense of the needy, or through indifference to the plight of
the poor.
Cyrus R. Vance, Human Rights Policy (Apr. 30, 1977) (transcript available in the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, Dept. of State), quoted in HENRY
SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 5 (1980).

There is an extensive literature that views these rights as part and parcel of
universal human entitlement.

See ALAN GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS:

ESSAYS ON

JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATIONS (1982); FRANK R. SCOTr, Expanding Concpts of
Human Rights, in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION: ASPECTS OF CANADIAN LAW AND
POLrTICs 353 (1977); CARL WELLMAN, A THEORY OF RIGHTS: PERSONS UNDER LAWS,
INSTITUTIONS, AND MORALS (1985); Canadian Mental Health Ass'n, Economic Policy
and Well-Being, in THE OTHER MACDONALD REPORT 80 (Daniel Drache & Duncan

Cameron eds., 1985); Martha H. Good, Freedomfrom Want: The Failureof United States
Courtsto ProtectSubsistence Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 335 (1984); Susan M. Okin, Liberty

and Welfare: Some Issues in Human Rights Theory, in HUMAN RIGHTS: NoMos XXIII
230 (J. Roland Pennock &John W. Chapman eds., 1981); Gregory Vlastos,Justice and
Equality, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 41 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
2 There are various treatments of what might be called citizenship theory, which
seeks to ground entitlements and obligations in the values of societal participation,

inclusion, and belonging in the wider community. In the context of social rights, see
DAVID HARRIS, JUSTIFYING STATE WELFARE 50-61 (1987); RUTH LISTER, THE
EXCLUSIVE SOCIETY: CITIZENSHIP AND THE POOR 62-66 (1990); Handler, supra note
14, at 966-67 (noting that "citizenship is about membership, the rights and obligations
of those who are involved in the community"). See generally RALF DAHRENDoRF, THE
MODERN SOCIAL CONFLICT: AN ESSAY ON THE POLITICS OF LIBERTY, at ix (1988)
(providing "an essay concerning the modern social conflict and the politics of
liberty"); KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION, at ix (1989) (providing "an extended essay on the past and potential

contributions of American law, especially constitutional law, to the definition of our
national community").
23 Adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976)
[hereinafter ICESCR].
24 See ANC Working Draft, supra note 1, at 118 (Art. 10.13-.15).
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values underpinning the rights to nutrition, housing, health, and
education. South Africans also should consider entrenching those
rights that fall under the general rubric of freedom of association,
including the right to join a trade union of one's choice, the right
to bargain collectively, and the right to strike, as well as rights
relating to workplace conditions, worker participation, skillsupgrade training, and transitional adjustment programs upon losing
one's job.25 Concerns of gender equality also must not be over26
looked in the constitutional reform process.
Traditional economic rights, such as freedom of contract,
commercial rights, or classically conceived rights to private property
are not part of our definition of social rights. Constitutionally
entrenched economic rights often work to frustrate the establishment of conditions that social rights seek to advance. 27 It is true
See ANC WorkingDraft, supranote 1, at 114-15, 118 (Arts. 6 & 10.13) (providing
for workers' rights, including the right to form and join trade unions, the right to
organize and bargain collectively, the right to strike and picket, and the right to work,
including the right to technical and vocational training).
26 See ANC Working Draft, supra note 1, at 115-16 (Art. 7) (providing that "men
and women shall enjoy equal rights in all areas of public and private life," that
"discrimination on the grounds of gender, single parenthood, legitimacy of birth or
sexual orientation is prohibited," that "positive action shall be undertaken to
overcome the disabilities and disadvantages suffered on account of past gender
discrimination," that there shall be legal remedies for "sexual harassment, abuse and
violence," and that "educational institutions, the media, and other social institutions
shall be under a duty to discourage sexual and other types of stereotyping"); see also
SACHS, supra note 1, app. 2 (reprinting "The ANC's Constitutional Guidelines for a
democratic South Africa-proposed amendments after seminar on gender").
27 The most notorious examples can be found in early twentieth century decisions
of the United States Supreme Court placing a substantive gloss on the due process
protection of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. See e.g.,
Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (invalidating minimum wage legislation for
women and children) (1923); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating
maximum hours legislation for bakers); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner'sLegacy, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 873, 882 (1987) (giving an overview of the Lochner era and warning
against a constitutional interpretation that validates government's neutrality towards
social ills); Ada Verloren van Themaat, Property Rights, Workers'Rightsand Economic
Regulation-ConstitutionalProtectionforProperty
Rights in the United States ofAmerica and
25

the FederalRepublic of Germany: PossibleLessons for South Africa, 23 CoMP. INT'L L. S.
AFR. 53, 56-61 (1990) (performing comparative analysis).
Article 11 of the ANC Working Draft recognizes a right to acquire, own, or
dispose of property, but Article 11.5 permits the state to take steps to overcome the
effects of past discrimination in relation to enjoyment of property rights. See ANC
Working Draft, supra note 1, at 118-19 (Art. 11). Compensation is required in the
event of expropriation, although the state is authorized to control, use, or acquire
property in accordance with "the general interest." Id. at 119 (Art. 11.11).
The question of property rights in South Africa goes beyond the issue of state
"intervention" in the market economy and raises the problem ofwhat should be done
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that property rights can be conceptualized in a way that integrates
them into a constitutional scheme which seeks to remedy economic
and social disadvantage. 28 This might be accomplished by subordinating standard possessory accounts of property to an account that
29
accepts the legitimacy of government's redistributive functions.
We question the inclusion of traditional property rights on the basis
of pragmatic concerns such as the need to attract foreign investment or to stimulate economic growth. Such concerns are no doubt
well-grounded, yet, in our view, they do not outweigh the detrimental effect upon already disempowered South Africans occasioned by
an entrenchment of traditional property rights and the attendant
constitutionalization of existing structures of economic inequality.

30

Although our general conclusions are relevant to rights that seek
to protect cultural interests, we also do not examine the merits and
demerits of enshrining cultural rights relating to language and other
31
community institutions in a new South African constitution.
with respect to land seized in colonial dispossessions and evictions mandated by the
apartheid regime. See Albie Sachs, A Bill ofRightsfor South Africa: Areas ofAgreement
and Disagreement, 21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 13, 33-36 (1989) (advocating an
affirmative action policy in property takings as a means of breaking up racially
oriented monopolies and cartels).
28 See e.g., Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 787 (1964) ("It
is time to see that the 'privilege' or 'gratuity' concept, as applied to wealth dispensed
by government, is not much different from the absolute right of ownership that
private capital once invoked to justify arbitrary power over employees and the
public.").
2' See Frank I. Michelman, Property as a ConstitutionalRight, 38 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1097, 1112 (1981). See generally C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to
ConstitutionallyProtectedLiberty, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 741 (1986) (arguing that collective
control of property rights furthers important aspects of individual liberty); Frank I.
Michelman, Possessionvs. Distributionin the ConstitutionalIdea of Property, 72 IOWA L.
REv. 1319 (1987) (arguing that the distributive conception of property rights should
be used to interpret constitutional property rights).
50 For a detailed study of the functioning of property as right and metaphor in
American constitutional law, see JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
LiMrrs OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990); see also Jennifer Nedelsky,

ReconceivingRights as Relationship,30 ALBERTA L. REV. (forthcoming 1992);Jennifer
Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162 (1990)
(advocating the rejection of boundary as the metaphor for the relationship between
the collective and the individual); cf.ANC WorkingDraft,supranote 1, at 118-19 (Art.
11) (recognizing private property rights, but with significant limitations).
31 See Sachs, supra note 27, at 26-30 (exploring the possibility of constitutional
protection for linguistic groups and ethnically based cultural associations). The ANC
Working Draft prohibits discrimination based on language, protects the right to form
and join social and cultural bodies, protects freedom of conscience and religion, and
requires the state to act positively to further the development of the Sindebele,
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Moreover, many of our arguments would also be relevant to the socalled third generation rights to the environment and to development. 2 However, independent arguments relating to the importance of the values underlying cultural and third generation rights
are necessary to support their inclusion in a constitutional bill of
rights. This Article is relevant to the issue of cultural and third
generation rights only in so far as social rights, like cultural and
of state
third generation rights, serve as triggers for the scrutiny
33
obligations to protect and promote collective goods.
Fourth, in our view, much of the debate surrounding the
entrenchment of social rights stems from an improper conflation of
Sepedi, Sesotho, Siswati, Setswana, Afrikaans, English, Tsonga (Shangaan), Venda,
Xhosa, and Zulu languages, and to promote respect for all the languages spoken in
South Africa. See ANC Working Draft,supra note 1, at 110, 113-15 (Arts. 1 & 5).
32 See generally Philip Alston, A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive
Development or ObfuscationofInternationalHuman Rights Law?, 29 NETH. INT'L L. REV.
307 (1982) (asking whether the recognition of the rights to development, to peace,
to communicate, to be different, to a healthy environment, to the benefit from the
common heritage of human kind, and to humanitarian assistance, as part of
international law, might devalue and obfuscate existing rights); Jan Glazewski, The
Environment HumanRights andaNew South African Constitution,7 S. AFR.J. HUM. RTS.
167 (1991) (presenting an analysis of environmental issues and the constitution in the
South African context);Jeremy Waldron, Can Communal Goods be Human Rights?, 27
ARCHIVES EUROPEAN Soc'Y 296 (1987) (arguing that "public goods" may be expressed
in terms of individual human rights, while "communal goods," though important,
should not be regarded as the subject matter of individual rights).
33 Rights to one's linguistic heritage or to a healthy environment are usually
understood in terms of the need to achieve certain goods that can only be enjoyed
communally. In these situations, individual rights function more as rights of
enforcement, forcing governments to live up to obligations owed to many individuals.
Such rights may also be understood partially in terms of individual rights to
individualized goods or interests. Often this presupposes an existing collective good
of a kind the enjoyment of which can be individualized and to which access has been
wrongly denied (e.g., an existing minority education facility); if such a good is not yet
in existence, recognizing an individual right can initiate, by a process of generalization, the creation of a collective good in order to replicate the provision of a related
good (e.g., the provision of minority language tutorial instruction to one student) for
all those entitled. For an interesting exchange among legal philosophers on the
complicated question of rights in and to collective goods, see generally Leslie Green,
Two Views of Collective Rights, 4 CAN. J. L. & JURIs. 315 (1991) (contending that
collective goods mitigate the individualism and egoism latent in rights, but that
collective agents do not so mitigate); Joseph Raz, Right-Based Moralities, in THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 193, 208 (Joseph Raz ed., 1988) (stating that collective rights
exist when human interest justifies imposing a duty upon some individuals, the
interests in question are individual interests in a public good, and no single interest
of any one group member is sufficient to justify imposing a duty upon another
person); Denise Raume, Individuals, Groups, and Rights to Public Goods, 38 U.
TORONTO L.J. 1 (1988) (arguing that certain participatory goods, such as minority
language rights, can give rise to claims of group rights); Waldron, supra note 32.
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two distinct issues. The first is whether South Africa should move
toward a constitutional democracy with a written bill of rights
enforceable by the judiciary against the state. The second assumes
the merits of establishing a constitutional democracy and seeks to
determine the type of rights that deserve the mantle of constitutional guarantee. Many concerns expressed in relation to the entrenchment of social rights are in fact deeper concerns about the establishment of a constitutional democracy, misdirected toward the
subsidiary issue of whether to entrench social rights. We assume
that South Africa is already generally committed to the entrenchment of civil and political rights;3 4 as a result, we do not address
the merits and demerits of establishing a constitutional democracy
in the wake of apartheid. 5
Our task is much more modest,
namely, to argue for the inclusion of social rights in light of an
apparently pre-existing commitment to a constitutional democracy.
In our view, to exclude social rights from a constitution that

' SeeJohan D. van der Vyver, ConstitutionalOptionsforPost-ApartheidSouth Africa,
40 EMORY L.J. 745, 770 (1991) ("It can be taken for granted that the South African
constitution for post-apartheid South Africa will almost certainly contain a bill of
rights."). See generally ANC Working Draft, supra note 1, at 110-14 (Arts. 1-5).
35 For the view that a South African constitution ought to provide for independent
judicial review, see SOUTH AFRICAN LAW REFORM COMM'N, GROUP AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (Working Paper No. 25, Project No. 58, 1989); M.M. Corbett, Human Rights:
The Road Ahead, 96 S. AFR. L.J. 192, 201 (1979); David Dyzenhaus, Democracy, Rights,
and the Law, 7 S. AFR.J. HUM. RTS. 24,42 (1991); Higginbotham, supranote 7, at 563;
Sachs, supra note 27, at 19; C.G. Weeramantry, The ConstitutionalReconstruction of
South Africa: Some EssentialSafeguards,3 LESOTHO L.J. 1, 15 (1987). For an extended
discussion of Working Paper 25 of the 1989 Law Reform Commission Report, see
John Dugard, A Bill of Rightsfor South Africa?, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 441, 448-65
(1990).
For the view that such a constitution ought to contain social as well as civil and
political rights, see Lynn Berat, A New South Africa?: Prospectsfor an Africanist Bill of
Rights and a TransformedJudiciary, 13 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 467, 480 (1991);
D.M. Davis, Legality and Struggle: Towards a View of a Bill ofRightsfor South Africa, in
A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA 169 (Johann van der Westhuizen & Henning
Viljoen eds., 1988); Albie Sachs, Towards a Bill of Rights in a DemocraticSouth Africa,
6 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 15 (1990); Charles Villa-Vicencio, Whither South Africa?:
Constitutionalismand Law-Making, 40 EMORY LJ. 141, 157 (1991). For the view that
only civil and political rights ought to be entrenched, see D.H.M. Brooks, Albie Sachs
on Human Rights in South Africa, 6 S. AFR.J. HUM. RTS. 25, 33 (1990); Cowling, supra
note 7, at 177;J.M. Didcott, PracticalWorkings of a Bill of Rights, in A BILL OF RIGHTS
FOR SOUTH AFRICA, supra, at 52.
For the view that useful lessons can be learned from the Namibian experience,
see generally Eric C. Bjornlund, The Devil's Work?: Judicial Review Under a Bill of
Rights in South Africa and Namibia,26 STAN.J. INT'L L. 391 (1990);John Hatchard &
Peter Slinn, Namibia: The ConstitutionalPathto Freedom, 17 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL.

644 (1991).
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of sand"
protects civil and political rights would be to throw "ropes
36
to the poor and disempowered in South African society.
Finally, the Article is written from a position of solidarity with
the struggle of South Africans and of the ANC, but it is also written
from a distance. Writing as outsiders, our feel for the current
South African context is necessarily underdeveloped. We seek to
offer a perspective on the justiciability of social rights that has
sufficiently general analytic relevance to be adaptable to particular
societies and situations. This perspective may therefore be of use
to South Africans and the ANC in their deliberations about their
country's future.
The remainder of this Article is aimed at supporting our belief
that concerns about the legitimacy of judicial review do not
outweigh the desirability of entrenching social rights in a new South
African constitution, and that the judiciary is not institutionally
incompetent to deal with the adjudication and interpretation of
social rights. Part I outlines two types of arguments against the
constitutional justiciability of social rights. The first claims that it
is illegitimate to enshrine social rights in a constitution and for the
judiciary to be given the power to interpret and enforce social
rights. The second claims that courts are not institutionally
competent to address matters pertaining to social rights. In Part II,
we address the legitimacy dimension and contend that the exclusion
of justiciable social rights from a South African constitution would
threaten the realization of social justice in South Africa because of
law's constitutive influence on society's and individuals' selfunderstandings. In Part III, we scrutinize and find wanting claims
of institutional incompetence, notably claims which deny the
capability of courts to impose positive obligations on governments
and claims which allege that social rights are too imprecise for
adjudication.
Part IV discusses the "interdependence" of civil and political
rights with social rights and argues that such interdependence helps
s The metaphor is borrowed from Indian constitutional jurisprudence. In
People's Union for Democratic Rights v. India, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 456, the Indian
Supreme Court, perjustice Bhagwati, held that, because economic necessity vitiates
choice, the payment of less than the minimum wage is "forced labour," and thus
prohibited by the Indian Constitution. The court concluded that any other
interpretation would render the guarantee a "mere rope of sand." Id. at 487; see also
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. India, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 67, 103 (holding that "[i]t is the
fundamental right of every one in this country... to live with human dignity, free
from exploitation"); infra text accompanying notes 401-08.
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to challenge further claims that judicial bodies can neither legitimately nor competently scrutinize social rights as a matter of
constitutional review. This Part addresses the drafting history,
textual provisions, and interpretive development of various
instruments of international law, namely, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights of 1948, s7 the International Covenant on Civil
39
and Political Rights (ICCPR)38 and its (First) Optional Protocol,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR),40 the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR),4 1 the European Social Charter,4 2 the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 43 and the American Convention on Human Rights. 44 Part V then shifts from international law
to comparative constitutional law and invokes emergent jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of India, which is infused with the
principle of interdependence, to tell a story of the rhetorical
possibilities of constitutionalized social rights. The Indian experience is instructive because it provides nascent factual support for
our contention that the judiciary both can and should seek to
protect social rights. Finally, in Part VI, we offer some concrete
textual and institutional strategies to minimize the antidemocratic
potential of judicial review.

37 G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/777, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR],
reprintedin UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL

INSTRUMENTS 1, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/i/Rev. 2 (1983).
38Adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
[hereinafter ICCPR].

39 Adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
[hereinafter
ICCPR, Optional Protocol].
40
See ICESCR, supra note 23.
41 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]; see also COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
1, 44 (1991) (final version of the Convention as amended).

42 Oct. 18,1961, Europ. T.S. No. 35 [hereinafter ESC] (entered into force Feb. 26,

1965); see also Protocol Amending the European Social Charter, openedforsignature

Oct.4 18, 1961, Europ. T.S. No. 142 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1991).
s Handbook of ExistingRulesPertainingto Human Rights in theInterAmenicanSystem,
OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L./V/II.60 Doc. 28 (1983) 21 [hereinafter American Declaration], reprinted in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, pt. 1, ch. IV, at
i (Thomas Buergenthal & Robert E. Norris eds., 1982) [hereinafter BUERGENTHAL &
NORRIS].

44 American Convention on Human Rights: Pact of SanJose, Costa Rica, Nov. 22,
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American
Convention].

19921

ROPES OF SAND

I. Two DIMENSIONS OF JUSTICIABILITY
By the term "justiciability" we mean, in broad outline, the extent
to which a matter is suitable for judicial determination. 45 For the
purposes at hand, this refers to the ability to judicially determine
whether or not a person's right has been violated or whether the
state has failed to meet a constitutionally recognized obligation to
respect, protect, or fulfill a person's right.46 "Justiciability" is a
deceptive term because its legalistic tone can convey the impression
that what is or is not justiciable inheres in the judicial function and
is written in stone. In fact, the reverse is true: not only is justiciability variable from context to context, but its content varies over
time. 47 Justiciability is a contingent and fluid notion dependent
on various assumptions concerning the role of the judiciary in a
given place at a given time as well as on its changing character and
48
evolving capability.
Debates over the justiciability of a particular subject matter
occur in the long shadow of the basic democratic principle that the
will of the majority ought to prevail in the fashioning of law and
policy. This principle underpins a standard doctrine of separation
of powers manifested in democratic governance: the legislature
makes the law, the executive implements the law, and the judiciary
applies and enforces the law. 49 In the words of Philip Kurland,
"[s]eparation of powers.., encompasses the notion that there are
fundamental differences in governmental functions-frequently but
not universally denoted as legislative, executive, and judicial-which

4 Galligan defines "non-justiciable" as "unsuited for adjudication."

D.J.

GALLiGAN, DIsCRETIONARY POWERS: A LEGAL STUDY OF OFFICIAL DIsCRETION 241
(1990). Given our view that it is important to conceive ofjusticiability as contingent,
we deliberately use the word "suitable" rather than "suited". Also, by referring to the
"extent" ofjusticiability, we hope to suggest that justiciability is not a concept that
lends itself to "either-or" categorization. We thus prefer to adopt a more fluid
understanding of "justiciability," the contingency of which is comprised of both the
character of the courts as institutions and of the judges as persons in their societal
context.
46 See infra notes 244-52 and accompanying text for a more detailed description
of these three levels of obligation.
47 See e.g., Chayes, supra note 9 (describing the evolution of the judicial role with
the growth in public law litigation).
48 See supra text accompanying note 5 (noting that we do not assume as given any
traditional understanding of courts as institutions).
49 See e.g., David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism,74 VA. L. REV.
519, 521 (1988) (suggesting that legislatures should be freer than courts to embark
on paternalistic courses since they are subject to popular will).
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must be maintained as separate and distinct, each sovereign 50
in its
own area, none to operate in the realm assigned to another."
The enactment of a constitutional bill of rights to be interpreted
and enforced by the judiciary represents a fundamental restraint on
this understanding of democracy.51 Certain matters are hived off
from majority rule and placed within the exclusive interpretive
province of the judiciary. Traditional separation of powers
principles require that in performing the interpretive function, the
judiciary is not to intrude on the governmental function assigned to
other branches of government. Many of the arguments opposing
the inclusion of social rights in a written constitution52 enforceable
by the judiciary are arguments that assert that their inclusion would
lead to an unacceptable blending of judicial with legislative power.
In many jurisdictions, both international and national, a sharp
distinction is often drawn, implicitly or explicitly, between civil and
political matters and economic and social matters, with the former
enjoying justiciable status, increasingly as constitutional rights, and
the latter viewed merely as involving potentially legitimate legislative
aspirations or policy goals, sometimes, but just as often not,
constitutionally recognized.53 As will be seen in Part IV, a stark
example of this distinction lies in the decision to split the 1948
54
Universal Declaration of Human Rights into two binding treaties.
50 Philip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine"of Separationof Powers, 85
MICH. L. REV. 592, 593 (1986).

51 This is not to suggest that scholars have not attempted to reconcile judicial
review with democratic values. Classic efforts include JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL

REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION
OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 2 (1980); JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OFJUDICIAL REVIEW 181 (1980). For a critique, see Richard
Parker, The Pastof ConstitutionalLaw-And Its Future,42 OHIO ST. LJ. 223,223 (1981)

(arguing that Ely's and Choper's theories have underlying assumptions that are
implausible in light of recent experience). See generally MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE,
AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988) (presenting and
critiquing
comprehensive normative theories of constitutional law).
5
2 It should be recognized that questions ofjusticiability also present themselves
in the absence of a written bill of rights. Even where thejudiciary is not constitutionally authorized to test expressions of majority will against a bill of rights, debates can
occur over justiciability focusing on the limits and possibilities of adjudication as a
vehicle for the resolution of disputes. See Fuller, supra note 9, at 354.
53 See E.W. Vierdag, The Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the International
Covenant on Economi4 Social and Cultural Rights, 9 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 69, 92-93
(1978) (having thejudiciary "declare that a government is lagging behind in creating
the conditions under which a social right could be enjoyed" would raise "utterly
political questions").
54 See infra notes 294-95 and accompanying text.
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One treaty, the ICCPR, 55 deals with so-called "civil and political
rights" that may be subjected to determinations of compliance by a
quasi-judicial body on the basis of individual complaints, and the
other, the ICESCR, 56 addresses so-called "economic, social and
cultural rights." Rights in the latter covenant were originally
designed to be scrutinized at a high level of abstraction from
individual situations, with evaluation of the collective performance
of states unaided by individual complaints of violation.
The
distinction between civil and political matters and economic and
social matters has enjoyed a resurgence in official United States
human rights diplomacy in the 1980s. The separation is reflected in
the adamant refusal of the United States to view social and
economic rights as human rights, let alone as justiciable, in
negotiations surrounding new human rights treaties and on votes on
57
United Nations resolutions.
The distinction between social and economic matters and civil
and political matters also finds expression in domestic debates over
the proper interpretation of entrenched constitutional guarantees
that, on their face, refer only to civil and political matters. In the
United States, for example, it is often said that social and economic
matters may well constitute potentially legitimate aspirations or
policy goals of government, but should not or cannot be characterized as constitutional entitlements. Many of the reasons offered in
support of this view do not speak to the broader question of
whether to entrench social rights in a new constitution; instead, they
refer more specifically to the interpretation of textually pre-existing
civil and political rights, and claim that it would be improper for the
judiciary to arrogate to itself a review function with respect to social
rights relying on a constitution that, on its face, only entrenches
58
civil and political rights.

55 See supra note 38.
56
See sura note 23.
57

See Philip Alston, U.S. Ratificationof the Covenanton Economic,Social and Cultural
Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 365, 365 (1990)
[hereinafter Alston, New Strategy] (reviewing the history of proposals for the United
States to ratify the ICESCR); Philip Alston, Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting

the New U.N. Committee on Economic Social and CulturalRights, 9 HUM. RTs. Q. 332,
333-34 (1987) [hereinafter Alston, Out of the Abyss] (discussing the challenges faced

by this Committee in developing an effective and acceptable supervisory process).
58 This vision is very much alive in judicial thinking. InJackson v.Joliet, 715 F.2d
1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984), for example, Judge
Posner stated that "the Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive
liberties." See also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S.
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In this context, the doctrine of separation of powers suggests
that the judiciary simply interpret and apply the law, including the
constitution, and not take on an overtly legislative function.
However, some of the reasons advocating a limited judicial role in
the interpretation of civil and political rights in an existing
constitution are relevant to the question of whether to entrench
social rights in a new constitution. Such reasons transcend their
particular interpretive context and challenge in general the
justiciability of interests underlying social rights.
Judges work more or less explicitly with constellations of
considerations to determine whether, and how far, they should act
and, whether, and how far they can act. More specifically, arguments against the inclusion of social rights in a written bill of rights
correspond to two dimensions of justiciability:
the legitimacy
dimension and the institutional competence dimension.5 9
For

189, 194 (1989) (holding that the State of Wisconsin is under no affirmative
constitutional duty to protect a child from a brutally abusive father); Bandes, supra
note 6, at 2317; MichaelJ. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects ofSlaughter-House: A Critique
of a Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VANDERBILT L. REV. 409, 411 (1990);
Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of ConstitutionalSpace: What Lawyers Can Learn
From Modern Physics, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1, 39 (1989).
For arguments in favor of expanding equal protection doctrine to include social
and economic matters, see Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional
Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659, 664 (while equal protection can protect welfare
entitlements, it is an "inappropriate task" for courts to rule on the adequacy or level
of provision of a social right); see also Olga Popov, Towards a Theory of Underclass
Review, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1095, 1098 (1991) (proposing that laws creating or
perpetuating an underclass should be subject to strict scrutiny); Laurence H. Tribe,
Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to
Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1065-66 (1977) (suggesting that
"despite its difficulties, a doctrine will ultimately emerge that recognizes under the
fifth and fourteenth amendments constitutional rights to decent levels of affirmative

governmental protection in meeting the basic human needs of physical survival and
security, health and housing, employment and education").
For criticism of Michelman's thesis, see Susan F. Appleton, ProfssorMichelman's
Questfor a ConstitutionalWelfare Right, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 715, 722-24; Robert H.
Bork, The Impossibility of FindingWelfare Rights in the Constitution,1979 WASH. U. L.Q.
695,695 (stating that a welfare rights theory would require "political decisionmaking
by the judiciary"); see also Antonio C. Pereira-Menault, Against Positive Rights, 22
VALPARAso L. REV. 359,360 (1988) (arguing that positive rights belong more to the
realm of the state than to the realm of the constitution); cf. Sunstein, supra note 12,
at 206-07 (expressing ambivalence about "social reform through the judiciary" for
"pra natic reasons").
5' This terminology appears in Martha Jackman, The Protection of Welfare Rights
Under the Charter,20 OTrAWA L. REv. 257,330-37 (1988) (discussing the institutional
legitimacy and competence of the judiciary); see also THOMAS A. CROMWELL, Locus
STANDI: A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF STANDING IN CANADA 6 (1986) (distinguishing legitimacy from adequacy when deciding whether to use the courts); GALLIGAN,
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analytical convenience, the legitimacy dimension refers to the
nature, or character, of social rights and asks whether it would be
legitimate to confer constitutional status on social rights in light of
their subject matter. The institutional competence dimension of
justiciability looks more to the nature, or character, of the judiciary,
and addresses whether the judiciary possesses the
institutional
60
capacity and competence to adjudicate social rights.
The legitimacy dimension ofjusticiability can be further refined
by reference to a distinction between "conservative" and "progressive" visions of social justice. 6 1 A conservative vision of social
justice views the constitutionalization of social rights as illegitimate
because such rights entail the redistribution of wealth and state
intervention in market economies. 62 According to this view, a
constitution ought to guard against state intervention and subject
state initiatives that seek to institutionalize the values underpinning
social rights to constitutional scrutiny. 63 The kind of rights that
supranote 45, at 241-51 (distinguishing between policy reasons and whether a matter
is analytically suited for resolution by adjudicative procedures); MINOW, supra note
14, at 356-62 (discussing legitimacy and competence); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTnONAL LAW 67 (2d ed. 1988) (justiciability relates to concerns aboutjudicial

competence and separation of powers); Jamie Cassels,JudicialActivism and Public
InterestLitigation in India: Attempting the Impossible?, 37 AM.J. COMp. L. 495, 509-17
(1989) (examining questions of legitimacy and adequacy in the judicial function);
Gerald Gunther, Some Reflections on theJudicialRole: Distinctions,Roots and Prospects,
1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 817, 818 (linking legitimacy to the question of which rights are
recognized and protected and competence to the question of remedies); Ghislain
Otis, La Charteet la modification des programsgouvernementaux: l'exemplede l'injonction
structurelle en droit ambricain, 36 MCGILL L.J. 1349, 1357-60 (1991) (discussing the
judicial role in terms of legitimacy and efficacy); Craig Scott, The Interdependenceand
Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards a PartialFusion of the International
Covenants on Human Rights, 27 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 769, 839-40 (1989) (dividing
justiciability into the value, or normative, component and the expertise, or empirical,
component).
o Cf. Jackman, supra note 59, at 331-32 ("The content of social rights generates
concerns at the level of institutional competence; the character of social rights at the
level of institutional legitimacy.").
61 For a similar approach, see TUSHNET, supra note 51, at 1-17; Patrick Macklem,
ConstitutionalIdeologies, 20 OTFAWA L. REV. 117, 120 (1988); Milton C. Regan, Jr.,
Community andJustice in Constitutional Theoy, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 1073, 1074; West,
supra
note 5, at 717.
6
2 See RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 307-12 (1985); 1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND
LIBERTY 112-15 (1975).
See generally West, supra note 5, at 672 (describing
conservative constitutional thought concerning the legitimacy of market outcomes and
existing distributions of wealth).
63 For a recent economic analysis specifically directed to the issue of'positive social
rights, see Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitu-
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ought to be constitutionalized are those that create and protect a
zone of individual freedom from state intervention, not rights which
place positive obligations on the state.'
A progressive vision of social justice, on the other hand, does
not take issue with the legitimacy of the values underpinning social
rights, but may well have concerns about the legitimacy of empowering the judiciary to overrule the popular will as expressed through
legislative activity. 65 This may simply be a particular version of the
general argument from majoritarian democracy which opposes not
simply the constitutional entrenchment of social rights but the
entrenchment of any rights at all. Proponents of this view prefer to
see battles won through majoritarian politics 6 6 and energy devoted

tional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1185 (1990). While arguing for aggressive
indirect protection of social rights interests through the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, she nonetheless argues that while constitutional rights must operate in a
market economy to remove state-imposed barriers, they do not require the removal
of "background" economic impediments which "necessarily" exist in a market
economy. See id. at 1219.
6 For ajudicial articulation of this view, see Coppagev. Kansas, where it was held
that:
[i]ncluded in the right of personal liberty and the right of private propertypartaking of the nature of each-is the right to make contracts for the
acquisition of property. Chief among such contracts is that of personal
employment, by which labor and other services are exchanged for money
or other forms of property. If this right be struck down or arbitrarily
interfered with, there is substantial impairment of liberty in the longestablished constitutional sense.
236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915); see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (noting
that, absent genuine health concerns, "the freedom of master and employ6 to
contract with each other ... cannot be prohibited or interfered with").
For classic defenses of this ideological perspective, see MILTON FRIEDMAN,
CAPrrALIsM AND FREEDOM 34-36 (1962); HAYEK, supra note 62, at 55-56; FRIEDRICH
A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 119-21 (1960). For recent academic calls
for the return to versions of the Lochner era in the United States, see EPSTEIN, supra
note 62, at 7-18; BERNARD H. SEIGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
324 (1980) (arguing that government should bear the burden of persuading the
judiciary that legislation that interferes with property rights serves important
governmental objectives, that the means are substantially related to those objectives,
and6 that
less drastic means could not be used to achieve a similar result).
5
See, e.g., Penuell M. Maduna, JudicialReview and Protection of Human Rights
Under a New ConstitutionalOrderin South Africa, 21 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 73, 7681 (1989) (voicing similar concerns in the South African context). See generally
TUsHNET, supra note 51, at 70 (discussing thejurisprudence of democracy); Anthony
Chase, The Left on Rights: An Introduction, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1541, 1541 (1984)
(discussing the relationship between rights on the one hand and capitalism and
socialism on the other).
6 See, e.g., MICHAEL MANDEL, THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND THE LEGALIZATION
OF POLITICS IN CANADA 41-48 (1989) (discussing arguments minimizing the
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to reform of that process as well as to the attainment of substantive
outcomes through that process. Thus, for the "progressive", it is
not the "social" content, but the "constitutionalized" content of the
subject-matter in question that speaks against justiciability.
Buttressing this view are somewhat different democratic concerns
about the lack of an appropriately representative judiciary. Judges
are traditionally almost exclusively male, white and wealthy, and
their decisionmaking perspective is bound to be heavily structured
by their background.
On this view, there would be little, if
anything, different about social rights from other kinds of constitutional rights that would prevent courts from interpreting those
rights regressively.
In contrast to its legitimacy dimension, the institutional
competence dimension of justiciability refers not to whether it is
legitimate for a particular matter to be made the subject of judicial
review, but rather to whether a particular matter is capable of being
made the subject of such review. Constitutional jurisprudence and
scholarship tend to adopt the view that the judiciary is an institution
that, by virtue of its nature, does not possess the capability to
adequately engage in the relatively complex task of delineating the
contours of social rights.68 Opponents argue for the exclusion of
unrepresentative nature ofjudicial review).
6 See supra note 6.
68 There is a strong body of U.S. scholarship arguing that the judiciary is illequipped for activism and its quasi-policymaking demands. See HOwARD I. KALODNER
& JAMES J. FISHMAN, THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1978); Kenneth C. Davis, Facts in
Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 931, 942 (1980); Fuller, supra note 9, at 393-405;
Horowitz, supra note 9, at 1307; Arthur S. Miller & Jerome A. Barron, The Supreme
Cour the Adversary System and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary
Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187, 1190-91 (1975); Fritz W. ScharpfJudicialReview and the
Political Question: A FunctionalAnalysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966) (discussing the
delicate balance judges must strike between making political rulings and deferring to
political bodies); see also Paul Weiler, The Charter at Work: Reflections on the
Constitutionalizingof Labour and Employment Law, 40 U. TORONTO L.J. 117 (1990)
(discussing institutional competence in the context of employment and constitutional
rights).
These arguments focus their criticism on the ability of the courts to find and
receive proper information upon which to base their decisions, and upon the ability
of the courts to monitor, administer, and implement the changes. However, as
Professor Komesar points out, such criticisms in many respects can also be leveled at
the legislative branch, particularly where the interests in question are those of
powerless, systemically under-represented groups. See Komesar, supra note 9, at 69799; see also REBELL & BLOCK, supra note 9, at xi (stating that in the area of educational
policymaking, the courts have a unique and important role).
While U.S. jurisprudence has on the whole found little textual support in the
Constitution for positive government obligations, judges have nonetheless taken an

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

24

[Vol. 141:1

constitutional review of social rights by the judiciary either because
of deficiencies in skill, education, training, or procedure, or because
the adjudication of social rights touches on the complex intersection
of issues involving institutional design, policy choice, and contested
political aspirations.
The resistance to constitutionally entrenched social rights on
grounds of institutional competence is often summarized in the view
that social rights are said to be positive rights and therefore
requiring governmental action; resource-intensive and therefore
expensive to protect; progressive and therefore requiring time to
realize; vague in terms of the obligations they mandate; and
involving complex, polycentric, and diffuse interests in collective
goods. Civil and political liberties, on the other hand, are said to
be, paradigmatically, negative rights that are: cost-free; immediately
satisfiable; precise in the obligations they generate; and comprehensible because they involve discrete clashes of identifiable individual
interests. These characterizations, even when acknowledged to be
overdrawn, 69 support the view that civil and political liberties both
are and ought to be seen as involving justiciable matters. 70 Many of
these characterizations do not go simply to concerns of institutional
competence of the judiciary but also to legitimacy concerns, with
conclusions relating to the lack of institutional competence circling
back to1 reinforce impressions that a judicial role would be illegitimate.

7

The two dimensions ofjusticiability interact with one another to
create a powerful web of resistance to the proposition that social
rights ought to be included in judicial constitutional discourse. On
the one hand, an alleged lack of institutional expertise reinforces
activist role at the remedial level in implementing constitutionally mandated
desegregation, prison reform, and electoral district reform. See Robert E. Easton, The

Dual Role of the StructuralInjunction, 99 YALE L.J. 1983, 1983-85 (1990); Robert A.
Schapiro, The Legislative Injunction: A Remedy for UnconstitutionalLegislative Action,
99 YALE L.J. 231, 231 (1990).

69 Even detractors of thejusticiability of social rights note that these distinctions
are overdrawn, leading some to contemplate drawing more fluid lines between
justiciable and non-justiciable rights. See, e.g., Vierdag, supra note 53, at 82 (arguing
that financial support on the part of the state, taken alone, is not the most
appropriate key to distinguishing between social and civil rights).
70 See Scott, supranote 59, at 833 (noting that alignment of "justiciable" with "civil
and political rights" and "non-justiciable" with "economic, social and cultural rights"
submerges and obscures a whole series of other distinctions).
71 See MINOW, supra note 14, at 356-62 (concluding that judicial competence
reinforces perceptions ofjudicial legitimacy).
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the view that it would be illegitimate for the courts to delve into
constitutional adjudication of social rights. For example, the
perceived imprecision or indeterminacy of social rights that could
be said to render courts incapable of making meaningful determinations also underscores for many that social rights adjudication
would involve the pervasive exercise ofjudicial choice and creativity.
Awareness of this fact then provokes misgivings about the legitimacy
of according such an authoritative decisionmaking role on such
open-ended issues to unelected persons who are drawn from a
narrow band of the social and ideological spectrum. On the other
hand, the ideologically driven sense of illegitimacy provides a
dispositional readiness for the judiciary and other legal actors to
marginalize arguments geared toward the expansion and transformation of the courts' capabilities to render the judiciary a more
appropriate institution for dealing with such matters. In particular,
to the' extent that capacity flows from experience, as we shall
contend it does, a sense of illegitimacy directly impairs competence
because it drains courts of the needed courage to take the first
steps. Furthermore, not only do the two dimensions interact in the
above-described way but also "[i]t is in practice difficult to keep
apart the two senses of non-justiciability, since the same situations
may involve elements of both, and the reasons given by the courts
72
for not intervening do not always make clear the distinction."
We are proceeding from the premise that a significant majority
of South Africans are not resistant to the establishment of a
constitutional democracy. A glance at the ANC's Working Draft,73
the Freedom Charter, 74 and the ANC's Constitutional Guidelines 75 makes it clear that the ANC, which in our understanding is
72 GALLIGAN, supra note 45, at 241 (discussing matters of national security).
73 See ANC Working Draft, supra note 1, at 116-18 (Art. 10).
74 Freedom Charter, June 26, 1955 (adopted at Kliptown, Transvaal), reprintedin
M. HAMALENGWA ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA:
BASIC DOCUMENTS AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 99 (1988). The Freedom Charter
provides for the recognition, inter alia, of economic, social and language rights. See
id. at 99-103.
75 The ANC's Constitutional Guidelines call for interalia guarantees of freedom
of association, expression, thought, worship, and the press, as well as rights to work,
education, and social security. See AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, CONSTITUTIONAL
GUIDELINES FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA, reprinted in 5 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS.
129, 131 (1989). For commentary, see SACHS, supra note 1, at 197; Corder & Davis,
supra note 7, at 639-44; Dugard, supra note 35, at 452 (unclear whether the
Guidelines indicate support for "the principle of judicial review as a necessary
component of a bill of rights"); see also Winston P. Nagan, Law and Post-Apartheid
South Africa, 12 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 399, 427-33 (1989) (discussing the Bill of Rights
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the organization commanding the greatest following among South
Africans, is not ideologically opposed to the values underpinning
rights to nutrition, housing, health, and education. By implication,
it can be concluded that many South Africans view such values to be
as critical to the realization of social justice as the values underpinning more traditional constitutional freedoms, such as a person's
right to speak freely, to be free from arbitrary detention, to be
presumed innocent, and to have their privacy respected. Given
these premises, the two hurdles South Africans face in deciding
whether to constitutionalize social rights in a new South African
constitution relate to progressive concerns about the legitimacy of
entrusting the judiciary with the task of overseeing democratic
initiatives enacted in the name of social justice, and concerns about
the institutional competence of the judiciary even if it were accepted
that entrenching such rights would be desirable in principle. The
next two Parts address these concerns in turn.
II. THE LEGITIMACY OF SOCIAL RIGHTS

The constitutionalization of social rights raises concerns of
legitimacy from at least two ideological perspectives. A conservative
vision of the proper content of a bill of rights would view the
inclusion of social rights as antithetical to the purpose of constitutional guarantees. Social rights generate positive obligations on the
state to ameliorate certain social and economic conditions in
society, whereas a conservative vision of social justice entails a
constitutional imagination that views such state intervention in
market ordering as illegitimate. Constitutional rights ought to
guard against, not compel, such state intervention. A progressive
vision of social justice, on the other hand, would not quarrel with
the interests underlying social rights. Ensuring equal access to
adequate nutrition, housing, health, and education to all is viewed
as a fundamental responsibility of the state from a progressive
perspective. Where a progressive vision of social justice may have
cause for concern, however, is with the constitutionalization of
those interests and the attendant transfer of power to an unelected
body to ensure that the state lives up to its social obligations. 76 It
generally, as well as limitations on free expression and economic matters);Johan D.

van der Vyver, Comments on the ConstitutionalGuidelinesof the African NationalCongress,
5 S. AFR.J. HUM. RTs. 133, 152 (1989) ("[The ANC's] Guidelines entail no more than
tentative suggestions as the basis for reflection and which [sic] have been put forward
to stimulate participation .... ").
76 It must be acknowledged that more radical critiques would call into question
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is this latter aspect of the legitimacy of social rights to which this
Part is addressed.
The dangers associated with judicial review and with engaging
in progressive struggles for social justice through the medium of
institutionalized legal rights discourse should not be underestimated. 77 However, these dangers exist not so much in relation to the
question of whether to constitutionalize the values underpinning
social rights but more broadly in relation to the more fundamental
question of the appropriateness of establishing a constitutional
democracy. If South Africa takes the historic step of moving toward
a modern constitutional democracy and entrenching certain
constitutional rights against the state, it will be confronted with the
tension between democracy and judicial review endemic to all
systems of government that vest power to pass judgment on laws in
the judiciary. If South Africa were to constitutionalize civil and
political rights but decide to treat social rights as non-justiciable,
however, it would create another kind of danger, namely that the
values underpinning social rights would be devalued as a result of
selective constitutionalization. A constitutional discourse could
emerge that implicitly views the values protected by social rights to
be illegitimate aspirations of modern governance.
More specifically, legal discourse about the nature of rights has
a constitutive effect on political discourse at large. 78 As expressed
the values reflected by social rights by noting that they can serve legitimating
functions for a cooptive, and non-transformative, liberal welfarism. See infra note
100 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the regressive potential of social
rights.
"7See Girardeau A. Spann, PurePolitics, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1971, 2000-03 (1990);
West, supra note 5, at 713-721. See generally Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights
Controversy: The EssentialContradictionsofNormative ConstitutionalScholarship,90 YALE
LJ. 1063 (1981) (reviewing the controversy surrounding the legitimacy ofjudicial
oversight of the legislature in a democracy and concluding that no objective criteria
to assess
theories ofjudicial review exist).
7
' As E.P. Thompson eloquently puts it in reflecting upon his scholarship:
I found that law did not keep politely to a "level" but was at evey bloody
level; it was imbricated within the mode of production and productive
relations themselves (as property-rights, definitions of agrarian practice) and
it was simultaneously present in the philosophy of Locke; it intruded
brusquely within alien categories, reappearingbewigged and gowned in the
guise of ideology; it danced a cotillion with religion, moralizing over the
theatre of Tyburn; it was an arm of politics and politics was one of its arms;
it was an academic discipline, subjected to the rigour of its own autonomous
logic; it contributed to the definition of the self-identity both of rulers and
of ruled; above all, it afforded an arena for class struggle, within which
alternative notions of law were fought out.
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by Pierre Bourdieu, "[t]he discovery of injustice as such depends
upon the feeling that one has rights." 79 If there is no forum that
is socially recognized as authoritative and in which individuals or
communities of people similarly disadvantaged can make submissions about the profound barriers they face in attempting to lead
meaningful lives, those difficulties will increasingly be deemed
irrelevant, and the underlying values that social rights are designed
to protect will diminish in meaning and importance. Constitutional
jurisprudence forms one of the most authoritative moral and
political discourses in contemporary society.80 The exclusion of
one set of interests from the list of protected rights is in effect a
vast legal judgment lending universality and authority to those
interests that enjoy constitutional protection. Denying an individual
or group the ability to make constitutional claims against the state
with respect to nutrition, housing, health, and education excludes
those interests from a process of reasoned interchange and
discussion, and forecloses a useful forum for the recognition and
redressing of injustices. The exclusion of social rights from such a
discourse is bound to affect the breadth and depth of such a
discourse, with the effect that the parameters of debate and
dialogue will be unnecessarily curtailed.
In many contemporary societies, access to rights discourse is a
necessary precondition to access to equality of attention. As
Patricia Williams points out, an appeal to legal rights implies "a
respect which places one within the referential range of self and
others, which elevates one's status from human body to social
being."8 1 Whereas the constitutionalization of social rights would
be a recognition of the fact that adequate nutrition, housing, health,
and education are critical components of social existence, the
exclusion of social rights from a South African constitution
necessarily would result in the suppression of certain societal

E.P. THOMPSON, THE POVERTY OF THEORY AND OTHER ESSAYS 96 (1978); see also
Robert Gordon, CriticalLegal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 109 (1984) (noting that
many Critical writers would claim that law "is omnipresent in the very marrow of
society-that lawmaking and law-interpreting institutions have been among the
primary sources of the pictures of order and disorder").
79 Bourdieu, supra note 6, at 833.
8o See Brest,supra note 10, at 178 ("In our society, most significant issues of public
morality are, or once were, or eventually will be, constitutional issues.").
81 Williams, Alchemical Notes, supra note 14, at 416; see also Minow, supra note 6,
at 1893-94 (stating that legal rights influence "the pattern of exdsting and future
relationships").
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voices.8 2 Perhaps the strongest reason for including a certain
number of economic and social rights is that by constitutionalizing
half of the human rights equation, South Africans would be
constitutionalizing only part of what it is to be a full person. A
constitution containing only civil and political rights projects an
image of truncated humanity. Symbolically, but still brutally, it
excludes those segments of society for whom autonomy means little
without the necessities of life.
Similar concerns exist not only at the level of constitutional
entrenchment, but also at the level of constitutional interpretation.
Courts do not simply discover the inherent meaning of a right that
has somehow been settled by the mere inclusion of words in a
constitutional document. Rather, they respond to arguments over
the kinds of worlds in which we want to live and the types of social
beings we want to become. Judges bring their systems of values to
bear on creating or determining concrete meanings of rights, until
better or simply different arguments are made in the future. Legal
meaning is not found or discovered through or by adjudication; it
is created in the context of particular fact situations that demand
legal resolution. The meaning of constitutional guarantees will
always be underdetermined by their wording; reference must always
be had, explicitly or implicitly, to more general normative under83
standings of the society in which a legal decision-maker operates.
But society-wide understandings are neither sufficiently shared nor
sufficiently specific to resolve concrete disputes concerning
fundamental values. As a result, recourse is invariably had to
narrower "interpretive communities" whose conventions and whose
members' reciprocal interactions serve as reference points for the
84
generation of interpretive meaning.
82

As MarthaJackman points out:

The observation also bears repeating that there is a significant difference
between the judicial intervention called for by the rich and by the poor:

"where the wealthy invariably want the courts to strike down actions the
other branches have taken, the disadvantaged often ask the courts to take
actions the other branches have decided not to take."
Jackman, supra note 59, at 336 (quoting HOROWITZ, supra note 9, at 11 n.41).
83 AsJames White writes, Illegal argument is an organized and systematic process

of conversation by which our words get and change their meaning." JAMES B. WHITE,
WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 268 (1984); see Bourdieu, supra note 6, at 805;
Cover, supra note 6, at 4; Minow, supra note 6, at 1866-67; James B. White, Law as
Rhetoric Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
684, 688-96 (1985).
84 See generally STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY
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In simple cases, "outside" references to communities of
understanding may appear to engender a straightforward "plain
meaning" of the law or an uncontroversial interpretation of the
facts. In more complex cases, however, particularly where vague
constitutional laws are applied to complicated fact situations, the
appropriate interpretive community is itself open to choice and
different judges will engage in sometimes wide-ranging appeals to
authoritative meaning-giving sources. However, whether the source
appealed to is the intent of the constitutional framers, 85 a philosophical theory of fundamental rights,86 an understanding of

conventional morality, 87 or a complex theory of the appropriate
scope of judicial review,88 no such source, "alone or in combina89
tion, can provide an acceptable basis for legal decisionmaking."
Through their involvement-and ethical engagement9°-in the
interpretive process, judges individually and courts as collectives
oF INTERPRETIVE CoMMUITIES 1 (1980) (addressing the question whether "the reader
or the text [is] the source of meaning").
85 See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BYJUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 111 (1977); Edwin Meese, The Attorney General's View ofthe
Supreme Court: Toward a jurisprudenceof OriginalIntention, 45 PUB. ADMIN. 701,70304 (1985). For commentary on "originalism," see generally Earl Maltz, Some New
Thoughts on an Old Problem-TheRole of the Intent of the Framersin ConstitutionalTheory,
63 B.U. L. REV. 811 (1983) (reexamining the role of intentionalism in constitutional
discourse); Pierre Schlag, FramersIntent: The illegitimate Uses of History, 8 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 283, 286 (1985) (presenting "aseries of attacks on intentionalism");
Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist
Interpretation beJustfied?, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1422 (1985) (discussing the problems
associated with originalist interpretation).
86 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 59, at 769-1435 (describing a theory of preferred
rights in constitutional adjudication); David A.J. Richards, The Individua4 the Family,
and the Constitution: AjurisprudentialPerspective,55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1980) ("We
must philosophically conceive and explicate the conflicting rights of children, parents,
and society as a matter of general moral and constitutional principle.").
87 See, e.g., Wojciech Sadurski, ConventionalMorality andJudicialStandards,73 VA.
L. REv. 339,341 (1987) (discussing the relationship between "the standards ofjudicial
lawmakingand the dominant, conventional morality"); Harry H. Wellington, Common
Law Rules and ConstitutionalDoubleStandards: SomeNotes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J.
221,224-25 (1973) (discussing the problems associated with collapsing the distinction
between principle and policy).
88 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 51, at 181 (arguing that judicial review "can appropriately concern itself only with questions of participation, and not with the
substantive merits of the political choice under attack"). But see Parker, supra note
51, at 223 (critiquing the constitutional theories ofJohn Hart Ely andJessie Choper).
89
Jerry Frug, Argument as Character,40 STAN. L. REV. 869, 870 (1988).
90 See Scott, supra note 59, at 835 n.221 ("Judicial interpretations of vaguely
worded rights need to be seen as practical ethical choices made in light of thejudges'
engagement with the social context.").
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help to make and remake, constitute and reconstitute legal relations
among individuals, groups and the state, 91 and participate in a
constitutional discourse that is critical to the self-definition of
society and its members.
However, it is because of this fluid and open-ended conception
of constitutional rights discourse that one must be aware of the
dangers of the process being controlled and the meaning coopted
92
against the interests of the more vulnerable members of society.
The constitutionalization of social rights is not only legitimate in
terms of the values and interests that these rights seek to protect
but also because their exclusion from a bill of civil and political
rights would give the judiciary freer rein to thwart the realization of
a progressive vision of social justice. Armed with a bill of rights that
only enshrines civil and political rights, courts would have more of
an opportunity to frustrate progressive reform initiatives in the
name of classical civil liberties.
At one level, this is simply the risk that any society takes in
deciding to establish a constitutional democracy with an entrenched
bill of rights. Having made the decision to advocate the establishment of a bill of rights, however, a new South Africa would have
accepted that the benefits of constitutional review outweigh the risk
of an unelectedjudiciary frustrating social reform. The adoption of
a bill of rights that included social as well as civil and political rights
would lessen the risk of a reactionary judiciary even further; by
contrast, the exclusion of social rights would increase the potential
forjudicial frustration of social reform efforts, especially if rights to
private property remain integral to the document. If social rights
were excluded, redistributive efforts could not be as easily
characterized as following from a constitutional mandate but,
conversely, could be characterized as interfering with classical civil
and political rights. With the inclusion of social rights, such
redistributive laws would be viewed as representing a balance
91 In the words of Martha Minow, constitutional rights are grounded "in the
processes of communication and meaning-making, rather than in abstract and
enduring foundations." Minow, supra note 6, at 1862; see also Macklem, supra note

6, at 131 (stating that judicial decisionmaking occurs in an "ever-shifting web" of
active interpretation of legal, political, social, and economic data).

92 See Spann, supra note 77, at 1982-83 (arguing that the United States Supreme
Court is ineffective in protecting the interests of disempowered minorities because
its system of tenure and appointments offers no checks on the tendency ofjudges to
subconsciously inform their decisions with majority values, and ensures that only
judges holding mainstream values are likely to be appointed).
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between conflicting interests which find constitutional expression.
Thus, the danger associated with the entrenchment of social rights,
as opposed to the danger of establishing a constitutional bill of
rights, is that the judiciary would fail to perform its assigned
function.
A recent example from Canada illustrates the issues discussed
above.

In Wilson v. Medical Services,9" regulations introduced by

the province of British Columbia limited and directed the influx of
new doctors into the province. Given a huge increase in government expenditures on physician services and an extraordinarily high
rate of doctors per capita, British Columbia refused to provide the
billing number required by new doctors to practice medicine unless
it could be shown that a doctor was filling "a demonstrated [medical
or community] need." 94 The province also issued billing numbers
that were restricted to certain regions suffering a shortage of
doctors. The regulations, challenged as an infringement of the right
to liberty as guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, were ruled unconstitutional by the British Columbia
Court of Appeal.95
Whether or not one agrees with the result reached in Wilson, it
is clear that the case would have taken on a different argumentative
form and structure had there been an explicit constitutional right
to health. 6 The province would have been able to assert that its
regulations were aimed at protecting or fulfilling the constitutional
right to health of British Columbia residents, especially those in
regions facing a shortage of doctors. Thejudiciary would have been
faced with an inquiry fundamentally different than that presented
by Wilson. The government would have been able to claim that its
regulations were not only permitted by the constitution but were in
fact mandated by the constitutional right to health and its concomitant duties on the state. The regulations would have been more
easily characterized as a balance between two conflicting constitutional rights.
93 53 D.L.R.4th 171 (B.C. Ct. App. 1988), leave to appeal denied, [1988] 2 S.C.R.
viii; see Weiler, supra note 68, at 119-21 (commentary on Wilson as part of a broader
genre of Charter cases).
94 Wilson, 53 D.L.R.4th at 178.
95 See id. at 195.
" Canada's health care system is statutory. See Canada Health Act, ch. 6, 1984
S.C. 273 (Can.). Whether § 7 of the Canadian Charter, which affirms the rights to
life, liberty and security of the person, protects aspects of Canada's health care system
from legislative erosion has yet to be determined.
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It is true that entrenching social rights does not ensure that such
state initiatives would pass constitutional muster. The risk that
initiatives of this sort would be declared unconstitutional stems
from vesting the power ofjudicial review in thejudiciary. Excluding
social rights from the catalogue of rights the judiciary is empowered
to protect, however, exacerbates this risk. Conversely, had the
regulations been challenged as being an insufficient response to the
regional shortage of doctors and thus an infringement of a
constitutionally guaranteed right to health, the major risk associated
with a reactionary judiciary would be that it would refuse to exercise
its authority and find ways to avoid the issue.
That this is the primary risk does not mean that it is the only
risk. All legal texts possess regressive potential. The entrenchment
of social rights provides a boost to certain kinds of arguments aimed
at combatting disadvantage, but entrenchment alone does not
ensure that such arguments will prevail. If rights are guaranteed to
all, 97 more advantaged members of society will attempt to have
constitutional guarantees interpreted consistently with their
interests and world views, aided by the financial resources that the
disadvantaged lack.98 For this reason, as we will suggest in Part
VI, it is desirable to set an interpretive framework for adjudication,
through a clause, or series of clauses, that establishes that social
rights must be approached from the perspective of remedying
disadvantage and not that of reinforcing advantage. 9 In the
97

See Bakan, supra note 6, at 310-15 (discussing the problems of underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness created by the conceptualization and phrasing of rights
in terms of universal beneficiaries).
" Joel Bakan has suggested examples in this vein, in the context of the current
debate in Canada over whether and how to constitutionalize a "social charter":
1. under a right to housing, rent control laws could be challenged on
the basis that they reduce housing stock,
2. under a right to employment, union security clauses could be
challenged, and
3. under a right to an adequate standard of living, taxation necessary
to fund social programs could be challenged.
GWEN BRODSKY, SOCIAL CHARTER IssuEs AFrER BEAUDOIN-DOBBIE 20 (1992).
" See id. at 24-34 (reprinting of the Draft Alternative Social Charter proposed by
a large number of equality-seeking and anti-poverty groups in Canada). In several
clauses, the various social rights proposed are tied into an underlying purpose,
namely "the fundamental value of alleviating and eliminating social and economic
disadvantage." Id. at 29 (§§ 2 & 5). The umbrella phrase introducing the various
rights refers to them as falling within the "human rights of all members of Canadian
society, and, in particular, members of its most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups."
Id. (§ 1). For good measure, a further cause suggests that "[g]overnments have
obligations to improve the conditions of life of children and youth and to take
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presence of such a clause or clauses, it becomes more likely that a

judiciary, recalcitrant about reform efforts, may avoid deciding the
issue on the basis of social rights claims, but would be discouraged
from reinforcing existing relations and structures of advantage.
Even then, however, a focus on disadvantage and vulnerability can
slip into protectionist paternalism that risks treating civil liberties
1°0
as trade-offs for the satisfaction of social need claimed as right.
positive measures to ameliorate the historical and social disadvantage of groups facing
discrimination." Id. (§ 4).
"0An excellent example of this can be found in thejurisprudenceconstante of the
Committee of Independent Experts under the European Social Charter with respect
to Article 8(1). See ESC, supra note 42, art. 8(1), Europ. T.S. No. 35 at 7 ("With a view

to ensuring the right of employed women to protection, the Contracting Parties
undertake... to provide either by paid leave, by adequate social security benefits or
by benefits from public funds for women to take leave before and after childbirth up
to a total of at least 12 weeks.").
This would seem on its face to be a progressive provision with no obvious
opening for regressive interpretation. Indeed, the Committee has called upon
governments to account for the inadequacy of the level of benefits provided on a
number of occasions. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CASE LAW ON THE EUROPEAN
SOCIAL CHARTER 87-88 (1982) (summarizing the results of the firstfour cycles ofstate
reporting to the Committee on the question of the adequacy of financial entitlement
under Article 8(1)). The Committee found that the United Kingdom's level of
benefits for income maintenance during leave were inadequate, recalling language
from an earlier report according to which "it is essential that the mother should not
suffer prejudice in the form of a substantial reduction in her income, implyinga kind
of sanction on maternity, for this would constitute a socially harmful instance of
discrimination." COMMrrrEE OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL
CHARTER, CONCLUSIONS XII-I, 1988-89, at 151 (1992) [hereinafter CIE, CONCLUSIONS
XII-1]; see also id. at 246-52 (Fabricius, dissenting) (setting out the case law to date on
the level of benefits and arguing that the Committee should not have found a
violation, but rather should have postponed its decision in light of the need to clarify
that case law).
The above appears to show not only a capability for a supervisory body to make
determinations with respect to positive social rights, but also suggests that these
interpretations ought to be generally welcome. However, the second prong of Article
8(1) deals with the length of the leave. It is on this point that the Committee seems
to venerate motherhood more than a woman's own determination of what is good for
her as a mother.
Beginning in 1984, the Committee opined that Article 8(1) had a dual purpose
when read in light of national law and other international treaties. The Committee
stated that the provisions "were designed both to grant working women increased
personal protection in the case of maternity and to reflect a general interest in public
health-i.e the health ofthe motherand child." COMMITTEE OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON
THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, CONCLUSIONS VIII, 1980-81, at 123 (1984)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter CIE, CONCLUSIONS VIII].
The Committee observed that the first purpose of Article 8(1) would point
towards the duty of employers and government in tandem to make 12 weeks
remunerated leave available if women choose to take the leave for part or all of that
period. But the second purpose cut against allowing women complete "freedom of
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Once again, it is desirable to enhance the progressive potential of
such rights through a second kind of clause that warns against
interpretations
that subordinate free agency to social benefits
10 1
provision.
In the absence of entrenched social rights, it would be unwise
to expect that values left unconstitutionalized (and thus not
reinforced by the continuing processes of constitutional interpretation) could hold their own in wider political discourse. They will be
marginalized and categorized as second-class arguments and those
most dependent on them for basic survival and for integration into
society at large will become or remain second-class citizens.
Institutionalized norms enshrine certain kinds of people as the
norm and tend to engender a consciousness that "treat[s] classifications of difference as inherent and natural while debasing those
defined as different." 10 2 When we make rights arguments, we are
competing for a place on the constitutional landscape. If arguments
concerning fundamental social values are not available because the
rights that are labels for those values are not entrenched, then other
values will come to dominate the broader public discourse. As
Barry Glassner has stated, "we view ourselves in part through the
eyes of others, and when others see us in a certain way, at least for
long enough or sufficiently powerfully, their views are sure to have
some effect." 10 3 A failure to entrench social rights is an act of
institutional normatization that amounts to a powerful viewing of
members of society by society itself. A constitutional vision that
includes only traditional civil liberties within its interpretive horizon
fails to recognize the realities of life for certain members of society
choice," and required a compromise interpretation of the 12-week rule. The result
was that the Committee found that Article 8(1) "obliged the woman concerned and the
employer to observe within this total period [of 12 weeks], a minimum period of
cessation of work, which had to be taken after birth and which it was reasonable to
fix at six weeks." Id. (emphasis added).
In subsequent reports, the Committee has found states in violation ofArticle 8(1)
even if the level of benefits is adequate and 12 or more weeks of leave is provided at
the request of the woman in question. See CIE, CONCLUSIONS XII-1, supra,at 150-52;
id. at 253-54 (Stegard, dissenting).
101 Ironically, with respect to the discussion supra note 100, the European Social
Charter has the makings of such a clause in another article. See ESC, supra note 42,
art. 13(2), Europ. T.S. No. 35 at 10 ("[T]he Contracting Parties undertake ... to
ensure that persons receiving such assistance shall not, for that reason, suffer from
a diminution of their political or social rights.").
102 MINOw, supra note 14, at 111.
103 Barry Glassner, Labeling Theory, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEvLANCE 71 (Michael
Rosenberg et al. eds., 1982).
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who cannot see themselves in the constitutional mirror. Instead,
they will see the constitutional construction and legitimation of a
legal self for whom social rights are either unimportant or taken for
granted. 1°4 With the passage of time and absent important
countervailing factors, this normative vision will help to confirm the
10 5
very reality that it posits.
Perhaps the most insidious quality of poverty is the tendency 1of
°6
advantaged members of society to become blind to its effects.
The modern state tends to paint the regulatory future with a broad
legislative brush. 10 7 To the extent that the state can and does
104 In one human rights context, that of international law, it has been argued that
rights correspond to various philosophical anthropologies or understandings of the
nature of humans. See JACK DONNELLY, THE CONCEPT OF HuMAN RIGHTS 27-44

(1985); see alsoJohannes Morsink, The Philosophy of the UniversalDeclaration,6 HUM.
RTS. Q. 309, 331-32 (1984) (discussing the structure of rights in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights); Scott, supra note 59, at 803-09 (discussing the
Universal Declaration's ideal of the free person).
105 Joel Handler has advanced similar ideas in his study ofstatutory welfare rights
in the United States. He notes that welfare programs "define values and confirm
status; they are expressive and symbolic. The distinction between the deserving and
undeserving poor is a moral issue that affirms the values of the dominant society by
stigmatizing the outcasts." Handler, supra note 14, at 926.
Handler makes the point clearly with respect to the bureaucratic decisions as to
whom should receive help and on what conditions: through the selection process
itself, "dominant values are affirmed by those included as well as by those excluded."
Id. at 929. The histories recounted by Handler of how the welfare system had close
to free rein to label and marginalize the poor according to moral and structural
dictates could have taken different paths if there had been constitutional norms
permitting persons to conceive of and argue about their situation in non-degrading
terms. See id. at 926-31.
Cordoning off the "private" from government action is regulation no less than
is active government intervention:
Within a sphere cordoned off as "private," removed from state intervention,
family members remain individuals who have or who lack rights to appeal
to the state.... It would be false to say that family relations were

unregulated: they were regulated by the government's grant of financial,
physical, and social privileges to the male head of household and refusal to
hear any objections of other family members.
MINOW, supra note 14, at 279.
106

See DANILO TORK, U.N. COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON
THE REALIZATION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS at 14, U.N. Doc. E/

CN.4/Sub.2/1989/19 (1989) ("The problem with poverty seems to be that people
other than the poor get used to it and that the very notion of poverty conveys a
certain idea of passivity.").
107 This requires attention to the extreme marginalization of the poor from both
legislative and regulatory law-makers. "[M]anagerial formalism [within a bureaucratic
welfare culture] requires low-income citizens to secure extremely explicit legislative
rules and remedies.... [But] the poor face unusual and large difficulties in
organizing and financing political action." Rand E. Rosenblatt, SocialDuties and the

19921

ROPES OF SAND

individualize rules through regulations and discretionary decisions,
it is essential that there be a responsive way to oversee the largely
unseen and unchecked activities of the executive bureaucracy, which
or thwarting broadly
has considerable autonomy in implementing
08
worded policies of the legislature.1
Thus, the legislative function requires mechanisms for monitoring how its policies actually affect people and correspond to its own
commitments. In the context of the European Social Charter, David
Harris has argued persuasively that there are limits to how well any
supervisory body, no matter how democratic, diligent, or expert, can
determine whether policies and laws respect human rights without
having the benefit of real-life detail that individual petitions
provide. 10 9 Such petitions have the effect of drawing attention to
personal circumstances that reveal failures and problems unknown
to or avoided by those responsible for drafting legislation. Such
failures and problems may not have been predicted by, or may
remain hidden from the view of, legislators or bureaucrats who live
a more privileged life than those claiming the benefit of constitutionally entrenched social rights, and who are not institutionally
required to listen to individual stories to produce a bridge between
life experiences. n 0 This applies whether the body is the government, a legislative committee, or an international monitoring body
such as the European Social Charter's Committee of Independent
Experts."'
Problem of Rights in the American Welfare State, in THE POLITICS OF LAw 90, 102 (David
Kairys
10 8 ed., 2d ed. 1990).
SeegenerallyJerryFrug, Administrative Democracy,40 U. TORONTO L.J. 559,56373 (1990) (arguing that democratic procedures should be incorporated into governmental bureaucracy); Handler, supra note 14, at 943 (stating that "[t]he bureaucracy
of welfare plays an active role in shaping the operational characteristics of welfare

policy").
109 See DAvID HARRIS, THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 217-19

(1984).

110 It is worth noting Frank Michelman's view that judges actually "enjoy a
situationaladvantageover the people at large in listening for voices from the margins."
Frank I. Michelman, Law'sRepublic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493,1537 (1988) (emphasis added).
This suggests another way in which institutional competence and legitimacy interact.
At least potentially, courts or court-like bodies are institutionally well-placed to listen
for stories of suffering, to act to remedy the situations according to their specific
requirements, and to prompt a broader social dialogue about the implications of
these stories for politics and policy. For discussion and appraisal of other writings
which emphasize the importance of perspective for the methodology ofjudging, see
MargaretJ. Radin, The Pragmatistand the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699, 1719-26
(1990).
I To date, the Committee of Independent Experts measures states' fulfillment
of obligations under the Charter solely on the basis of the states' periodic reports to
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Court cases in conjunction with media publicity generated by a
free press keep the plight and pain of marginalized members of the
community on the political agenda.11 2 A court provides a forum
for relating debates over fundamental values to individual concrete
cases. It is an opportunity to have personal narratives heard and
rights put in living context in a way that is virtually impossible for
modern legislatures. In general terms, rights litigation is important
for its demonstrative effect on society at large by the way in which
it engenders awareness over how broader societal ideals are being
played out in the context of real lives.
Arguably, social rights can be treated as equally important as
civil and political rights and still have their constitutional protection
and promotion left exclusively to state legislatures. 1 13 One could
point to other constitutions, such as that of India, that follow the
bifurcated approach to justiciability of the International Covenants
by placing classical rights and liberties in a section of the constitution that is expressly justiciable while placing social rights in a
section that is expressly non-justiciable and meant only to indicate
unenforceable constitutional duties of the government. 114 Dethe Committee. It does not have the benefit of individual petitions that could shed
light on the actual operation of the laws and policies being evaluated. See ESC, supra
note 42, arts. 21-24, Europ. T.S. No. 35 at 14-15.
112 Patricia Williams describes the sense of empowerment that rights bring to
those whose concerns have otherwise traditionally been ignored. "It is the magic
wand of visibility and invisibility, of inclusion and exclusion, of power and no-power.
The concept of rights, both positive and negative, is the marker of our citizenship,
our participatoriness, our relation to others." Williams, Alchemical Notes, supra note
14, at 431.
On the importance of individualized petition procedures to participatory
democracy see Anita Hodgkiss, Note, Petitioning and the Empowerment Theoy of
Practice, 96 YALE L.J. 569, 584 (1987).
11
3 See Didcott, supra note 35, at 59 (stating the inclusion of social rights "belongs
[in] a political programme ... not a bill of rights").
114 In India, the classical rights and liberties are expressed in the Fundamental
Rights section of its constitution, while social rights are expressed in the Directive
Principles of State Policy section. See infra text accompanying notes 395-97. Ireland
and Spain have similar bifurcated constitutions. Compare IR. CONST. arts. 40-44
(setting out fundamental,justiciable rights) with id. art. 45 (setting out nonjusticiable
social rights); compare CONSTrrUCI6N chap. II, arts. 14-29 (Spain) (outlining the
justiciable basic rights and liberties) with id. chap. III (outlining nonjusticiable social
and economic guidelines that the state must observe). The correspondence between
directive principles of state policy and social rights is not total; all of these
constitutions have concessions within the justiciable fundamental rights sections to
social rights including those with positive obligations attaching. See de Villiers, supra

note 4, at 31, 34; Brian Walsh, Existence andMeaningofFundamentalRights in Ireland,
1 HuM. RTs. L.J. 171, 173-81 (1980); infra note 385 and accompanying text.
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spite the best of intentions, this approach serves to marginalize the
centrality of social rights, the values they seek to vindicate, and,
most significantly, the persons whose chance to be human and
whose place in society is most dependent on these rights.
One reason for this is that just discussed, namely that an
individualized petition or complaints procedure offers a kind of
scrutiny and protection that the pure political process and
policymaking cannot. In the words of Philip Alston, "a complaints
procedure brings concrete and tangible issues into relief" and makes
"real problems confronting individuals and groups come alive."1 15
Although we do not agree with the dated philosophical view that
something can only be a human right ifjudicially enforceable, one
must acknowledge that judicial review has practical importance for
the enforcement of constitutional rights, and thereby confers
legitimacy on the values and interests that social rights seek to
protect.
A second reason, directly related to the first and also discussed
earlier, 116 is that rendering social rights justiciable will provide
greater weight to their underlying values in policymaking and
political discourse generally. If social rights are phrased merely as
directive principles of state policy or as state responsibilities or
obligations, a political discourse may emerge that avoids notions of
individual need and entitlement and instead remains at the level of
generalized policy considerations. 117 Such generalized attention
115 Philip Alston, No Right to Complain About Being Poor The Needfor an Optional
Protocol to the UN Covenant, in THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION IN A
CHANGING WORLD: FIFTY YEARS SINCE THE FOUR FREEDOMS ADDRESS (ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF TORKEL OPSAHL) 79, 91-92 (Asbjorn Eide &Jan Helgensen eds., 1991).
116 See supra text accompanying notes 78-84, 102-05.
1 17
We should not be understood as claiming that there is anythinginherent about
this tendency; the chances of marginalization almost certainly varies from society to
society, and era to era. Indeed, it is likely that the chance of marginalization of values
is contingent upon an array of factors, including the extent to which popular
understandings link judicial protection with "real" rights; the relative degree of
activism of thejudiciary in interpreting and enforcing those constitutional rights that
are within its province; the role and status of the judiciary in the democratic culture
of a particular society; the ideological disposition of the mainstream of thejudiciary;
the force of tradition and consensus supporting those values that do not have
constitutional protection; and the relative influence of market forces. The evaluation
of these kinds of factors in the context of South Africa is one which we are not well
placed to undertake. Given the widespread and deeply-felt aspirations in South Africa
for a constitutional democracy that involves judicial protection of human rights,
however, there will be an inexorable tendency for the values underlying justiciable
rights to be enhanced and those not made justiciable to be viewed as being less
fundamental and unworthy of equal protection.
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risks treating individuals as abstract, passive units of policy and not
as active agents suffering hardship with legitimate claims of
constitutional right. If expressly phrased as rights, even if nonjusticiable, individual circumstances would command greater
attention in politics and policymaking as long as political institu-

tions are structured or simply function in such a way that takes
constitutional commitments seriously.
However, in a world
increasingly committed to judicial protection of human rights,
excluding social rights from the ambit of justiciability will tend to
The marginalizing tendency of selective constitutionalization has been evident in
a number of different contexts. One example is India, which will be discussed in
considerable detail in Part IV, infra. In the Indian context, one assessment has been
made that "[t]he non-justiciability of the directive principles has led to a situation
where their unenforceability has been overemphasized to such an extent that the
political and electoral checks originally envisaged have not fully met the promise."
K.P. KRISHNA SHETrY, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC JUSTICE IN THE
INDIAN CONSTITUTION 76 (1969), quoted in de Villiers, supra note 4, at 38 n.62. Dc
Villiers adds by way of comment: "Due to a more activist approach of the Supreme
Court lately, this criticism by Shetty has at least partially been addressed." Id.
Another example is the European Social Charter, which has enjoyed a very low
profile compared to the European Convention on Human Rights, although the two
are meant to comprise two halves of a whole. Personal interviews conducted by one
of the authors with several officials within the Council of Europe suggest that the
Charter's status and the importance of the values it deals with were detrimentally
affected by falling within the jurisdiction of the Council of Europe's Social Affairs
Directorate. It has only begun to be taken seriously since its transfer to the
jurisdiction of the Human Rights Directorate. Even so, the "social partners"
(employers' and employees' organizations) have made it clear that they will not invest
time in a process in which they have no serious role and, in particular, in which there
is no petition procedure similar to that under the European Convention on Human
Rights. See Interview with Pierre-Henri Imbert, Assistant Director of Human Rights,
Council of Europe, in Strasbourg, Fr. (May 27, 1992); see also D.J. Harris, A Fresh
Impetusfor the EuropeanSocial Charter,41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 659, 659 (1992) (stating
that the factors preventing the Charter from "realising its full potential" result from
a "lack of political will").
As to the relative status of the ICCPR and the ICESCR, it has been generally
acknowledged that the ICESCR has been the "poor cousin" of the pair by not having
the opportunity to receive complaints or call states to account in concrete cases. See
Alston, Out of the Abyss, supra note 57, at 341-42, 355-62; Scott, supra note 59, at 820-

21.
Finally, observers north of the Canada-U.S. border will be forgiven for
speculating that the constitutional rights discourse in the United States has both
helped create and reinforce a political culture that values the negative freedom of its
members in a manner entirely out of proportion to the marginalization of huge
sectors of the population. The values of "natural" freedom, individual responsibility
for one's successes and one's plight, and distrust of government are not independent
features ofAmerican political culture. Rather, we would contend, they are intimately
influenced by the historical and current constitutive effects of constitutional rights
discourse. See Gabel, supra note 13, at 1572-81.
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have a negative effect on those rights and ultimately on the people
that depend on them.
As noted in Part I, debates over the justiciability of social rights
occur against the backdrop of an express or implied separation of
powers, and often such separation is trumpeted as a reason unto
118
itself for not rendering social rights constitutionally justiciable.
To confer on the judiciary the power and responsibility of ensuring
that the legislative branch lives up to certain social standards is to
intrude on the exclusive realm of the legislature and thereby to
interfere with the separation of powers necessary to modern
democratic governance. To a certain extent the constitutionalization of social rights does upset traditional conceptions of a
separation of powers and the idea that each branch of the state
possesses a distinct function which should not be invaded by the
action of another branch. 119 Yet many question the ability to
delineate in the abstract the boundaries of the judicial and legislative spheres. 120 In place of an abstract theory of a separation of
powers between the judiciary and the legislature that seeks to
determine a priori the appropriate reach of each institution, the
constitutionalization of social rights entails to a certain extent a
context-specific approach to the delineation of the boundary of
judicial and legislative action.
In the words of Martha Minow, "[t]he legal regulation of
separation of powers requires a continuing process of mutual action
and interaction." 12 1 She adds that context, as opposed to a priori
definition, ought to be the means by which separation of powers
occurs:
The historical moment, the substantive issue at stake, the
responsiveness of other branches to that issue, and their abilities
to reassert their roles in the balance of power are more central
than a remote theory of the distinct functions of each branch ...
Evaluation of the legitimacy ofjudicial conduct depends largely on
the responsiveness of the other branches. Questions of the
separation of powers concern not so much whether one branch
has invaded the prerogatives of another as whether the branches
118 See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
119 See Shapiro, supra note 49, at 551-58.
120 See

e.g., MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE

PERSPECTIVE 150 (1989) ("I am very sceptical about the possibility of drawing an

abstract line to determine how far judicial review can legitimately go.").
121 MiNow, supra note 14, at 361.
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all remain able to participate in the process of mutually defining
122
their boundaries.
The inclusion of social rights in a South African constitution
would require rethinking the relationships that would otherwise
exist between the executive, legislature, and judiciary. Interpreting
constitutional guarantees as requiring positive governmental action,
and invoking the constitution to prod the state into better protecting the necessities of life for members of society, would involve
some blending of the judicial and legislative functions. The limits
of the judicial power in part would be determined by the responsiveness of the judicial, executive, and legislative branches to each
other's constitutional stances, and the spheres of each source of
governmental authority would be shaped and reshaped by contextspecific disputes.
Ideally, the relationship between the judiciary and the other two
branches of government would be cooperative as opposed to
antagonistic, interactive as opposed to separate. This is not to deny
that, in practice, the relationship will often be shaped by spirited,
even bitter, resistance to what one branch perceives as overly
intrusive incursions by another. Limits on the spheres of authority
of each would emerge from the relationships that they jointly
construct through the dialogic encounter, whether cooperative or
conflictual, engendered by a judicial role that explicitly blends the
12 3
legislative with the judicial.

122 Id. at 361-62; see also Kurland, supra note 50, at 605 (discussing how the
executive and legislative branches have shaped their roles through confrontation);
Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Contemporary DebateAbout Legislative-Executive Separation
of Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 430, 438-44 (1987) (discussing the contemporary
emphasis on the checks and balances conception of government).
123 Some argue that traditional separation ofpowers doctrine falsely assumes that
the judicial role can be characterized as a non-legislative function. Kurland, for
example, states that:
[T]o resort to the idea that there is a tripartite division of powers,
legislative, executive, and judicial, each term self-defining, is to deal with
phantasms. If we take the basic arguments usually asserted that it is for the
legislature to make the rules governing conduct, for the executive to enforce
those rules, and for the judiciary to apply those rules in the resolution of
justiciable contests, it soon becomes apparent that it is necessary to
government that sometimes the executive and sometimes the judiciary has
to create rules, that sometimes the legislature and sometimes thejudiciary
has to enforce rules, and sometimes the legislature and sometimes the
executive has to resolve controversies over the rules.
Kurland, supra note 50, at 603.
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III. SOCIAL RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE

Scholars have also argued that social rights should be treated as
nonjusticiable not only because of concerns about the legitimacy of
entrenching social rights in a constitution, including fears of
upsetting the separation of powers that ought to exist between the
various branches of government, but also because the courts are
perceived as institutionally incompetent institutions to entrust with
their delineation and enforcement. 124 One position is that social
rights are radically different than their classical civil and political
counterparts, and as a result, the judiciary is an institution that does
not possess the capability to engage properly in the relatively
complex task of delineating their scope and content. Arguments of
this type can and have been made without taking any position on
the legitimacy of entrenching social rights in constitutional form.
Instead, they tend to focus on the capacity or capability of the
judiciary to adjudicate matters involving the assertion of social
rights. In this Part, we review and criticize two types of arguments
that assert institutional incompetence on behalf of the judiciary in
relation to the adjudication of social rights.
The first type of argument is that courts are inappropriate
institutions for adjudicating social rights because social rights
impose positive obligations on the state which require government
to act rather than refrain from acting. The concern with the
supposed positive nature of social rights is not simply a legitimacy
concern that the courts will usurp the power of the legislature to
initiate social change through law and determine the terms on
which such initiation takes place. There is also a concern that their
perceived positive nature entails the expenditure of state resources
and that courts are ill-positioned to make the kind of complex fiscal
decisions necessary to create and implement the structures
necessary to realize social rights. 12 5 Moreover, states can only act
Arguments of this sort are canvassed in Brooks, supra note 35, at 33; Asbjorn
Eide, Realization of Social and Economic Rights: The Minimum Threshold Approach, 43
INT'L COMM'N JURISTS REV. 40 (1989); Dugard, supra note 35, at 461-63; Jackman,
supra note 59, at 330 (discussing the differences between classical and social rights
and the implications for the role of the judiciary); C. Michael MacMillan, SocialVersus
PoliticalRights, 19 CAN.J. POL. Sci. 283, 300 (1986) (placing the onus on the state to
protect the exercise of social rights); Pereira-Menault, supra note 58, at 377-82
(discussing the difficulties that courts face when enforcing positive rights).
125 For example, in rejecting the idea of including social and economic rights in
a new South African Bill of Rights, Justice Didcott of South Africa stated:
124
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incrementally if they wish to realize the values that underpin
positive social rights. Such rights cannot, it is thought, be delineated in terms of immediate obligations on states. Thus, the rubric
"positive" stands as an umbrella category for concerns about the
institutional inability of courts to make determinations that are
costly, are complex, and require time to achieve. By contrast,
classical rights are seen as negative rights requiring that a state
refrain from interfering with a pre-defined zone of individual
liberty. Courts are seen as able to more easily demarcate the limits
of negative liberty through drawing the boundaries of individual and
collective freedom when the message directed to governments
concerns the legitimate exercise of state power.
The second type of institutional competence argument raised
against the justiciability of social rights is that social rights suffer
from a high degree of imprecision. 126 The obligation of a state
to provide nutritious food to hungry people, for example, seems
hopelessly vague and indeterminate. Courts, it is said, would be
unable to translate such an abstract aspiration into enforceable
orders in specific cases. Civil and political rights, by contrast, are
thought to have a higher degree of precision. Critics espousing this
view see courts as useful institutions only with respect to the
delineation and enforcement of civil and political rights and
incompetent with respect to social rights.

A bill of rights is not a political manifesto, a political programme.

Primarily, it is a protective device. It is a shield, in other words, rather than
a sword. It can state, effectively and quite easily, what may not be done. It
cannot stipulate, with equal ease or effectiveness, what shall be done. The
reason is not only that the courts, its enforcers, lack the expertise and the
infrastructure to get into the business of legislation or administration. It is
also, and more tellingly, that they cannot raise the money.
Didcott,
supra note 35, at 58.
126 Asbjorn Eide, Director of the Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, comments

that:
A number of economic rights have been shown to be enforceable in the
context of domestic law provided only that their component parts are
formulated in a sufficiently precise and detailed manner.
The economic, social and cultural rights are broadly recognized, bu't the
corresponding obligations are not. They are largely formulated as broad
obligations of result rather than specific obligations of conduct. This has
its strengths and its weaknesses. Its strength is that it allows for flexibility,
making it possible for states to comply with their obligations in ways which
correspond to their particular situation. The weakness is that the obligations-and neglect of them-are very difficult to pinpoint.
Eide, supra note 124, at 41.
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Although the argument about imprecision is, in theory,
independent of whether or not the right is felt to be negative or
positive, this probably concedes too much, at least in respect of the
strongest critics of social rights, who have difficulty conceptualizing
social rights as being anything but positive. Thus, the imprecision
argument is often bound up in the overall claim that social rights
are positive. For instance, a lack of precision may be thought to
inhere in the very nature of social rights because violations of social
rights are not amenable to immediate rectification, unlike civil and
political rights that, it is thought, simply require the state to stop its
interference. The very clarity of the obligations is tied to immediacy, with immediacy in turn being associated with negative rights and
a remedy that takes the form of "no longer do what you have just
done." The obligation of immediate noninterference seems more
precise because the suspect act itself defines the zone of immediate
prohibition carved out by the right. Thus, courts do not have to
look into what the government should do, but need only use as their
reference point what government has clearly and observably already
done.
Even if critics were to accept that the clarity of an obligation of
noninterference adhering to a negative civil or political right only
results from a value-laden inquiry into the prior question of whether
the interference has in fact gone too far, the content or scope of
civil and political rights is viewed as more bounded and determinate
than those about social rights. The allegedly more specific quality
of civil and political rights often presupposes, implicitly or explicitly, a greater degree of social consensus about their worth and
content as compared to the supposedly more ideologically contentious social rights. Social rights are seen as more controversial and
therefore more indeterminate, thereby seriously complicating the
judicial task.
These two types of arguments are seen by many to provide
strong justification for excluding social rights from constitutional
discourse. Both types of arguments are seriously flawed.
A. Institutional Competence,Justiciabilityand the Negative
Rights-Positive Rights Distinction
The distinction between positive and negative rights has
powerful currency in arguments concerning the justiciability of
social rights. 127 Positive rights are typically imagined as requiring
1

27 The debate about negative and positive legal rights, conceived in terms of
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state intervention to correct for inequalities of wealth caused by

market freedom, whereas negative rights are imagined as checking
the growth of bureaucratic and governmental intervention into
cherished areas of individual freedom. 128 Proponents of limited
government thus view positive rights as antithetical to a free and
democratic society and argue that it is illegitimate for a constitution
to attempt to secure their realization. 129 This section does not
address the way in which the distinction between positive and
negative rights informs arguments concerning conservative visions
of social justice; as stated previously, the discussion assumes that
South Africans will not reject the constitutional entrenchment of
130
social rights on ideological grounds.
Parenthetically, however, invoking the distinction between
positive and negative rights in support of the view that social rights
are illegitimate instruments in a constitutional context involves a
serious oversimplification. At a conceptual level, any attempt to
determine whether something is a positive right, and therefore
requires state action, or a negative right, which requires state
inaction, rests upon one's initial vantage point. Without reference
to a normative, baseline understanding of the proper role of the
state and to a conception of human freedom, the distinction
between positive and negative rights is completely uninformative.13 1

In North America, judges have tended to take traditional

obligations of inaction and action, is related to, but not strictly aligned with,
competing conceptions of freedom. The classic articulation of the difference between
positive and negative freedom is found in ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in
FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 121-72 (1969). For two equally seminal critiques, see
C.B. MACPHERSON, Berlin's Division of Liberty, in DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ESSAYS IN
RETRIEVAL 95, 95-119 (1973); CHARLES TAYLOR, What's Wrong with Negative Liberty?,
in 2 PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 211, 211-29
(1985). For a positive account of freedom as "the capacity for autonomy," see Raz,
supra note 33, at 425.
128 SeeJackman, supra note 59, at 331.
'2' The distinction between positive and negative rights has been of considerable
practical significance in the United States. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (rejecting that state officials violated
the Constitution when they failed to protect a child from imminent danger, since the
government normally has no positive duties to protect citizens from private harm);
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (upholding a negative right to have an
abortion free of state interference, but rejecting the right to state-funded abortions,
even if necessary to save a woman's life).
isO See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
s See Daniel A. Farber, Playingthe Baseline: CivilRights, EnvironmentalLaw and
Statutoty Interpretation,91 COLUM. L. REv. 676, 678 (1991) (book review); Peter L.
Strauss, Review Essay: Sunstein, Statutes, and the Common Law--ReconcilingMarkets, the
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common law private entitlements as the essential components of a
largely unarticulated normative baseline.15 2 What goes unsaid in
the invocation of such a baseline is the fact that property and the
right to contract require extensive positive state action to be
effective legal institutions, and can in fact be seen as the state
structure upon which modern industrial society emerged. 5 5
As discussed in the introduction to this Part, the distinction
between positive and negative rights also informs arguments that
accept the legitimacy of legislative intervention to secure social
justice for disadvantaged groups but that take the position that
courts are not competent institutions to delineate the nature and
1 4
extent of government obligations that accompany social rights. 3
However, reliance on the distinction between positive and negative
rights to support arguments based on the institutional competence
of the judiciary to adjudicate social rights is equally suspect. The
negative-positive divide does not neatly distinguish sets of rights.
Moreover, the fact that a right can entail a positive obligation does
not mean that the judiciary is incapable of having something
constructive to say about the scope and remedial requirements of
that right. As a matter of practice, traditional civil and political
rights have been found to entail positive rights at both the constitutional and international levels, either because of the explicit
Communal Impulse, and the Mammoth State, 89 MICH. L. REV. 907, 909 (1991) (book
review); Sunstein, supra note 27, at 903, 918-19; see also David P. Currie, Positive and
Negative ConstitutionalRights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 864 (1986) (examining how
Judge Posner's view of the role of the state affects his view of positive and negative
rights); Anna T. Majewicz, Note, Baseline Analysis: BroadeningtheJudicialPerspective,
65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 495, 508 (1991) (stating that the baseline of analysis greatly
affects one's analysis of a problem); supra text accompanying note 83.
132 See e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901-02
(1992) ("[A]s it would be required to do if it sought to restrain [the plaintiff] in a
common law action for public nuisance, South Carolina must identify background
principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses [intended] .... ").
13 See Bandes, supra note 6, at 2325 (arguing that even in the case of negative
liberty, "[government's] actions... [are] based on value choices about whose freedom
it will protect and whose it will obstruct"); Jack M. Beermann &Joseph W. Singer,

Baseline Questions in Legal Reasoning: The Example of Property inJobs, 23 GA. L. REV.
911, 946 (1989); Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg
Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1297 (1982) (discussing the controversy
created by the "liberty of contract" at the turn of the century); Joseph W. Singer,
Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 467, 487 (1988) (book review); Sunstein, supra
note 27, at 889. See generally MACPHERSON, supra note 127, at 98 (describing the
philosophical tenets of negative liberty).
134 See e.g., Pereira-Menault, supra note 58, at 377-82 (noting the difficulty of
judicial enforcement of positive rights and the danger of politicization of such
enforcement).
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wording of the text or as a necessary implication of the right. The
judiciary has demonstrated that it is prepared and able to require
positive state action in the context of traditional civil and political
rights. Many examples could be given, but the following discussion
gives a flavor.
1. Due Process and Procedural Fairness
Unreasonable delays in the case of an accused person awaiting
trial have resulted in courts ordering that proceedings be stayed,
placing incentives on the state to increase the capacity of the
judicial system by building new courts and hiring extra judges and
staff. In R. v. Askov,1 3 5 for example, a delay of up to two years

between the date of committal for trial and the trial itself was held
to be in violation of an accused's right to be tried within a reason-

able time, as guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. Noting systemic problems in the judicial system under
challenge, the Supreme Court of Canada was conscious that its
decision would have fiscal implications for the administration of
justice:
This conclusion should not be taken as a direction to build an
expensive courthouse at a time of fiscal restraint. Rather, it is a
recognition that this situation is unacceptable and can no longer
be tolerated. Surely an imaginative solution could be found that
136
would rectify the problem.
Nevertheless, the court did go on to suggest several ways in which
costs could be minimized, such as adapting government buildings
or portable structures to serve as courthouses. Moreover, it stated
that if such temporary measures proved "unworkable," some other
137
solution would be required.

The European Court of Human Rights has drawn the link
between unreasonable delay and judicial services even more clearly
in several cases dealing with Article 6(1) of the European Conven-

tion, and has been willing to do so in the context of private law
proceedings.13 8 The court has distinguished between temporary
135 [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199, 1203-07, 1247 (Can.).
136 Id. at 1241.
137 Id. at 1243.

138 To some extent, the unreasonable delay cases about to be discussed, as well as
the civil legal aid case discussed later in this subsection, operate on the assumption
that one of the most basic functions of the state is to provide courts and access to
them in order to resolve disputes over what Article 6(1) refers to as "civil rights and
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backlogs13 9 and "organisationally in-built" backlogs. 140
In the leading case of Zimmermann v. Switzerland,141 the
applicants appealed an administrative decision related to airport air
and noise pollution to the Swiss Federal Court. Three and a half
years later their appeal was dismissed. Switzerland pleaded before
the European Court that the delay experienced by the applicants
was defensible because the Federal Court was experiencing an
excessive work load and had dealt with more urgent cases first. The
European Court found that creating priority categories would only
suffice as a provisional expedient in cases where the backlog is
temporary. A "temporary backlog of business does not involve
liability on the part of the Contracting States provided that they
take, with the requisite promptness, remedial action to deal with an
exceptional situation" 142 of temporary delay. It is only when the
backlog can be called temporary that states can raise a defense to
otherwise unreasonable delay, and, even then, the state has a
positive duty to take "remedial action" to ensure that the situation
remains only temporary. Nevertheless, states have a positive duty
to organize their legal system in a way that allows the judiciary to
meet their European Convention duties with respect to the
administration of justice. Thus, "if a state of affairs of this kind is
prolonged and becomes a matter of structural organisation, such
[provisional] methods are no longer sufficient and the State will not
be able to postpone further the adoption of effective measures." 143 As this passage implies, under the European Convention, states are subject to a duty to organize the provision of the
collective good of judicial services so as to facilitate expeditious
obligations." ECHR, supra note 41, art. 6(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228. Shoring up this
baseline assumption is the early landmark case of Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur.

Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1975). The narrow issue was whether censorship of a prisoner's
correspondence with his lawyer violated Article 6(1). The court found that even
though no proceedings were pending, the guarantees ofArticle 6(1) were not limited
to the procedural rights triggered only by existinglegal proceedings. It laid down the

much broader principle that Article 6(1), to be effective, presupposes a right to
submit a civil claim to ajudge. See id. at 17. Applying this principle could involve the
court in direct evaluation of the existence and sufficiency ofjudicial services. As will
be seen in the upcoming discussion, the unreasonable delay cases and the civil legal
aid cases involve elements ofjust such an evaluation.
139 See Zimmermann v. Switzerland, 66 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12-13 (1983).
140 Union Alimentaria Sanders S.A. v. Spain, 157 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16
(1989).
141 66 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12 (1983).
142 Zimmeirnann, 66 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12.
14S Id. at 12-13.
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handling of civil suits. Where delays are allowed to become
unreasonable and systemic, the state is under a potentially farranging duty to structurally reorganize its delivery of judicial
services.

144

The extension of rights of procedural fairness to persons and
subject matters in the administrative law area has increased the costs
of administrative tribunals enormously. In Goldberg v. Kelly, the
United States Supreme Court held that a certain degree of due
process is required before the termination of welfare benefits, even
if such procedure led to increased costs. 145 In the landmark
Canadian case of Re Singh,146 the Canadian Supreme Court
applied such rights to immigration hearings, holding that "[n]o
doubt considerable time and money can be saved by adopting
administrative procedures which ignore the principles of fundamental justice, but [that] such an argument misses the point of ...
constitutional entrenchment of the principles." 147 Similarly, the
European Court of Human Rights extended procedural protections
with respect to "civil rights" to statutory rights in the social welfare
context, with serious implications for the .administrative hearing
148
process in all of Europe.
Guarantees of a right to counsel, traditionally imagined as a
classical civil and political right, have resulted in court orders that
144

Such a broad obligation is implicit in many decisions of the European Court

of Human Rights. See, e.g., Martins Moreira v. Portugal, 143 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
21 (1988) (where an orthopedic exam was required in a car accident case, Portugal
was found in violation of Article 6(1) as a result of an inefficient medical services
system that delayed the scheduling of an exam and the trial); Guincho v. Portugal, 81
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17 (1984) (despite the difficulties caused by a recent
transition to democracy, a delay caused by the state's failure to act in the face of a
seemingly permanent increase in the volume of litigation breached Article 6(1));
Union Alimentaria Sanders S.A., 157 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (where the legal
backlog was a foreseeable result of increased migration to Catalonia and had become
entrenched, measures sufficient to meet temporary backlogs were both insufficient
and a violation of Article 6(1)). For a pre-Zimmerman case, see Buchholz v. Federal
Republic of Germany, 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1981) (considering a delaycausing increase in litigation due to an economic recession to be temporary).
1 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970) ("[T]he interest of the eligible recipient in uninterrupted receipt of public assistance, coupled with the State's interest that his payments
not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweigh the State's competing concern to
prevent any increase in its fiscal and administrative burdens.").
146 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.
147 Id. at 218-19.
148 See Deumeland v. Germany, 100 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1986); Feldebrugge v. The Netherlands, 99 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13-14 (1986); A.W. Bradley,
Social Security and the Right to a FairHearing. The StrasbourgPerspective, 1987 PuB. L.
3,4.
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entail state expenditures. The Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, which guarantees that accused persons "shall
enjoy the right... to have the assistance of counsel," 149 has been
held not only to prevent the state from interfering with the ability
of an accused to obtain counsel, but also to require the state to
provide indigent defendants with legal assistance.1 50 Under the
European Convention on Human Rights, and other international
instruments, the right to free legal aid in criminal cases is expressly
151
recognized for those who cannot afford it.
The European Court has made clear that this right is not to be
construed narrowly. 152 In one case, a lawyer was appointed to
represent the applicant on appeal to the Italian Court of Cassation.
Despite the lawyer's failure to act, the court allowed the appeal to
proceed. Italy argued that the initial appointment met its obligations and that, in such a straightforward case, the "interests of justice"153 did not require the appointment of counsel. In the face
of such lassitude, the European Court responded that
the Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are
theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective;
this is particularly so of the rights of the defence in view of the
149 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

I" See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1962) (holding that an

indigent defendant in a criminal trial has a fundamental right to counsel).
1 See ECHR, supra note 41, art. 6(3)(c), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228 ("Everyone charged
with a criminal offence [has the right to] legal assistance, to be given... free when
the interests ofjustice so require."); see also ICCPR, supra note 38, art.-14(3)(d), 999
U.N.T.S. at 177 (providing that in criminal proceedings "everyone shall be entitled
... to have legal assistance assigned to him... without payment... if he does not
have sufficient means to pay for it"); American Convention, supra note 44, art. 8(2)(e),
1144 U.N.T.S. at 147 ("Every person accused of a criminal offense has the right to be
...assisted by counsel provided by the State, paid or not .. ").
It is interesting to note that international instruments also expressly entrench a
positive right to "the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or
speak the language used in court." ECHR, supra note 41, art. 6(3)(e), 213 U.N.T.S.
at 228; see Oztfirk v. Federal Republic of Germany, 73 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1617
(1984) (holding that one charged with a criminal offense is entitled to the free
assistance of an interpreter); see also ICCPR, supra note 38, art. 14(3)(f), 999 U.N.T.S.
at 177 (providing for "the free assistance of an interpreter"); American Convention,
supra note 44, art. 8(2)(a), 1144 U.N.T.S. at 147 (guaranteeing "assist[ance] without
charge by a translator or interpreter").
152 See Artico v. Italy, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1980) (noting that a
restrictive interpretation of Article 6(3)(c) would lead to unreasonable results
incompatible with the purposes of the right and the Convention).
153 ECHR, supra note 41, art. 6(3)(c), 213 U.N.T.S. at 228.
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prominent place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair
154
trial, from which they derive.
The court went on to dismiss Italy's argument that actual prejudice
had to be shown by the applicant, "finding it sufficient to show that
a qualified lawyer could plausibly have been of assistance in the
circumstances."1 55 If Italy was in any doubt that noninterference
was insufficient for this Convention right, the court underlined that
" 156
"compliance with the Convention called for positive action.
Whereas the right to free legal assistance is expressly set forth
in the European Convention for criminal matters, no mention is
made of a similar right with respect to civil suits. This has not
prevented the European Court from ruling that such free legal
assistance can be read into Article 6(1) of the Convention on a
contextual basis. The court has held, for example, that where
matters are too complex to expect a person to represent herself or
himself, legal aid must be provided, even in a civil case.1 5 7 In
Airey, a woman of modest means could not obtain legal aid to cover
the high costs of an application to the Irish High Court for judicial
separation from a physically abusive husband and was thereby
unable to bring the action. 158 Although Irish law allowed Airey
to represent herself, thereby providing formal access to the courts,
such access would have been of little value to her because of, inter
alia, the complexity of the proceedings and of the substantive points
of law.1 59 The court noted that hindrance from exercising a right
in fact can breach the European Convention as much as any formal
legal impediment and emphasized that "fulfillment of a duty under
the Convention on occasion necessitates some positive action on the
160
part of the State."
It is important to note that Airey did not decide that Article 6(1)
implies a right to legal aid in all cases. Rather, the absence of legal
154Artico, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16.
155 Id. at 17-18.
'56 Id.at 18.
157 See Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15-16 (1979); see also Patrick
Thornberry, Poverty, Litigationand FundamentalRights-A EuropeanPerspective,29 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 250, 250-58 (1980) (commenting on Airey); infra text accompanying
notes 335-36 (discussing how the European Court related this case to the protection
of ri.hts that fall within social and economic subject matter).
1 In view of the context of wife abuse, it is worth noting that the Court also
found that this amounted to a breach of the ECHR Article 8 right to family life. See
Airey, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17.
159 Id. at 12-13.
1
60 Id.at 14.
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aid could trigger a violation of the right to effective access in which
case a state has a choice of means to render access effective. The
court suggested one means might be the simplification of procedure. 161 However, the thrust of the decision was that legal aid
would often be necessary where legal representation was required,
162
either by law or due to a case's complexity.
2. Life, Liberty, and Security of the Person
In the area of the right to life, security of the person, and the
right not to be detained, there is a significant body of international
precedent for holding states to a standard of due diligence to
prevent, investigate, and prosecute crimes against persons on a
state's territory.163 This duty has evolved in many international
tribunal and court decisions dealing with the area known as state
164
responsibility for the protection of aliens on a state's territory.
The basic component of the duty to prevent crime is the requirement to provide policing commensurate with a state's knowledge of
the circumstances. While the due diligence standard allows for
adjustments to be made according to the availability of state
resources, lack of resources is not an automatically dispositive
defense. On the contrary, the duty to protect is so important that
states are required to give a certain priority of resources to police
165
and related means of protection such as the court system.
161 See id. at 12-13. This does not mean that the Court, in a given case, would not
be competent to point to what is required to make access effective. In such a way,
a person might have a right to legal aid on a concrete set of facts.
162 It is interesting to note that Ireland responded to the individual remedy
provided by the Court by establishing a legal aid system, overseen by an independent
legal aid board. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES:
1959-1990, at 44 (1991). This response is of considerable significance as an
illustration of the remedial process, whereby a decision in an individual case dealing
with a positive right can be generalized into a scheme with the features of a collective
good, within which the contextual determinations of need and entitlement can be
made.
163
See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 518-32 (4th ed.
1990).
164 For an extended discussion of international law as it relates to injuries to the
persons and property of aliens on state territory, see id. at 518-52; see also Dinah
Shelton, Private Violence, Public Wrongs, and the Responsibility of States, 13 FORDHAM

INT'L L.J. 1, 3-26 (1989-90) (delineating the evolution in international law from simple
restraints on the exercise of state power to the more generalized obligation of
ensuring respect for human rights).
165 See BROWNLIE, supra note 163, at 452-55.
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Positive duties in the area of crime prevention, investigation,
and prosecution have now made their way into the international law
of human rights such that it can be said that there is a positive duty
on states in international law to protect not only aliens, but also
one's own nationals. A pathbreaking case in this area was handed
down two years ago by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
in a case against Honduras under the American Convention on
166
Human Rights involving the phenomenon of disappearances.
Basing itself in part on textual language, 167 and in part on the
general principles that have emerged from the law of state responsibility for the protection of aliens, 168 the court held that states'
duties under the Convention are not simply negative duties that
state agents abstain from violating rights. 169 Rather, states also
have extensive positive duties with respect to all human rights
guaranteed by the Convention, including those related to liberty,
humane treatment, and life at stake in the case at hand. 170 The
166 See Velsquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., OAS/ser.L./V./III 19, doc.
13 (1988), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 291.
167 Notably, the general obligation in the American Convention refers to the duty
of states "to respect ... and to ensure" all the rights set out in the rest of the
Convention. American Convention, supra note 44, art. 1(1), 1144 U.N.T.S. at 145
(emphasis added).
m68
The court in Veldsquez succinctly stated the applicable general principles that
place positive obligations on states:
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly
imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a private person
or because the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to
international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but
because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond
to it as required by the Convention.
Velisquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., OAS/ser.L./V./II1 19, doc. 13,1 172,
reprinted in 28 I.L.M. at 326.
169 The court linked the Article 1(1) duty "to respect" human rights to the
"concept of the restriction of the exercise of state power." Id. 1 165, reprintedin 28
I.L.M. at 324 (quoting The Word "Laws" in Article 30 of the American Convention
on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-6/86/ser. A/No. 6, [ 21 (May 6, 1986),
reprinted in 5 BUERGENTHAL & NORRIS, supra note 43, pt. 3, ch. 25, at 1).
170 The Court interpreted the Article 1(1) duty "to ensure" human rights to
generate extensive positive duties on the state to regulate private relations in society
that may violate the interests safeguarded by human rights:
This obligation implies the duty of the States Parties to organize the
governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which
public power is exercised, so that they are capable ofjuridically ensuring the
free and full enjoyment of human rights. As a consequence of this
obligation, the States must prevent, investigate and punish any violation of
the rights recognized by the Convention and, moreover, if possible attempt
to restore the right violated and provide compensation as warranted for
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court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to find that
Velasquez Rodriguez' disappearance "was carried out by agents who
acted under cover of public authority." 171 However, the court
went on to state explicitly that, even if the direct involvement of
Honduran state agents had not been proven, Honduras would still
have had no defense given its positive obligations and "the failure
of the State apparatus to act." 172 Thus, it would not have been
fatal to the victim's case that the death squads could not be linked
directly to the government: in either circumstance, Honduras was
in violation of the Convention for its failure to investigate the
173
disappearance.
Another example from international human rights law is
important as a statement of principle that positive duties of
prevention or protection relate to human rights generally, and are
not limited to situations of flagrant oppression such as those that
existed in Honduras. The case of Plattform "Arzte FurDas Leben" v.
Austria1 74 revolved around two incidents during the course of an
anti-abortion demonstration organized in Stadl-Paura by the
applicant organization at which demonstrators were pelted with eggs
and clumps of grass by pro-choice counter-demonstrators. One
incident occurred at the location where the traditional socialist
march normally took place every year; the Plattform had managed
to get its demonstration license first. The demonstration was
disrupted on both occasions by the counter-demonstrators despite
the presence at each event of a large contingent of police.
damages resulting from the violation.

The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human
rights violations and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious
investigation of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those
responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and ensure the victim
adequate compensation.
This duty to prevent includes all those means of a legal, political,
administrative and cultural nature that promote the safeguard of human
rights and ensure that any violations are considered and treated as illegal
acts ....
Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., OAS/ser.L./V./III 19, doc. 13,
11 166, 174, 175, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. at 324-25.
171 Id. 1 182, reprintedin 28 I.L.M. at 327. Based on the evidence and the use of
evidentiary presumptions, the court was able to conclude that Velasquez Rodriguez
had been kidnapped, tortured, and murdered by state agents.
172 See id. 1 182, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. at 327.
173 See id. 1 177-81, 188, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. at 326-27.
174 139 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988).
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The applicants initially alleged a violation of their rights to
publicly manifest their beliefs, 175 to freedom of expression and
opinion 176 and to freedom of assembly. 177 But the European
Court of Human Rights addressed the relatively narrow question of
whether the applicants had an "arguable case" on the merits, such
that their right to an effective remedy under Article 13 of the
Convention would have been denied by the absence of adequate
recourse in the Austrian legal system against the police for their
failure to protect them. The court cast the issue as one of freedom
of assembly and rejected Austria's contention that Article 11 only
creates negative duties:
[Although] [t]he Court does not have to develop a general theory
of the positive obligations which may flow from the Convention,
... effective freedom of peaceful assembly cannot.., be reduced
to a mere duty on the part of the State not to interfere: a purely
negative conception would not be compatible with the object and
purpose of Article 11. Like Article 8, Article 11 sometimes
requires positive measures to be taken, even in the sphere of
178
relations between individuals, if need be.
After analyzing the efforts made by the police, the court went on to
find that the police and authorities had in fact not failed to take
reasonable and appropriate measures. 179 In doing so, they made
clear that their scrutiny would not be so strict as to substitute their
opinion for that of the police, but would assess the failure to
prevent the clash in terms of "measures ... taken and not ...
18 0
results to be achieved."
A final example drawn from Germany is instructive. There, the
constitutional guarantee of a right to life has been interpreted to go
beyond requiring the State to investigate and prosecute crime, by
requiring the State to enact legislation making certain action
criminal. In the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, the
German Constitutional Court has interpreted the right to life
enshrined in the Basic Law to protect fetuses, and required the
State to make abortion a crime in certain circumstances. In the
Court's view, the Basic Law "forbids not only.., direct state attacks

175 See ECHR, supra note 41, art. 9(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
176 See id., art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
177 See id., art. 11, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232.
178 Plattform, 139 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12.
179 Id. at 13.
'80

Id. at 12.
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on the life developing itself but also requires the state ...

[to]

preserve it even against illegal attacks by others." 18 1 Regardless
of one's views on whether or not a right to life ought to extend to
the constitutional protection of a fetus, the German experience is
instructive in that it illustrates that there are no inherent barriers
related to competence preventing ajudiciary from requiring a state
to pass laws that conform to constitutional standards. 182 It also
illustrates that competence is as much about willingness to take an
interpretive step as it is about judicial capacity in the abstract.
3. The Rights to Privacy and Family Life
As has already been made clear from examples discussed above,
the European Court of Human Rights has explicitly stated that it
will not shy away from interpretations of rights that entail positive
duties on states. This willingness to forge a positive rights jurisprudence is perhaps most apparent in relation to "the right to respect
for ... private and family life."183 One area of concern relates
to the legal and social disabilities created by a child's "illegitimate"
status in a given domestic legal system. In the case of Marckx v.
Belgium, for example, the court held that Article 8's requirement of
respect for family life was violated by the absence of a domestic
legal regime that allowed a child born of an unmarried woman to be
considered that mother's child for all legal purposes without
recourse to special procedures by either mother or child after
birth.1 4 The court clearly adopted as its working baseline the
181 judgment

of

Feb.

25,

1975,

BVerfG,

39

Entscheidungen

des

Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1, translated in John D. Garby & Robert E.
Jones, West German Abortion Decisions: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9J. MARSHALLJ.
PRAC. & PRoc. 551, 641 (1976) (including prefatory and explanatory remarks). For
commentary, see Currie, supra note 131, at 867-72 (reviewing the German
Constitutional Court's reasoning behind its abortion stance); Donald P. Kommers,
Abortion and Constitution: United States and West Germany, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 255,
264-76 (1977) (examining the reasoning in support of the opposing doctrinal stances
of the German and American courts regarding abortion). The German Constitutional
Court has also held that the "right to life" requires state action to protect the
individual from "adverse physical or economic conditions," including the freedom to
broadcast and the right to choose a place of training. See Currie, supra note 131, at

870-71.

182 See supra text accompanying notes 83-101.
185 ECHR, supra note 41, art. 8(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 230 ("Everyone has the right

to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.").
184 See Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1979) ("As envisaged
by Article 8, respect for family life implies.., the existence in domestic law of legal
safeguards that render possible ... the child's integration in his family."); see also
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fact that states do enact laws dealing with family status and thus are
responsible for failing to create the proper legal relationship
between an illegitimate child and her or his mother:
[I]n addition to [the] primarily negative undertaking, there may be
positive obligations inherent in an effective "respect" for family
life.
This means, amongst other things, that when the State
determines in its domestic legal system the regime applicable to
certain family ties such as those between an unmarried mother and
her child, it must act in a manner calculated to allow those
concerned to lead a normal family life.... [R]espect for family life
implies in particular ... the existence in domestic law of legal
safeguards that render possible 18as5 from the moment of birth the
child's integration in his family.
Perhaps the most important part of the decision for present
purposes was the court's dictum concerning an illegitimate child's
inheritance rights. The court found that a law precluding an
illegitimate child from inheriting property from her or his unmar18
ried mother violates Article 14's nondiscrimination guarantee: 6
Matters of intestate succession-and of disposition-between near
relatives prove to be intimately connected with family life. Family
life does not include only social, moral or cultural relations, for
example in the sphere of children's education; it also comprises
interests of a material kind, as is shown by, amongst other things,
the obligations in respect of maintenance.., in the domestic legal
18
s
systems of the majority of the Contracting States ....
The court went on to find that Article 8 was not itself violated since
an entitlement to some share in relatives' estates was not "indispensable in the pursuit of a normal family life," 18 8 but nevertheless

Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25-26 (1986) (applying the Marckx

of Article 8).
interretation
85 Marckx, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15.
186 Article 14 is not a free-standing equality guarantee; discrimination must be
shown regarding a subject within the scope of another Convention right. Thus the
court must first determine whether a situation potentially could constitute a violation
of another right before moving on to Article 14. SeeJ.G. MERRIuS, THE DEvELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 152-57
(1988). With respect to the question of the mother's and daughter's basic legal status
addressed in Marckx, the court decided that the absence of appropriate legal
protection constituted a violation of Article 8 and also found discrimination on the
basis of illegitimacy, a violation of Article 14. See Marckx, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 18-20.
187 Id. at 23-24.
188 Id. at 24.
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found that underlying Article 8 interests were sufficiently engaged
to trigger the application of the Article 14 nondiscrimination
provision, which was then found to have been breached.1 9 Most
relevant for our purposes, however, is the acknowledgement by the
court that positive rights to material assistance, such as that
represented by maintenance laws, might be found in the future to
exist in Article 8, and at minimum would appear to play a threshold
role in triggering the application of Article 14.19°
Another case showing that positive rights can be "found" on a
contextual basis within the European Convention is the case of
X & Y. v. The Netherlands, in which the court held that there had
been a violation of the right to privacy because Dutch law failed to
provide for criminal prosecution of a person who had committed
sexual assault against a mentally handicapped girl; the law neither
allowed her to press charges on her own nor provided for any
guardian to do so on her behalf. 191 In addition to declaring a
breach of the Convention due to the absence of a criminal legal
sanction, the court ordered compensation to the victim as "just
192
satisfaction" under Article 50 of the European Convention.
The court did not go so far as to order the Netherlands to pass
amending legislation, 193 but it implicitly put the government on
notice that failure to do so would result in a finding of future
194
violations in similar circumstances.
The final example relates to a series of three recent cases
dealing with legal recognition of gender in the case of postoperative transsexuals. In two cases coming from the United
Kingdom, 19 5 applicants argued that British law did not go far
189 See id. at 24-27. For a very recent application of Marckx's finding of a violation
of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 regarding inheritance rights, see Vermeire
v. Belgium, 214 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991) at 9 (holding that the facts before it
were so close to Marckx that the results would apply equally to the succession at
issue); infra text accompanying notes 237-40.
190 See infra text accompanying notes 233-40.
191 See X & Y v. The Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11-14 (1985)
(finding a violation of the victim's Article 8 rights under the Convention).
192 Id. at 16.
193 In this international judicial context, it seems clear that the court could not

issue such an order, at least given the court's interpretation of Article 50 and "just
satisfaction" to date. See CHRISTINE D. GRAY, JUDIcIAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL

LAw 153-60 (1987).
194 The Netherlands, in fact, responded to the case by filling the gap in its
criminal code so as to authorize the legal representative of a mentally disabled person
to file a complaint. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 162, at 46.
195 See Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 7-8 (1990)
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enough in recognizing their true gender identity and that Britain
had an obligation to, inter alia, rectify their birth certificates to
reflect their true identity at birth to which their physiology now
corresponded due to surgical transformation. In Rees, the court
stated in general terms that states could be required to act: "[t]he
Court has already held on a number of occasions that, although the
essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against
arbitrary interference by the public authorities, there may in
addition be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for
private life .... 1 9 6
Due to the controversy surrounding the issue both in terms of
social mores and scientific understanding of transsexuality, and also
since "there would have to be detailed legislation" 197 to address
the degree of disclosure of the rectification to third parties, the
court held in both Rees and Cossey that "the positive obligations
arising from Article 8 cannot be held to extend that far." 198 In
each case, however, the court hinted strongly that its interpretation
would not remain static even though complex issues and positive
action would be involved. 199
A year and a half later, the court handed down a judgment
finding a violation of Article 8 in the case of similar claims to legal
and social recognition of a post-operative male-to-female transsexual. 200 The majority claimed to have distinguished Rees and Cossey,
and not, to have overruled them, on the basis of the fact that the
violation of privacy interests was more serious in France than in the
United Kingdom. 20 1 At least one dissenting judge felt the majority was being less than candid and that the judgment was open to the

(involvinga post-operative male-to-female transsexual); Rees v. United Kingdom, 106
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8-9 (1986) (involving a post-operative female-to-male
transsexual). In addition to rectification of the original birth certificate, Cossey also
sought recognition of a right to marry a male. See 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11-12.
T96 See Rees, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14; see also Cossey, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 14 (applying Rees and explaining that any differences between the cases were
not material).

197 Rees, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18.
198 Id.; see also Cossey, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15-16.
9 "The Convention has always to be interpreted and applied in the light of
current circumstances ....
The need for appropriate legal measures should
therefore be kept under review having regard particularly to scientific and societal
developments." Rees, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19; see also Cossey, 184 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 17 (reiterating the observations made in Rees).
200 See B. v. France, 232 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1992).
201 French law required the use of a "neutral" first name and preserved a greater
number of documents indicating one's unrectified gender. See id. at 22-24.
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interpretation that Rees and Cossey had been overruled. °2 No
longer able to prod parties to the treaty by hinting that they would
find a violation sometime in the future, the court pushed the
dialogue to another level by declining to offer its own view about
the way in which France would have to respond to the finding of a
breach.20 3 It is clear, however, that the extent to which a complex, positive right was involved was hardly
any less than had been
2°
cases.
Kingdom
United
the
in
case
the
4. Prisoners' Rights
Courts in the United States have long found there to be positive
obligations on authorities for the conditions in prisons and other
state institutions, such as those for the mentally insane. Courts have
ordered that prisons be built to relieve overcrowding and that
committees be established to carry out programs of institutional
reform laid down by the courts. 20 5 Prison officials have been
found to have engaged in cruel and unusual punishment, contrary
to the Eighth Amendment, after demonstrating "deliberate
indifference" to a prisoner's medical needs. 2° 6 The constitutional
202 See id. at 30 (Matscher, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's judgment
departed from the conclusions reached in Rees and Cossey).
03 See id. at 25 ('The respondent State has several means to choose from for
remedying this state of affairs. It is not the Court's function to indicate which is the
most appropriate." (citation omitted)). Of course, less than two years before, it had
not been the court's "appropriate function" to find a violation. One gets a strong
sense that the dialogue is not over.
On the notion of "putting the government to means," see Craig Scott, Social
Values Projected and Protected: A Brief Appraisalof the Federaland Ontario Government
Proposals,in CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARIES: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE 1991 FEDERAL
PROPOSALS 81, 90-91 (Douglas Brown et al. eds., 1992).
2o4 Indeed, the implications for government action in France might well be more
far-reaching if the views of the FrenchJudge Pettiti in dissent are taken into account:
There is another aspect of considerable importance. For states like
France whose civil status law is highly precise and compulsory, a consequence of rectification is that there is no obstacle to the marriage of a
transsexual with a person of the same sex as his original sex. There is also
the problem of adoption ....
The whole of the civil law and inheritance
law could be thrown into confusion.
B. v. France, 232 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35-36 (Pettiti, J., dissenting) (provisional
translation).
205
See generally Frug, supra note 9, at 718-30 (reviewing the nature and impact of
several court orders mandating massive changes in prisons,juvenile detention centers,
and facilities for the mentally ill).
206 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-05 (1976) (recognizing "the government's obligation to provide medical care for those who it is punishing by incar-
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right to access to courts has been interpreted as requiring prison
officials to furnish prisoners with the tools necessary to research
legal claims. 20 7 To name but a few positive initiatives, courts have
ordered an increase in custodial personnel, 0 8 the construction of
210
a prison hospital, 2 °9 and the provision of vocational training.
Arguably a common theme in these kinds of cases is an
unspoken acceptance of the provision of custodial institutions as a
legitimate baseline function of the state. 211 The right in question
is defined in less controversial terms, as an incremental entitlement
to an adequate prison regime that provides sufficient health care
and living space. Defining the right in this way masks the fact that
positive state action is required to maintain the baseline from which
the right seeks incremental improvement. A right to an adequate
prison regime presupposes a more basic obligation on the state to
provide prisons. While not being required to involve themselves in
the design or establishment of an entire custodial system, the courts
have been willing to engage in the complex and difficult task of
evaluating existing systems. Court orders in these kinds of custodial
cases amount to implicit or even explicit directives to improve the
situation, failing which the court may have no choice but to order
the release of the person from state custody or at least declare
continued detention unlawful.21 2
ceration"). Additionally, courts have found prison officials liable for assaults on
prisoners by third parties, since the prisoners have no way to protect themselves from
this private harm. See, e.g., Moore v. Winebrenner, 927 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.
1991) (holding that prison guards are liable for prisoner assault if they are
udeliberately indifferent" to the victim's safety); William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation,
PrisonConditionsAmounting to Crueland UnusualPunishment,51 A.L.R.3d 111, 156-59
(1978) (finding "little disagreement" among courts that an "aggravated denial of
protection" of prisoners may constitute cruel and unusual punishment); id. at 77-80
(Supp. 1991).
207 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817,828 (1977) (holding that prison authorities
must provide "adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in
the law").
208

See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 335 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (specifying

minimum custodial staffing levels for several state prisons), affd and remanded sub
nom., Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977).
209 See Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549, 550 (E.D. La. 1972).

See Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 423 F. Supp. 1250, 1269-71 (D.N.H. 1976). But see
Garza v. Miller, 688 F.2d 480, 485 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983)
210

(holding that "there is no constitutional mandate to provide educational, rehabilitative, or vocational programs, in the absence of conditions that rise to a violation of
the Eighth Amendment").
211 This can be conceptualized in terms of the rights to personal security of
members of society and the corresponding duty of the state to protect that personal
security. See supra text accompanying notes 163-82.
212 See Newman v. Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513, 1521 (11th Cir. 1984) (recognizing
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5. Equality Rights
Finally, mention must be made of equality rights. Where a
group of persons is being discriminated against with respect to
certain statutory benefits or goods, such as pensions or housing, a
violation of the right to equality is often expressed in negative
terms: the state must refrain from discriminatory action. In these
cases, however, the violation in question is a failure to provide equal
benefits and amounts to a breach of a positive obligation. Bedeviling questions of remedies exist in this area since the government
might respond to the finding by "equalizing down," i.e. lowering
2 13
benefits to match those of the persons discriminated against,
the ability of the courts to order the release of prisoners to end their unconstitutional
confinement); see also Bouamar v. Belgium, 129 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 9-11
(involving a series ofjudicial orders placing ajuvenile in a remand prison on nine
separate occasions). Bouamar claimed that he had been deprived of his liberty in
breach of Article 5(1) of the ECHR; the government argued that the placements in
a remand prison came within an "educational supervision" exception. See id. at 19-21.
Article 5(1) guarantees that:
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and
in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful orderfor the purpose of educational
supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before
the competent legal authority ....
ECHR, supra note 41, art. 5(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 226 (emphasis added).
Because this baseline state function was actually written into the human rights
document, the court first noted that the detentions were in conformity with the
Convention to the extent that they were lawful according to Belgian domestic law.
See Bouamar,129 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20-21. However, Article 5(1)jurisprudence
also requires that detentions not be arbitrary. The Bouamar placements were
arbitrary because they were not followed by educational supervision in an appropriate
setting. See id. at 22. Indeed, Belgium did not have any custodial institutions that
would count as fulfilling the "purpose of educational supervision." See id. at 22. By
finding Article 5(1) breached, the implicit result was that absent such positive
government action to make good on its baseline functions, Bouamar's detention was
in violation of his negative right to be free from state detention.
213 Great Britain has responded this way at least once after a finding by the
European Court of Human Rights. The court found United Kingdom immigration
rules that prevented women residents in Britain from having their husbands join
them, in situations in which the wives of male residents would be able to join them,
discriminatory. See Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 33-39
(1985). In response, rather than dropping the restriction on husbandsjoining wives,
the United Kingdom extended the restriction to wivesjoining husbands. See Andrew
Byrnes, Recent Cases: Abdulaziz et al. v. U.K., 60 AusTL. L.J. 182, 185 (1986); Rebecca
Cook, The InternationalRight to Nondiscriminationon the Basis of Sex: A Bibliography,
14 YALEJ. INT'L L. 161, 178-179 (1989).
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rather than "equalizing up," i.e. increasing the benefits of the
victims of discrimination. 214 In light of this fact, there are strong
arguments supporting the view that the judiciary ought to signal to
the legislature the direction that conforms to the underlying
purposes of constitutional norms.215 Equality rights, for all
practical purposes, involve positive duties in circumstances where
governments wish to respond in good faith or where the judiciary
extends the benefits in question to the class of persons discriminated against by virtue of the initial exclusion.
A recent case in Canada illustrates the above claims. At the first
level of appeal, in Schachter v. Canada,2 16 the Federal Court of
Appeal of Canada upheld a trial award extending the benefits of
underinclusive legislation to those unconstitutionally excluded. At
issue was the constitutionality of unemployment insurance legislation that provided adoptive parents but not natural parents with
unemployment benefits to care for a new child.2 17 The trial judge
held that the provision of benefits infringed the right not to be
discriminated against on the basis of parental status. As a remedy,
214 The constitutionality of this response depends on the extent to which equality
guarantees are interpreted as formal in nature or as honoring some commitment to
"substantive equality" dimensions. Equality norms can be said to be substantive if
benefits available in the private sphere are used as a reference point to effectively
interpret poverty itself as a prohibited ground of discrimination, or if existing social
benefits are taken as a baseline in determining whether a state has violated the
guarantee of equal benefit or protection of the law. In either kind of case, a kind of
ratchet effect is created. See Helena Orton, Section 15, Benefits Programs and Other

Benefits at Law: The Interpretationof Section 15 of the Chartersince Andrews, 19 MAN.

LJ. 2288, 298-302 (1990).

15 See Nitya Duclos & Kent Roach, ConstitutionalRemedies as "ConstitutionalHints':
A Comment on R. v. Schachter, 36 MCGILL LJ. 1 (1991); see also Evan H. Caminker,
A Norm-Based Remedial Model for Underinclusive Statutes, 95 YALE L.J. 1185, 1204
(1986) (arguing that a court can further help actualize constitutional norms by
recommending a preferable remedy).
216 [1990] 2 F.C. 129 (Ct. App.); see also Richard Gold, From Right to Remedy:
PuttingEquality to Work, 14 QUEEN'S LJ. 213,235-41 (1989) (discussing the choice of
remedy after a finding of discrimination in the provision of beneficial programs). But
see Bregman v. Attorney-General of Canada, 57 O.R.2d 409, 410-11 (Ct. App. 1986)
(Can.) (holding that the constitution gave no authorization to create a new class of
beneficiaries), leave to appealrefused, [1987] 1 S.C.R. vi; Re Phillips, 27 D.L.R.4th 156,
159 (N.S. 1986) (Can.) (same holding). For extensive commentary on Schachter, see
Duclos & Roach, supra note 215, at 29-34.
217 The Unemployment Insurance Act provided that one adoptive parent of either
sex could obtain benefits under the Act; biological parents had no equivalent
provisions, although expectant mothers were entitled to parental leave benefits.
Biological fathers, however, could qualify for parental leave benefits similar to
adoptive parents only if the mother had died or could not care for the child. See
Schachter,[1990] 2 F.C. at 135.

1992]

ROPES OF SAND

the judge ordered the extension of benefits to natural parents until
such time as Parliament chose to amend the legislation while still
respecting the need to provide an equal level of benefits as between
adoptive and biological parents. Citing a number of cases where
judicial orders in the name of constitutional guarantees resulted in
the appropriation of public funds, 21 8 the court of appeal endorsed the remedy and, in the process, advanced the bold proposition that the submission that the judiciary "must respect Parliament's constitutional authority over the public purse ... is not
2 19
supported by the jurisprudence."
On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada reversed the
court of appeal's disposition. 220 However, its judgment contains
dicta suggesting a constructive interbranch dialogue as a means by
which the judiciary can usefully engage the definition and enforcement of a positive rights. The court affirmed the power of the
judiciary in appropriate cases to extend the reach of an underinclusive statute to include a class of persons that the statute unconstitutionally excludes. After setting out criteria for deciding when to
read into a benefits conferring law instead of suspending an order
of invalidity, 221 the court decided that in this case reading in was
not appropriate, finding as well that suspensive invalidation was no
See Marchand v. Simcoe County Board of Education, 29 D.L.R.4th 596, 613-18
(Ont. High Ct. 1986) (holding that the right to French language educational facilities
requires public funds); R. v. Rowbotham, 25 O.A.C. 321, 365-71 (1988) (Can.)
(holding that accused has a constitutional right to be provided with counsel at the
expense of the state if he or she lacks the means to employ counsel).
218

219 SchaChter, [1990] 2 F.C. at 151.
2"2 See Canada v. Schachter, No. 21889, slip op. at 47 (Can. July 9, 1992)

("Without a mandate based on a clear legislative objective, it would be imprudent for
[this court] to take the course of reading the excluded group into the legislation.").
221 See id. at 44-45 (stating that cases of "benefit conferring schemes" will lend
themselves to remedies of reading down, reading in, or suspensive invalidation, that
is, striking down the law but suspending the operation of the judicial order until a
specified date so as to give the legislature time to visit the issue, rather than
immediate invalidation, as such schemes will rarely have an unconstitutional purpose).
In the United States, the Supreme Court has held that "extension, rather than
nullification, is the proper course" for remedying federal benefits statutes which
violate equal protection due to their underinclusiveness. Califano v. Westcott, 443
U.S. 76, 89 (1979); see also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring in result) (stating that extension rather than nullification is the better
choice in remedying some underinclusive statutes). But see Davis v. Michigan Dept.
of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 818 (1989) (refusing to cure an unconstitutional tax
scheme by broadening the class of those taxed); Moses Lake Homes v. Grant County,
365 U.S. 744, 752 (1961) (holding that courts must nullify an unconstitutional tax
because it is beyond the judicial power to extend a tax).
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longer appropriate because the legislation had in fact already been
222
changed (lowering the benefit period to ten from fifteen years).
Two of the criteria that the court set out were the relative
degree of imprecision involved and the relative government
expenditure that would be triggered in any "reading in" exercise,
each used as surrogate considerations for whether the legislature
can be interpreted to have intended the discriminatory exclusion. 223 The foregoing may suggest little in the way of support
for this Article's judicial competence thesis. However, the court's
view of its competence must be read in light of the fact that it was
not working with a constitutional text that explicitly mandated the
court to test its institutional capacities. Keeping in mind the
baseline provided by the existing Canadian Charter, it is significant
that the court saw precision and cost implications as matters of
degree, tied as much to background considerations of legitimacy as
to inherent limits on the judicial function:
It has also been pointed out that a wide variety of court orders
have had the effect of causing expenditures.... In determining
whether reading in is appropriate then, the question is not
whether courts can make decisions that impact on budgetary
policy, it is to what degree they can appropriately do so. A
remedy which entails an intrusion so substantial as to change the
nature of the legislative scheme in question is clearly inappropri224
ate.
The court made it clear that the statutory benefit in this case
was not also a constitutionally entrenched positive right.2 5 Other
2 See Schachter,No. 21889, slip op. at 48-49 (noting that Parliament's amendment
followed commencement of the litigation and differed from the change that "reading
in" would have imposed).
M On the facts of Schachter itself, the court did not invoke imprecision as a
concern, but did invoke budgetary implications as secondary support for a primary
conclusion that reading in would not be appropriate due to the lack of any "clear
legislative purpose" that would allow the court to reasonably find that the legislature
intended to include the excluded beneficiaries. See id. at 47-48. ("IT]he ensuing
financial shake-up could mean that other benefits to other disadvantaged groups
would have to be done away with to pay for the extension. Parliament and the
provincial legislatures are much better equipped to assess the whole picture in
formulating solutions such as these.").
4
Id. at 30 (citing Andr~e Lajoie, De l'interventionnismejudidairecomme apportti
l',mergence des droits sociaux, 36 McGILL L.J. 1338, 1344-45 (1991)).
Schachter, No. 21889, slip op. at 45-46. "The benefit with which we are
concerned here is a monetary benefit for parents ... not one which Parliament is
constitutionally obligated to provide to the included group or the excluded group."
Id. at 45.
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reasons given by the court suggest a preparedness to accept that an
equality guarantee's positive dimension may be actively embraced
and a willingness on occasion to fashion a "reading in" remedy.
More specifically, the court acknowledged that equality rights can
have positive rights dimensions: "[T]he equality right is a hybrid of
sorts since it is neither purely positive nor purely negative. In some
contexts it will be proper to characterize s.15 as providing positive
rights." 2 26 In so doing, the judgment suggests an approach that
would occasionally grant quasi, or at least conditional, constitutional
status to social benefits. The court stated that extending underinclusive statutes not only may serve statutory purposes but also may
be "sometimes required in order to respect the purposes of the
Charter."2 27 Giving the example of a law providing social benefits
to single mothers challenged by a man, the court argued that
striking down the legal provisions so as to nullify benefits would
amount to "'equality with a vengeance.'" 228 "While s.15 may not
absolutely require that benefits be available to single mothers, surely
it at least encourages such action to relieve the disadvantaged
229
position of persons in those circumstances."
Thus, Schachter suggests the beginning of a creative jurisprudence which would eschew either/or dispositions of issues and
would insert the courts into a dialogue with the executive and
legislature by making remedial determinations based on an
2 30 This
evaluation of the "deeper social purposes of the Charter."
would not be a world of either courts or legislatures, nor a world of
either constitutional norm or statutory norm. Rather, this would be
a world of interaction in which questions of disadvantage and
statutory social entitlement could be quasi-constitutionalized in a
way that fosters interbranch dialogue.
The legislature must
affirmatively depart from the judicial remedy of statutory extension
in the full knowledge that the court has made clear that underlying
values of the Charter encourage ratcheting up rather than ratcheting down.
Schachter suggests another level of preparedness to engage
positive constitutional rights. The court stated that constitutional
226

id.

2VId.at
228

18.
Id.at 19 (quoting a phrase of the Women's Legal Education Action Fund, an

intervenor organization). The court's working assumption, that such a law would be

discriminatory, is a controversial question in itself.
Id. (disapproving of Phillips which had previously been denied review).
230 Id. at 18.
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provision of benefits to single mothers "may" not be required,
although it proceeded to say that they are "at least" encouraged.
Given the fact that the court has appealed to "deeper social
purposes" of the Charter and found them to include remedying
disadvantage, in future cases the court can appeal to those same
purposes in interpreting substantive constitutional rights beyond
rights guaranteeing relative equality. Later in the judgment, for
example, the court in dicta referred to the right to life, liberty, and
23 1
security of the person as a hybrid positive and negative right:
Other rights [besides s.15] will be more in the nature of "negative"
rights, which merely restrict the government. However, even in
those cases, the rights may have certain positive aspects. For
instance, the right to life, liberty and security of the person is in
one sense a negative right, but the requirement that the government respect the "fundamental principles ofjustice" may provide
a basis for characterizing s.7 as a positive right in some circum232
stances.
Far from counting against the institutional competence thesis,
Schachtersuggests that institutional competence is first and foremost
subservient to and conditioned by a commitment to the fundamental values that underlie constitutional rights. 233
Courts create
their own competence. The courage to be creative depends on a
conviction that the values at stake are legitimate concerns for the
judiciary.
When the desirability of recognizing such values
231 See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights

and Freedoms), § 7 ("Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice.").
232 Canada v. Schachter, No. 21889, slip op. at 45 (Can.July 9, 1992).
2
33 The Canadian Supreme Court decided that corporations could not plead § 7.
See Irwin Toy v. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 1003-04. In doing so, however, the
court made clear that it was excluding claims by corporations with their attendant

commercial content, but not equating such "economic" claims with those claims likely
to be invoked by more disadvantaged groups. The court refrained from stating
whether, within § 7's "security of the person" provision, "economic rights fundamental to human life or survival are to be treated as though they are of the same ilk as
corporate-commercial economic rights." Id.
Lower courts have found that the rubric of "economic rights" embraces a
broad spectrum of interests, ranging from such rights, included in various
international covenants, as rights to social security, equal pay for equal
work, adequate food, clothing and shelter, to traditional property-contract
rights. To exclude all of these at this early moment in the history of Charter
interpretation seems to us to be precipitous.
Id. at 1003.
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nonetheless conflicts with perceived institutional inadequacies, the
judiciary need not absolve itself of the issue. Instead, it is free to
provide an interpretation and a remedy as best as it can do in the
circumstances, and hope to provoke a cooperative and constructive
dialogue with other organs of government and the citizenry at large.
Two cases from Belgium provide further insight into intea branch
dialogue in the equality rights context. In Marckx, after finding
discrimination in inheritance law, the European Court of Human
Rights stated that its "judgment [was] essentially declaratory and
leaves to the State the choice of means" and could not itself "annul
or repeal" the discriminatory legal provisions.2 3 4 In addition, the
court decided not to give the decision retroactive effect, thus
"dispens[ing] the Belgian State from re-opening legal acts or
2 5
situations that antedate the delivery of the present judgement."
In response to the judgment, Belgium took some eight years to
amend a number of legal provisions relating to affiliation and
inheritance. 23 6 In that new law, Belgium chose not to make the
new equality of inheritance rules retroactive to the time of the
European Court judgment and instead made them applicable only
from March 1987 onwards.
In 1981, Astrid Vermeire, an illegitimate child according to the
Belgian law that was found in Marckx to be in violation of Article 14
of the Convention, brought an action in Belgian courts to claim an
inheritance from her grandparents. 3 7 Although the grandmother
had died before the Marckx judgment was issued, the grandfather
had died afterward. With respect to the grandfather's estate, which
had gone to Vermeire's 'legitimate' brother and sister, both the
Belgian legislature and the Belgian courts adopted the view that the
old discriminatory law continued to apply. The following passage
from the Brussels Court of Appeal shows the negative-positive
distinction in majestic flight:
234 Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1979); see also supra notes
200-04 (discussing B. v. France,where the European Court of Human Rights also put
the government to means, with little or no guidance on what those measures should
be).2 3 5

Marckx, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25-26. The court gave as its reasons the
"principle of legal certainty" and the fact that many countries in Europe had regarded
treating "illegitimate" children worse than "legitimate" children as "permissible and

normal."
Id.
2

6 See EURoPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 162, at 44.
07 See Vermeire v. Belgium, 214 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991).
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[I]n so far as Article 8 entails negative obligations prohibiting
arbitrary interference by the State in the private or family life of
persons residing within its territory, it lays down a rule which is
sufficiently precise and comprehensive and is directly applicable
[in Belgian law by Belgian courts], but this is not the case in so far
as Article 8 imposes a positive obligation on the Belgian State to
create a legal status in conformity with the principles stated in the
said provision of the Convention; ... given that on this point the
Belgian State has various means to choose from for fulfilling this
obligation, the provision is no longer sufficiently precise and
comprehensive and must be interpreted as an obligation to act,
23 s
responsibility for which is on the legislature, not the judiciary.
The government pressed this argument before the European Court,
explaining that the legislature had taken so long to draft and pass
a new law because it preferred "an overall and systematic revision"
rather than "partial, fragmentary alterations." 239 Belgium thereby
played up the "choice of means" granted to it in Marckx and then,
with an interesting rhetorical twist, stated that it had "pondered
long" over the question of the date from which to give effect to the
new statute and, in the end, decided against retrospective effect out
of "concern for the legal certainty"-exactly the rationale the
European Court had used in order to avoid giving retrospective
effect to Marckx eight years before. The Belgian argument was
designed to persuade the court that putting the government to
means meant that the court must defer to the means chosen, and
could not later return to evaluate those means in light of the result
achieved, or not achieved. Any dialogue was to be brief and end
with the government's reply.
The court disagreed and substituted for the opinion of government its own view as to whether such positive action, in the form of
the thoroughgoing legislative revision occasioned by the judgment,
precluded an immediate obligation on the state to remedy discrimination:
An overall revision of the legislation, with the aim of carrying
out a thoroughgoing and consistent amendment of the whole of
the law on affiliation and inheritance on intestacy, was not
necessary at all as an essential preliminary to compliance with the
Convention as interpreted by the Court in the Marckx case.
238 Id. at 4. The Belgian Court of Cassation "concurred substantially with [these]
reasons." Id.
239 Id. at

9.
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The freedom of choice allowed to a State as to the means of
fulfilling its obligation under Article 53 cannot allow it to suspend
the application of the Convention while waiting for such a reform

to be completed ....

240

The European Court found, in essence, that the basic discrimination
regarding inheritance should have been treated with priority and
the law changed immediately. In the process, it not only showed
itself willing to assume the competence to draw lines as to what is
necessary and when, but also made known that it will continue the
conversation if the state is not listening.
Although many classical rights are often imagined in all but
exclusively negative terms, the above survey suggests that there is
nothing inherent in classical civil and political rights that limits
them to negative rights. It also suggests that rights imagined as
having significant positive dimensions need not involve the judiciary
in an illegitimate or even unfamiliar role. The enforcement of what
are traditionally imagined as negative rights often belies the image
and involves the imposition of positive obligations upon a state. 24 1
Courts have not shied away from the generation of positive duties
in the context of the adjudication of civil and political rights when
they are convinced that the fundamental values at stake demand
it. 242 To speak of civil and political rights as negative rights
against the state oversimplifies the nature of protection that they
provide. Courts and agencies charged with interpreting constitutional guarantees have demonstrated in the civil and political rights
context that they are quite capable of judging whether positive
duties on the state have been met. Competence in this regard is a
matter of will and experience. The same applies to judging whether
a state has lived up to its duties with respect to the positive
dimensions of social rights. As demonstrated by judicial experience
in the context of civil and political rights, the fact that rights involve
the imposition of positive duties on the state has not acted as a
243
barrier to judging and seeking to ensure compliance.
240 Id.
241 See Bandes, supra note 6, at 2278-85; Currie, supra note 131, at 886-87;
Gerhardt, supra note 58, at 438-40.
212 In enforcing the Equal Protection Clause of the Bill of Rights, federal judges
have had resort to judicially imposed taxation in the face of intransigent legislatures.
See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 35-36 (1990) (judges may order local governments to levy taxes in order to remedy constitutional violations).
24s The examples from international human rights law should not only be read
illustratively, but also in light of the situational disadvantages that characterize this
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B. Institutional Competence,Justiciability,and the Lack of
Precisionof Social Rights

The second type of argument often brought to bear against the
constitutionalization of social rights is that, unlike traditional
constitutional rights against the state, social rights often suffer from
a painful lack of precision with respect to the nature and extent of
obligations that attach to the state party. Moreover, social rights are
perceived as imprecise because the circumstances that constitute
violations of social rights cannot be rectified immediately. The key
to making obligations attendant upon the constitutionalization of
social rights clearer and more precise is to have experience with
actual, real-life situations that call upon courts to move from the
abstract to the concrete and develop the meaning and scope of
social rights with some degree of precision. 244 Just as it would be
a mistake to assume that in the 1800s courts in the United States
had extensive knowledge of what "equal protection" of the law
entailed, so too would it be a mistake to assume judicial precision
in relation to enforceable obligations that might flow from a right,
such as the right to education, too early in the constitutional history
of that right.245 The specific shape and contour of a right is the
result of years of repeated applications of practical reasoning to
facts at hand. The lack of precision associated with many social
rights should not be held up as ajustification for their nonentrenchment. On the contrary, nonentrenchment is to a very large extent
area of law, including judicial resources and factfinding capabilities that are much
more limited than those found in most domestic systems. In addition, the
overarching fact that international courts work within a unique set of normative
baselines results not only in democratic legislative sovereignty but also in state
sovereignty mediating all decisionmaking and creating certain pressures for restraint.
Finally, given the diversity of legal systems and cultural viewpoints represented on an
international bench, such as the European Court (whatever stock one puts in the idea
of a "united" Europe), there is constantly at work a "lowest common denominator"
dynamic in collective judicial decisionmaking at the international level.
244 Eide proposes an outline of a minimal-threshold approach to immediate
implementation of international social and economic rights that uses country-specific
indicators measuring nutrition, infant mortality, disease frequency, life expectancy,
income, and unemployment, as well as indicators relating to adequate food
consumption. See Eide, supra note 124, at 47.
245 "Municipal courts have been able to give effect in a wide range of situations
to concepts such as 'due process' or 'equal protection.' In many such cases the courts
have adopted the attitude that while they may be unable to define the term precisely,
'they know an abuse when they see it.'" Philip Alston, International Law and the
Human Right to Food, in THE RIGHT TO FOOD 9, 57 (Philip Alston & Katarina
Tomalevski eds., 1984).
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the reason for the lack of precision. Historical, ideological, and
philosophical exclusions of social rights from adjudicative experience have resulted in a failure to accumulate experience that would
render the imprecision of social rights less and less true as time
goes on.
Moreover, the fact that social rights suffer from a lack of
precision should not be overstated. Over the past decade, the
United Nations has invested considerable energy in developing the
idea of a multilayered obligations structure that may potentially be
generated for any right, whether it be a civil liberty or a social right.
Initial attention has been focused on the right to food. 46 Attention is now shifting to the realization of economic, social, and
cultural rights more generally. 247 The structure of obligations
being developed within the United Nations, following the ideas of
Henry Shue, 248 is threefold: the duty to respect; the duty to
protect; and the duty to fulfill. Each layer will be briefly addressed
to demonstrate that social rights suffer from less imprecision than
249
their critics claim.

2 46

See Asbjorn Eide, Report on the Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right, U.N.

ESCOR, Comm'n Hum. Rts., 39th Sess., Agenda Item 11, at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2 472/1987/23 (1987).
See TORK, supra note 106, at 5; Danilo Tfirk, ProgressReport on the Realization
of Socia4 Economic and CulturalRights, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n Hum. Rts., 42d Sess.,
Agenda Item 7, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/19 (1990). Although these
studies within the United Nations system are bringing increased precision and clarity
to social rights obligations, they have also been concerned to demonstrate that social
rights do not need to be judicially enforceable in order to be considered as rights.
The reports tend to leave discussion of implementation mechanisms aside and focus
instead on normative exposition. For a similar view, see G.J.H. van Hoof, The Legal
Natureof Economic Social and CulturalRights: A Rebuttal ofSome TraditionalViews, in
THE RIGHT TO FOOD, supra note 245, at 97; see also Symposium, The Implementation
of the International Covenant on Economic Social and CulturalRights, 9 HuM. RTs. Q.
121,123 (1987) (finding that human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible
and interdependent, and that equal attention and urgent considerations should be
given to the implementation, promotion, and protection of both civil and political
and economic, social, and cultural rights).
248 See SHUE, supra note 21, at 38-40.
249 Although this structure of obligations addresses claims of imprecision, the
structure is equally useful in debunking the claim that purely 'negative" rights exist.
All rights, whether commonly imagined as positive or negative, generate a range of
obligations, some of which are negative (duties to respect) and some of which are
positive (duties to protect and fulfill). See id. at 39-40.
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1. The Primary Obligation to Respect Social Rights
The primary obligation to respect social rights requires that
states refrain from infringing a social right directly, a duty traditionally associated with many classical rights such as the right to free
expression. For example, under a duty to respect the right to food,
a state would be prohibited from interfering with the normal means
of food procurement for members of vulnerable groups. Therefore,
a state should not take away the land of a subsistence farmer
without providing any replacement in kind or a stream of monetary
entitlement for lost food and productive capability. Similarly, the
right to housing would be violated if the government destroyed
homes or evicted squatters without providing alternative and
comparable housing.
The obligation to respect social rights bears some resemblance
to property rights, especially in the housing context, despite several
significant differences. The obligation is not dependent on an
extant characterization of "property" at law; prior formal ownership
by squatters, for example, is not a necessary precondition for
judicial protection. Also, the violation is a function of the economic
circumstances of the victim. A person who has one of two or more
homes expropriated, for instance, is not being denied the right to
housing. That person would only be able to appeal to a right to
property which may or may not be recognized by the constitution.
Similarly, a landowner who has a farm expropriated for redistribution cannot appeal to the right to food if he or she was not
dependent on that land for food and had sufficient means to
purchase food on the market.

2. The Secondary Obligation to Protect Social Rights
The secondary obligation to protect social rights corresponds to
many of the examples given earlier. The state is under a positive
250
duty to prevent a right from being infringed by private actors.
The United States Supreme Court has rejected the idea that states have any
general obligation to protect citizens from private harm. See DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1989). However, the Court has
recognized this positive obligation in limited settings, such as prisons and mental
hospitals:
The rationale for this [exception] is simple enough: when the State by the
affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it
renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide
for his basic human needs-e. g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and
250
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The failure of the South African government to provide sufficient
police resources or make a serious effort to prevent recent violence
throughout South Africa, for example, would be a violation of rights
to life and security of victims and potential victims. One commentator, G.J.H. van Hoof, gives another example which could have
widespread application in South Africa as well as around the world:
[T]he obligation to respect and protect the right to adequate
housing, as laid down in Article 11 of the [ICESCR], would in my
view be violated, if the government's policy, even in the least
developed countries, allowed the hovels of poor people to be torn
down and replaced by luxury housing which the original inhabitants could not afford and without providing them with access to
alterative housing on reasonable terms.2 51

3. The Tertiary Obligation to Fulfill Social Rights
The tertiary obligation to fulfill social rights is the level of
obligation traditionally thought to be the exclusive terrain of social
rights but, as the previous section indicated, it has many counterparts in the field of civil and political rights. The tertiary obligation
to fulfill social rights translates into state duties to provide food,
housing, health, and education (or a monetary entitlement sufficient
to secure access thereto) to those in society without the means to
2 52
provide for themselves.
reasonable safety-it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by
the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause.
Id. at 200; see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982) (holding that
involuntarily committed mental patients must constitutionally be entitled to safe
conditions of confinement); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (holding that
a state must provide medical treatment for those injured in prison); Moore v.
Winebrenner, 927 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that prison guards are
liable for an assault by one prisoner against another if the prison guards are
"deliberately indifferent" to the victim's safety), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 97 (1991).
251 Van Hoof, supra note 247, at 107; see infra text accompanying notes 409-14
(describing a case brought by Bombay's sidewalk dwellers that bears a striking
resemblance to Van Hoof's example).
252 Our conception of a social right does not mandate universal entitlement at the
level of the obligation to fulfill, according to which government would be obliged to
provide benefits to all free of charge. The government may decide that the best way
of protecting everyone's rights is to provide universal health care, for example.
However, that would be a choice of means that would not be mandated by the right.
Such a decision could also be made, of course, by society at large as a matter of
constitutional choice.
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The above structure of obligations that accompanies social rights
makes it clear that social rights can be understood with a greater
degree of specificity and precision than their critics are willing to
acknowledge. The implications of primary obligations to respect
social rights are relatively straightforward and precise. Imprecision
increases the more one moves toward tertiary obligations to fulfill
social rights. Yet this is also the case with civil rights, which can be
hopelessly imprecise in the context of determining what a state must
do to fulfill civil and political rights. In effect, when critics claim
that, unlike civil and political rights, social rights suffer from a lack
of precision and therefore ought to be imagined as nonjusticiable,
they are comparing apples and oranges. 253 That is, they are
comparing civil and political rights at the relatively precise first level
of obligations with social rights at the relatively imprecise third level
of obligations, with second level obligations playing an ambivalent
role in between. Critics of the justiciability of social rights often
claim a high degree of precision in relation to civil and political
rights by referring to the relatively specific primary obligations to
respect civil rights that accompany their entrenchment, and argue
that the relative lack of precision that accompanies tertiary
obligations to fulfill social rights ought to render social rights
nonjusticiable. The foregoing brief survey suggests that social rights
have relatively precise first and second level obligations, just as civil
and political rights have imprecise third level obligations. The

For those with the ability to obtain goods and services covered by social rights
(that is, education, health, food), the duties to respect and protect those rights (that
is, not directly or indirectly deprive, or permit others to deprive, them of the means
to independently obtain adequate education, health and food) are the state's duties.
Thus, the state could tax a person up to, but not past, the point at which they could
preserve their own basic social rights. If a universal system of education or health
care existed, then it is obviously easier for the court to determine that the rights to
respect and protection have been accorded; judicial inquiry would then be able to
focus on whether the system is in fact functioning universally and whether the level
of entitlement provided meets the constitutional standard of adequacy.
Under our conception, even if the state taxes a family to the point that it cannot
afford a private school, as long as there are state schools available to all, then the
right to education of the family members has not been violated. But see Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that a law which requires the
use of public schools violates the rights of property, contract, privacy and association).
For those without the means, the duties to respect and protect would be insufficient,
and the duty to fulfill would govern: the state would have to provide schools or the
means of access to private schools. As a result, the rights of all are universally met,
even if the duty incumbent on the state varies in relation to the social circumstances
of the persons in question.
253 For this claim, see Eide, supra note 246, at 24.
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imprecision that accompanies third level obligations to fulfill civil
and political rights is not imagined as a reason for their nonentrenchment, and adjudicative bodies have felt capable of rendering
third level obligations to fulfill civil and political rights more
precise. The relative lack of precision that accompanies third level
obligations to fulfill social rights equally should not, therefore, stand
as a reason for treating social rights as nonjusticiable. Moreover,
courts are very capable of overseeing obligations at the first two
levels of the duty to respect and the duty to protect.
Additionally, one must not attach too great a degree of
imprecision to the obligation to fulfill social rights. Nor should the
fact that social rights are directed to circumstances that cannot be
immediately rectified stand as a reason for their nonentrenchment.
Immediate action can be taken with respect to violations of social
rights even at the level of a duty to fulfill. A body of principles,
known as the Limburg Principles, 2M has been promulgated by a
group of the world's leading experts in the field of the legal
protection of social rights. The developing practice of the new
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights demonstrates
that there can be clear, near-absolute, core entitlements to the
provision of the basic subsistence needs of the most vulnerable in
all states party to the ICESCR. With respect to the most vulnerable,
the obligation to fulfill is immediate in nature and is not dependent
on scarcity of resources, except perhaps in the most impoverished
of countries where even total redistribution of wealth might not
meet everyone's needs. 255 In effect, a priority of attention is
mandated for people who would not be able to meet the most basic
of health, nutrition and housing needs without direct government
assistance. People who would die or suffer serious consequences for
their health if no assistance were immediately forthcoming fit in this
category. Courts are capable of determining the adequacy of
fulfillment at this most basic level, with the aid of evidence and the
256
testimony of experts.
254 The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic Social and CulturalRights, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 43d Sess.,
Annex, Agenda Items 8 & 18, at 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17 (1987) [hereinafter
Limburg Principles].
25 In such a case, evolving duties on the international community as a whole
would complement the state's duties. See General Comment No. 1, in Report on the
Third Session, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 3d
Sess., Supp. No. 4, Annex 3, at 87, 89, U.N. Doc. E/1989/22, E/C.12/1989/5 (1989)
[hereinafter Report on the Third Session].
2 For the sources of expertise on the most basic and core level of social rights
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A recent example from Canada demonstrates judicial capabilities

as to a core level of entitlement. The Federal Court Trial Division
held that a provincial government cannot deduct from current

welfare checks amounts that it may have overpaid in error on
previous welfare checks. Such deductions would bring the recipient
below the level at which he or she could hope to make ends

meet. 257 The person who brought the case was a chronic epileptic who relied wholly on the welfare system for support. Although

the court was relying on a liberal interpretation of an administrative
agreement between the federal and provincial governments, the

judges were unanimous in their belief that they were both justified
in and capable of determining a level of benefits below which a
decrease in benefits could not be tolerated.
Beyond this area of core entitlement, which helps to lend
precision to social rights phrased in terms of obligations of result,
social rights at the third level of entitlement can also be rendered

more precise by interpreting them as including an affirmative duty
to progressively achieve the full realization of rights that go beyond
basic subsistence. 258 Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, for example,
provides:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps,
individually and through international assistance and co-operation,
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization
of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative mea2 59
sures.

within development economics scholarship and international organizations, as well
as one economistes attempt to draw together international law and economics in the
area of social rights, see Frances Stewart, Basic Needs Strategies,Human Rights, and the
Right to Development, 11 HuM. RTs. Q. 347, 373 (1989).
257 See Finlay v. Minister of Fin. of Can., 57 D.L.R.4th 211,227,229 (Fed. Ct. Trial
Div. 1989), affd, [1990] 2 F.C. 790 (Fed. Ct. App.). The Court of Appeal held that
the province was not providing basic necessities adding that "it must not be blithely
supposed that it is necessarily in the public interest to bleed those who live at or
below the poverty line as a purgative for social health, even if the bleeding is only at
a little at a time and only once a month." [1990] 2 F.C. at 816.
258 For a discussion of the division in international legal doctrine between
obligations of conduct and obligations of result, a distinction that revolves around the
degree of precision with which a duty is framed and the corresponding degree of
freedom a state enjoys to achieve a certain result, see Eide, supra note 246, at 24.
259 ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 2(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.
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Circumstances that contribute to the violation of a social right take
time to rectify and can be addressed by a duty to adopt measures
that partially, but progressively, go to ameliorating the situation.
Although ultimately constructing schools or inoculating all children,
for example, may take time, a duty to begin the process of reaching
that ultimate goal itself is immediate. 26° While decision-makers
should leave a margin of discretion to the government in choosing
261
the means and schedule for ultimately fulfilling these rights,
their fulfillment cannot be postponed indefinitely. Much in the
same way that courts and tribunals are able in international matters
to determine whether a state is acting with due diligence,2 62 there
will be obvious cases where a court could say that the obligation to
take steps has not been satisfied.263
260 See Limburg Principles,supra note 254, 1 16, at 2 ("All state parties have an
obligation to begin immediately to take steps towards full realization of the rights
contained in the Covenant."). The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights recently stated that steps must be "deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly
as possible towards meeting the obligations recognized in the Covenant." General
Comment No. 3, in Report on the Fifth Session, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 3, Annex 3, at 83, U.N. Doc. E/1991/
23, E/C.12/1990/8 (1990) [hereinafter Report on the Fifth Session].
261 See Limburg Principles, supra note 254, 1 71, at 8 ("In determining what
amounts to a failure to comply, it must be borne in mind that the Covenant affords
to a State party a margin of discretion in selecting the means for carrying out its
objects, and that factors beyond its reasonable control may adversely affect its
capacity to implement particular rights.").
262
26 See supra text accompanying notes 163-80.
3Amartya Sen has described how such a duty to fulfill can be made justiciable:

A metarightto something x can be defined as the right to have policies
p(x) that genuinely pursue the objective of making the right to x realisable.
As an example, consider the following "Directive Principle of State Policy"
inserted in the Constitution of India when it was adopted in 1950:
"The state shall, in particular, direct its policy toward securing... that
the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means
of livelihood:"
There are, of course, ambiguities as to ways of checking whether the
measures taken by the government amount to a policy p(x) aimed at
securing a certain right x.... But such ambiguities of specification are not
unusual in dealing with rights in general.... Indeed, sometimes it is
patently clear that the policies are not thus directed.
...

There is ...

no difficulty in conceiving of the same right being

made institutional and concrete, permitting any individual to sue the
government for not pursuing, with the required amount of urgency, a policy
that is genuinely aimed at achieving the right to adequate means.
Amartya Sen, The Right Not to Be Hungy, in THE RIGHT TO FOOD, supra note 245, at
69-71.

80

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 141:1

The duty to take steps required in the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is not limited to a duty to
act by all appropriate means. The required steps are cumulative in
nature, and must be designed "to achiev[e] progressively the full
realization of [those] rights." 264 This element of progressive
realization has implications for the degree of precision that can be
achieved by the constitutional entrenchment of a social right as well
as for judicial review of the entrenched rights. The Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has indicated that the concept
of progressive realization does not simply refer to the fact that
fulfillment of a right must be pursued as expeditiously and
effectively as possible. It also creates a kind of ratchet effect in that
lowering the fulfillment level of a right is presumptively prohibited
once that level has been achieved.2 65 Existing levels of provision
can thereby be used as a baseline, adding further precision to the
judicial task.
Levels of provision of social goods existing in statutory form at
the time of constitutionalization can themselves be specifically
worded and entrenched in the constitution as minimum constitutional, as opposed to statutory, standards. For example, debate is
currently occurring in Canada over whether to constitutionalize the
elements of universality, accessibility and portability of the existing
health care system so as to render those elements constitutionally
sacrosanct. 266 Were this to occur, a so-called positive right would
in effect be recognized as a negative right, at least in the sense that
specified components of the social state (as opposed to the 'state of
nature') become the baseline for constitutional analysis. Social
rights constitutionalized in this way would operate in much the
264 ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 2(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.
265 See Heikki Karapuu & Allan Rosas, Economic Social and Cultural Rights in
Finland,in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS IN DOMESTIC LAW: FINNISH AND
POLISH PERSPECTIVES 195, 208-09 (Allan Rosas ed., 1990) (discussing prohibitions

against "going back" in a Finnish domestic constitutional context). CompareReport on
the Fifth Session, supra note 260, at 85 ("[A]ny deliberately retrogressive measures...
would require the most careful consideration and would need to be fullyjustified by
reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context
of the full use of the maximum available resources.") with Limburg Principles,supra
note 254, 1 72, at 8 ("A State party will be in violation of the Covenant, inter alia,if:
... it deliberately retards or halts the progressive realization of a right, unless it is
acting within a limitation permitted by the Covenant or does so due to a lack of
available
resources or force majeure .... ").
2 66
See generally MINISTRY OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT OF
ONTARIO, A CANADIAN SOCIAL CHARTER: MAKING OUR SHARED VALUES STRONGER

17-18 (1991) (outlining various opinions for entrenching fundamental principles).
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same way that the system of private property and contract
rights
267
functions as a constitutional baseline in the United States.
On the other hand, where a state is required to progressively
achieve the realization of a benefit not initially enjoyed by all at the
time of constitutional entrenchment, the baseline or point of
reference against which state action would be assessed by the
judiciary would be a moving one. Such would be the case where the
entrenched right is a right to the progressive achievement of a
certain social good, such as universal medicare. Unlike the previous
example, the baseline by which state action would be judged would
not be levels of entitlements actually in existence at the time of
entrenchment, but rather a shifting baseline that conforms to
judicial assessments of the adequacy of steps taken to realize the
ideal articulated in the guarantee. 268 Even where such an ideal is
expressed in general terms, a corresponding duty to take steps
would have the effect of lending precision to the guarantee, in that
steps taken would form the baseline against which subsequent state
action would be assessed, to the extent that it is not in dispute that
full realization of the right has yet to be achieved. 6 9
In either of these two situations, the judiciary is provided with
many more precise reference points to work with than critics of
social rights tend to acknowledge. A shifting baseline need not
mean a total prohibition on downward movement or change, but
could involve placing a burden of justification on government to
show, for instance, why backsliding is fiscally necessary and why
existing benefits may be more generous than captured by the term
"full realization" of rights. Whatever the justificatory burdens and
criteria, a sine qua non for permitting justified downward movement could be that individuals not find themselves lacking core
minimum entitiements as a result of such change.
Other obligations on the state could combine with a duty to take
steps to provide even further precision to social rights. Beginning
267 At the level of individual entitlement, where people have yet to receive a
benefit to which they are constitutionally entitled, positive state action would be
required. A constitutional challenge to an attempt to take away existing statutory
entitlements, however, looks very much like the assertion of a classical negative right.
Cf. Reich, supra note 28, at 739-46 (describing removal of social benefits as a
government activity bounded by constitutional protections).
268 See Sen, supra note 263, at 70-71, and quote reprinted therein.
269 Cumulative stages of achievement would thus provide the type of baseline to
which the Report on the Fifth Session and the Limburg Principlesimplicitly refer. See
Report on the Fifth Session, supra note 260, at 85; Limburg Principles,supra note 254,
1 72, at 8.
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with United Nations studies on the right to food, process-oriented
obligations of conduct, for example, have been posited at the third
level of obligation; these duties involve gathering the necessary
information and obtaining the necessary input from those most in
need as the necessary foundation for fulfilling the social rights in
question. 270 Failure to engage in this process and to assume
process and participation-oriented duties raises a presumption that
the state is not meeting its constitutional duty to fulfill the right in
question.
The following summary of recommendations of the United
Nations's Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Asbjorn Eide,
gives some indication of what shape these obligations of conduct
could take in the context of social rights. 27 1 In Eide's view, states
ought to: (1) establish a nation-wide system of identifying local
needs and opportunities for achieving food security (defined to
mean enough and adequate food in terms of nutrition and cultural
acceptability, viable patterns of procurement of food, and a
sustainable food resource base); (2) draw up plans for national food
security, focusing on household and community food security; (3) as
part of such identification of need and within such a national plan,
identify as a matter of priority the needs of groups which have the
greatest difficulty in achieving food security, and set specific
objectives for achieving sustainable access to adequate food for
these groups; (4) ensure popular participation in periodically
assessing and analyzing local needs and opportunities, and facilitate
contributions by the least privileged groups into the action plans
that follow from such assessment and analysis; (5) determine the
areas in which international assistance is required and detail the
requirements; and (6) ensure that an adequate monitoring system
for the right to food is developed and put into action.2 72 These
recommendations suggest that even the most generally worded
social right can be conceptualized so as to generate quite precise
obligations of conduct rather than simply act as a general obligation
of result.
270 For an emphasis on popular participation and public discussion in the context
of taking steps to fulfill social rights as well as in relation to obligations to report to
the Committee on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights on steps taken, see Limburg
Principles, supra note 254, 11 11, 76, at 2, 9.
271 See Eide, supra note 246, at 56-57.
272 See id.
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Given the current unwillingness, at least at a general level, of
international human rights law and the new Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights to make judgments about the
preferred approach of states for achieving required substantive
results, formulating obligations of conduct can ensure that a state
will be under an amalgam of procedural duties that, if met, create
further pressure to take social rights seriously. In the words of the
Committee on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights, "it would be
incorrect to assume that reporting is essentially only a procedural
matter designed solely to satisfy each State party's formal obligation
to report to the appropriate international monitoring body."2 73
In its elaboration of the objectives that the reporting function is
designed to achieve, the Committee has in essence indicated that
states are under an immediate obligation to place an individualrights focus on all social and economic policymaking, specifically to
know who is in need and to target their need as a matter of
274
priority.
273 Report on the Third Session, supra note 255,

1 1.

274 Extracts from the Committee's description of the second and third objectives
of the reporting function serve to illustrate this claim:
A second objective is to ensure that the State party monitors the actual
situation with respect to each of the rights on a regular basis and is thus
aware of the extent to which the various rights are, or are not, being
enjoyed by all individuals within its territory or under itsjurisdiction. From
the Committee's experience to date, it is clear that the fulfillment of this
objective cannot be achieved only by the preparation of aggregate national

statistics or estimates, but also requires that special attention be given to any
worse-off regions or areas and to any specific groups or subgroups which
appear to be particularly vulnerable or disadvantaged. Thus, the essential
first step towards promoting the realization of economic, social and cultural
rights is diagnosis and knowledge of the existing situation....
While monitoring is designed to give a detailed overview of the existing
situation, the principal value of such an overview is to provide the basis for
the elaboration of dearly stated and carefully targeted policies, including the
establishment of priorities which reflect the provisions of the Covenant.
Therefore, a third objective of the reporting process is to enable the
Government to demonstrate that such principled policymaking has in fact
been undertaken.
Report on the Third Session, supra note 255, 113 -4.
The fusion of procedural and substantive obligations has subsequently become
even more complete with the revision of reporting guidelines that states are to use
when preparing their reports. The requirement to gather and act on disaggregated

information and to be sensitive to individual circumstances, or at the very least to the
situation of presumptively vulnerable groups, is now painstakingly reflected in twenty
closely-typed pages of questions that states are to use as "guidelines." See Revised
Guidelines, in Report on the Fifth Session, supra note 260, Annex 4, at 88-110.
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In summary, social rights suffer from less conceptual imprecision than their critics are willing to acknowledge. There are a
multiplicity of ways to render social rights more precise. While it
is true that social rights preponderantly speak to circumstances that
take time to remedy, this should not stand as a reason for their
nonentrenchment. Some deprivations can be rectified immediately.
Other deprivations can be addressed in a progressive way through
the interpretive evolution of a duty to take steps to eliminate
2 75
conditions that constitute violations of social rights.
Moreover, precision is a function of the repeated invocation and
application of social rights by the judiciary. Any lack of precision
in practice is in part due to the fact that they are not yet treated as
justiciable in many jurisdictions, and should, therefore, not stand as
a reason for their nonentrenchment. That being said, it is true that
the constitutionalization of social rights will place the judiciary in a
new and unfamiliar environment. Social rights require the judiciary
to explicitly adopt a promotional and creative stance in their
interpretive endeavors. However, judicial competence in this area,
as in others, is a function of experience and effort, and does not lie
in the inherent nature of the institution. In the words of Mauro
Cappelletti, "[s]ooner or later, [judges] have to accept the realities
of a changed conception of the law and of a new role of the state of
276
which, after all, they are a 'branch."

275

Philip Alston has given an example of the type of steps which might be taken:

The starting point for a program to implement economic and social rights
is to ascertain, as precisely as possible, the nature of the existing situation
with respect to each right, so as to identify more clearly the problems that
need to be addressed and provide a basis for principled policymaking.
Thus, to take the case of the right to food, an immediate and feasible step
that the United States could take would be to adopt legislation requiring the
various levels ofgovernment to collaborate periodically on a detailed survey
of the nutritional status of the American people, with particular emphasis
on the situation of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups and
regions. Such a survey could then constitute the basis for carefully targeted
legislative, administrative and practical measures aimed at enhancing
realization of the right.
Alston, New Strategy, supra note 57, at 379-80.
276 CAPPELLETrI, supra note 120, at 15.
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IV. THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Thus far we have been advocating the inclusion of social rights
in a new South African constitution, with the assumption that South
Africa is already committed to the principle of at least enshrining
classical civil and political rights in constitutional form. If South
Africa decides to include social rights in its new constitution, it
would be assuming a leading role in the international human rights
movement by eclipsing the debate that has cast positive and negative
freedom as theatrical rivals rather than supporting actors. Such a
decision would also lead the way in the modern world by resurrecting a fundamental principle of international human rights law: the
interdependence of human rights. By the principle of interdependence, we refer to the fact that the interests underlying civil,
political, and social rights are indivisible and interconnected.
Neither category of human rights is more important than the other.
Moreover, neither category can be seriously respected without
simultaneously respecting the other. They ought to be viewed as
"two wheels of a chariot,"2 77 each indispensable to the other and
both necessary for there to be any forward movement toward the
realization of a progressive vision of social justice.
It is trite but true that many traditional civil liberties are illusory
to those living in poverty. Satisfying human needs for nutrition,
housing, health, and education is a fundamental precondition of
contemporary citizenship. The ability to participate in decisions
that affect one's life is in no small measure conditional not only on
the existence of civil and political rights but also on material
circumstance. Likewise, the constituent elements of social rights
also ought to include reconceived values normally associated with
classical civil and political rights. Social rights are not meant simply
to entrench bureaucratic structures of the modern welfare state so
that beneficiaries continue to be treated as passive recipients of
state largesse. Instead, social rights ought to include rights to
277 Minerva Mill Ltd. v. India, 1980 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1789,1806 (India) (Chandrachud,

C.J.) (discussing the relationship between the justiciable Fundamental Rights in Part
III of the Indian Constitution and the Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV).
If only to emphasize the highly rhetorical nature of the notion of interdependence,
it is worth noting that in this case the Supreme Court of India invoked the evocative
chariot metaphor in order to strike down a nationalization law (enacted pursuant to
a newly constitutionalized Directive Principle) as a violation of a Fundamental Right.

See id.
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participate in the design, implementation, critique, and revision of
measures that seek to improve material and social circumstances. 278 As such, social rights are aimed at the material and politi279
cal empowerment of the worst off in society.
In Part II, we addressed the legitimacy of entrenching social
rights alongside more classically imagined civil liberties in terms of
the negative constitutive effect on social and political discourse and
conceptions of identity and status. To constitutionalize half the
human rights equation 280 would entrench a certain vision of the
human and social self, while marginalizing those who do not fit that
norm. The notion of interdependence may be seen as a shorthand
28 1
principle for these claims.
In this Part, we seek to illuminate aspects of the interdependence of social rights through an examination of a number of
different instruments of international human rights law. Interdependence is relevant in two ways, in each instance in terms of what
could be called a "doctrine of advocation." First, interdependence
is a doctrine that advocates pulling rights together. That is, it tells
us to engage, wherever useful and possible, in an integrated
consideration of rights.2 8 2 This includes making a social rights
278 For a similar view, see White, supra note 14, at 865, 872, 873, 877.
279 For an extended treatment of the concept of interdependence, concentrating
on importing the interests underlying social rights into interpretations of civil and
political rights, see Scott, supra note 59, at 786-90.
280

See supra text accompanying note 82.

"The term interdependence attempts to capture the idea that values seen as
directly related to the full development of personhood cannot be protected and
nurtured in isolation." Scott, supra note 59, at 786. Interdependence may also be
seen as a way of advocating within human rights discourse "a full conception of
human freedom and a full and integrated conception of the self." Id. at 804.
Furthermore, "interdependence" could also be seen as a way of rejecting a related
series of fundamental oppositions or dichotomies that can serve to privilege certain
conceptions of the self, and to reinforce marginalization. See Janet Mosher, The
Harms of Dichotomy: Access to Welfare Benefits as a Case in Point, 9 CAN.J. FAMILY L.
281

97, 97-104, 113-16 (1991) (analyzing selected dichotomies, including "dependence/
independence," as they relate to statutory social rights law and policy in Canada).
212 See Scott, supra note 59, at 779-86, for an attempt to fashion two "analytical
meanings" of interdependence. In a relationship of organicinterdependence,one right
forms a part of another right and may therefore be incorporated into that latter right
(for example, the right to nutrition as part of the right to life). In a relationship of
relatedinterdependence,rights are equally important and complementary, yet separate,
such that the question is not whether one right is part of another but, rather, whether
one right applies to another (for example, the right to a fair hearing applying to a
pension benefit).
The concept of interdependence is not limited to the relationship between social,
civil, and political rights, although that is historically the axis of concern and almost
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claim before a court on the basis of a document generally imagined
to be about civil and political rights. 285 Second, interdependence
advocates the importance of a right or a given set of rights, imbuing
that claim of worth with a further implicit claim that its importance
is in part a function of its relation to other rights. Used in this way,
interdependence refers to a right's status within an overall system
of valuation and protection. It is a way of stating that a right should
be given due attention, or protection, through appropriate mechanisms and procedures. To the extent possible, the right in question
should be accorded the same status and form of protection
provided to other valued rights. For our purposes, interdependence
suggests the protection of social rights through more justiciable
petition procedures.
In international human rights law, the first aspect of advocation
has had little effect on practice. There are relatively few instances
84
of integrated considerations of social, civil, and political rights.
Even fewer cases have actually acknowledged the concept of
interdependence. 8 5 It is the second, more general and even
polemical use of interdependence which has begun to make some
headway into the practice of international human rights law.
Developments in the last five years in the United Nations Covenant
system, the Council of Europe system and the Inter-American
certainly still provides the context in which the concept is the most useful. But, as
a general matter, interdependence connotes primarily the inextricable quality of all
rights, including, for example, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and
association. See Plattform Arzte Fuir Das Leben v. Austria, 139 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 12 (1988) (noting that a state's failure to provide protection for those wishing to
assemble freely could "deter associations or other groups... from openly expressing

their opinions"); YoungJames & Webster v. United Kingdom, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 23-24 (1981) (noting that the "protection of personal opinion afforded by
Articles 9 and 10 in the shape of freedom of thought, conscience and religion and
freedom of expression is also one of the purposes of freedom of association as

guaranteed by Article 11").
283 Recall the discussion of Schachterand Irwin Toys and the possible "importation"
of social rights into the right to "security of the person." Seesupra text accompanying
notes 226-33.
284 By integrated consideration, we include side-by-side consideration of such
rights in the same case. See Yanomami, Resolution No. 12/85, Case No. 7615 (1985)
(Brazil), reprintedin INTER-AMERICAN COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS & INTER-AMERICAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, INTER-AMERICAN YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 1985, at
264, 278 (1987) (finding that the Brazilian government violated both the personal
security and health rights of the Yanomami Indians) [hereinafter 1985 INTER-AM.
YEARBOOK].

285 The authors know of only three. See infra text accompanying notes 301-10
(trilogy of cases interpreting Article 26 of the ICCPR).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

88

[Vol. 141:1

system have begun either to draw attention to the need for greater
petition-linked justiciability or have actually begun to forge such
justiciability.
A. The InternationalBill of Rights: The UniversalDeclarationand the
InternationalCovenants
The principle of the interdependence of human rights underlies
the cornerstone of contemporary international human rights law,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.286 The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights represents an idealistic
global recognition of human rights espoused by societies that
claimed membership in the United Nations at the time the document was drafted.2 8 7 The Declaration recognizes rights to social
security and those "economic, social and cultural rights indispensable" to human "dignity and the free development of... personality. " 288

Civil and political rights and social rights co-exist side by
side in this document, which has been so often been invoked
around the world in struggles for freedom and equality. The
inclusion of social rights in a South African constitution would
resurrect and vindicate the original, if inchoate, promise of the text
and intention of many of the drafters of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.

289

286 See supra note 37.

As a recommendation of the United Nations General

Assembly, the Declaration is traditionally conceived to have no independent legal
status, and is rather a document of a political and moral nature. Many have argued
that the Declaration indirectly obligates states, either as an authoritative interpretation of the United Nations Charter's generally-worded human rights provisions or as
evidence of customary international law. See BROWNLIE, supra note 163, at 570-71
(discussing past usage of the Declaration by international institutions); John P.
Humphrey, The UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights: Its Histoiy, ImpactandJuridical
Character,in HuMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 22,
28-30 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1979) (discussing widespread use and influence of the
Declaration).
It should perhaps be noted that South Africa refused to endorse the Declaration.
See Dugard, supra note 35, at 446.
287 SeeJohannes Morsink, The Philosophyof the Universal Declaration,6 HUM. RTS.
Q. 309, 309 (1984) (describing human rights conceptions incorporated into the
Declaration); Scott, supra note 59, at 791 (documenting the history of the Declaration).
288 UDHR, supra note 37, art. 22, at 75. Article 22 serves as an "umbrella article"
for the articles immediately following it. See Humphrey, supra note 286, at 28.
289 See Morsink, supra note 287, at 334 (noting that the framers "went consciously
beyond the earlier declarations and were proud of it").
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Despite its initial prominence in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the principle of the interdependence of human
rights was immediately submerged by an international debate over
what legally-binding treaties could be parented by the Declaration.
The primary source of controversy was whether to include some
kind of quasi-judicial supervisory machinery to oversee states'
obligations and, if so, whether all Declaration rights could be
subject to such machinery. The debate was explicitly over justiciability, with the proponents of dividing the Declaration into two
Covenants arguing that social rights were non-justiciable and
therefore could not be included in a unified document, if that
document was to go beyond the purely normative statement of the
Declaration.
The primary stumbling block for continuing to adhere to the
Declaration's vision of an integrated body of human rights was not,
therefore, fueled by a conservative vision of the limits of state
intervention or by the view that social rights are somehow inferior
to, or of a lesser order than, classical rights and liberties. Rather,
social rights were not viewed as justiciable because courts, or courtlike bodies, were not thought to be competent bodies to deal with
them. It is also true that the debates do reveal some clear ideological resistance by several states' delegates to the very idea of social
rights as "rights." 29 ° Yet even these states acceded to the consensus position that the two categories of rights were in fact philosophically inseparable and in principle equally legitimate subjects of
external review of states' conduct. 29 1 The General Assembly
292
resolution that called for the drafting of two separate treaties
did so only after quoting an earlier General Assembly resolution
which had called for one treaty in terms that had explicitly accepted
293
the'principle of the interdependence of human rights.
m See Scott, supra note 59, at 797-98 (discussing views of Canada and the United
States). The U.S. representative at the time was Eleanor Roosevelt, the widow of
President Roosevelt, who had promulgated a vision of a second Bill of Rights that
included social rights. See 90 CONG. REC. 57 (1944) (statement of Franklin D.
Roosevelt).
For a persuasive view that the sub-text, as opposed to the rhetoric, of the entire
debate was an ideological East-West split on the merits of laissez-faire economic
policy, see Farrokh Jhabvala, On Human Rights and the Socio-Economic Context, 31
NErH. INT'L L. REv.149, 159 (1984).
291 See Scott, supra note 59, at 800.
292
See Preparingof Two Draft InternationalCovenants on Human Rights, G.A. Res.
543, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., 375th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952) [hereinafter
Draft Covenants].

2 The following two preambular clauses were borrowed from the earlier
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Thus, despite pronounced emphasis on the equal claim to
legitimacy of social rights through the principle of interdependence,
the United Nations General Assembly decided to split the Declaration's catalogue of rights into the ICCPRFM and the ICESCR. 295
To underscore the fact that the principle of interdependence was in
fact affirmed rather than rejected, the preamble of the ICCPR
makes direct reference to the principle of interdependence:
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and
political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be

achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his
civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and
cultural rights .... 296

The corresponding preambular paragraph in the ICESCR reverses
the order of the relationship of the two sets of rights. 297 The
wording of these documents clearly conveys the message that

pragmatic considerations concerning the judiciary's competence to
adjudicate social rights prevented states from incorporating social
and political rights in a single covenant.
Procedures established to address alleged violations of the two
Covenants further pushed the Declaration's enthusiastic embrace of
the principle of interdependence to the margins of international
human rights law. The ICCPR provided for the creation of a quasijudicial organ, the Human Rights Committee. This Committee is
empowered under a protocol to the treaty, the Optional Protocol, 29 8 to deal with individual claims (petitions) of violations of
resolution:
Whereas the enjoyment of civil and political freedoms and of economic,
social and cultural rights are interconnected and interdependent;
Whereas when deprived of economic, social and cultural rights, man
does not represent the human person whom the Universal Declaration
regards as the ideal of the free man.
Draft International Covenant on Human Rights and Measure of Implementation: Future
Work of the Commission on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 421E., U.N. GAOR, 5th sess.,
317th mtg. at 43, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950), at pmbl. 11 3 & 4, reprinted in Draft
Covenants, supra note 292, at pmbl. 1 2.
294 See ICCPR, supra note 38.
25 See ICESCR, supra note 23.
296 ICCPR, supra note 38, pmbl. para. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173.
27 See ICESCR, supra note 23, pmbl. para. 2, 993 U.N.T.S. at 5; see also Scott,
supra note 59, at 809-11 (noting that the two preambular paragraphs serve as the

textual interpretive basis for mediating the unity and distinctiveness of the two
Covenants).
29 See ICCPR, Optional Protocol, supra note 39, pmbl. para. 1 & arts. 1-5, 999
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rights enshrined in the Covenant. 29 The exercise of such jurisdiction requires states to accept explicitly the individual petition
procedure. The ICESCR, by contrast, provided no equivalent right
of individual petition and limited its monitoring mechanism to a
3°
state report procedure. 0
The Human Rights Committee, in two related cases arising out
of the Netherlands, has helped to draw attention, at least implicitly,
to the principle of interdependence. In both cases, the petitioners
invoked the principle of interdependence as one justification for
interpreting the generally worded right to equality in Article 26 of
the ICCPR3s0 to include the right to non-discrimination with
30 2
respect to social welfare benefits. In Broeks v. The Netherlands
and Zwaan-de Vries v. The Netherlands,3 0 3 two unemployed female
U.N.T.S at 302.
29 See DOMINIC MCGOLDRIcK, THE HuMAN RIGHTS COMMITFEE 150-51 (1991).

The decisions of the Committee are termed "views" under the Optional Protocol and
are technically non-binding.
3o0 See ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 16, 993 U.N.T.S. at 9; see also Philip Alston &
Gerald Quinn, The Nature andScope of States Parties'Obligationsunderthe International
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HuM. RTS. Q. 156, 170 (1987)
(noting that no provision for effective remedy was proposed during the drafting of
ICESCR). See generally Alston, Out of the Abyss, supra note 57, at 332 (outlining the
challenges that the Committee will face in monitoring states' compliance to the
ICESR); Philip Alston & Bruno Simma, Second Session ofthe UN Committee on Economic
Social and CulturalRights,82 AM.J. INT'L L. 603,604 (1988) (noting that constructive
dialogue during the Committee's deliberations reduced the level of politicization and
therefore raised the stature of the Committee closer to the level of its ICCPR
counterpart, the Human Rights Committee); Philip Alston & Bruno Simma, First
Session of the UN Committee on Economic Social and CulturalRights, 81 AM.J. INT'L L.
747, 749, 755 (1987) (claiming that the newly established U.N. Committee is not fully
depoliticized); Bruno Simma, The Implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic Social and Cultural Rights, in THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL RIGHTS: NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ASPECTS 75-81 (Franz
Matscher ed., 1991) (analyzing the reporting system, the sole implementation
machinery of the Covenant).
301 Article 26 of the ICCPR provides:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.
ICCPR, supra note 38, art. 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
302 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2/172/1984, U.N. Sales No. E.89 XIV.1 (1987),
reprinted in 2 UNITED NATIONS, SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMrrTEE UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL: SEVENTEENTH TO THIRTY-SECOND
SESSIONS 196, 201 (1990) [hereinafter SELECTED DECISIONS].
303 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2/182/1984 (1987), reprinted in 2 SELECTED
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workers had unemployment benefits terminated pursuant to the
Dutch Unemployment Benefits Act, which provided that benefits
could not be awarded to married women who were neither
"breadwinners" nor permanently separated from their spouses. The
Act did not contain a similar exclusion for married men. The major
issue facing the Committee was whether to interpret Article 26 as
prohibiting discriminatory treatment with respect to social benefits,
especially given the existence of Article 2(2) in the ICESCR
guaranteeing the right to non-discrimination in the provision of
benefits guaranteed by that Covenant."
The claim of the government was largely based on the fact that an interpretation of
Article 26 of the ICCPR to provide non-discrimination protection
for social benefits would create an overlap with Article 2(2) of the
ICESCR as it operated in conjunction with Article 9 of the
ICESCR.3 05 In the government's view, the Human Rights Committee should use a principle of minimizing overlap as an interpretive presumption. Related to this was the argument that if Article
2(2) and Article 9 in tandem are not justiciable under the ICESCR
(in the sense of subject to the same kind of petition procedure as
available under the ICCPR), they should not be rendered justiciable
by means of an interpretation which imports them into Article 26
of the ICCPR.
In both cases, the Committee held that discrimination is
prohibited by the ICCPR, thereby declining to endorse a principle
of non-overlap that would have had the Committee interpret Article
26 on the basis of a proposition that might be expressed as "what is
there (in the ICESCR) explicitly cannot be here (in the ICCPR)
implicitly." Instead, in refusing to accord dispositive importance to
the presence of Article 2(2) of the ICESCR, thereby enabling it to
supra note 302, at 209, 213; see also Danning v. The Netherlands, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2/180/1984 (1987), reprintedin 2 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note
302, at 205 (dismissing a marital status discrimination claim by a disabled man and
holding that by choosing not to enter into marriage, the applicant had not assumed
the full extent of the duties incumbent on married couples, and thus was not entitled
to receive the full benefits provided by Netherlands law for married couples).
304 See ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 2(2), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5 ("The States Parties to
the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the
present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.").
o5 See ICESCR, supranote 23, art. 9, 993 U.N.T.S. at 7 ("The States Parties to the
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social
insurance.").
DECISIONS,
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become justiciable in concrete cases by way of Article 26 of the
ICCPR, the Committee noted an "interrelated drafting history" of
the two Covenants, but explicitly stated that it was restricting its
analysis to the wording of Article 26.306 The petitioner, Broeks,
however, had expressly argued that the human rights in the two
Covenants were interdependent. These arguments were set out in
detail in the Committee's decision and the Committee did little to
30 7
distance itself from this proposition.
Even if the Committee did not openly embrace the interdependence concept to bolster its reasoning, the results in these cases
illustrate the interdependence of social rights with civil and political
rights. 0 8 They also illustrate that civil and political rights can be
and have been interpreted to cover matters associated with social
rights protection, albeit in a way that provides only limited, indirect
protection.,3 9 Although these have been the only cases in which
interdependence has openly played a role in argument, several other
cases have raised issues of overlap between the ICESCR and the
ICCPR, with the result of one decision being hostile to the principle
3 10
of interdependence.
06 See Scott, supra note 59, at 856-57.
07

3

See id. at 858-59 (considering the significance of the style ofjudgment in this

case for the Committee's view on the question of interdependence).
308 See id. at 855-59 (relating to the question of how far these cases can be said to
endorse, or leave open, interpretive borrowing from the ICESCR by the ICCPR based
on the principle of interdependence).
30 In subsequent cases, the Committee has not backed away from applying Article
26 to social rights legislation, always emphasizing the indirect, procedural nature of
the protection accorded to social rights. It has, however, declined to interpretArticle
26 in a way that would in effect read substantive social rights into it. See Report ofthe
Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 40, 11647-50, U.N. Doc. A/44/40
(1990) (comment by the Committee on its own jurisprudence).
0 One of us has previously extensively reviewed a case which decided whether
the freedom of association guarantee of Article 22(1) of the ICCPR should be
interpreted to include the right to strike, which is found explicitly in Article 8(1)(d)
of the ICESCR. See Scott, supra note 59, at 869-74. While interdependence was not
explicitly discussed, the principle of no-overlap was argued by the Canadian
government and, in effect, endorsed by the Committee majority who refused to read
the right to strike into Article 22(1) of the ICCPR. SeeJ.B. v. Canada, Communication No. 118/1982 (1986), reprinted in 2 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 302, at 34
(refusing to read the right to strike into Article 22(1) of the ICCPR). But see Scott,
supranote 59, at 869-74 (arguing that the freedom of association guarantee of Article
22(1) of the ICCPR should be interpreted to include the right to strike found
explicitly in Article 8(1)(d) of the ICESCR).
Due process guarantees for social benefits, under Article 14(1) of the ICCPR, are
also the subject of such interpretations. SeeY.L. v. Canada, Communication No. 112/
1981, reprinted in 2 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 302, at 28 (dealing with the
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After years of ineffectual monitoring of the ICESCR by a
Working Group of the United Nations Economic and Social
Council, the Council created a parallel expert committee under the
ICESCR to oversee the implementation of that treaty.31 1 In its
first years of operation, the new Committee has shown a strong
interest in receiving information from states on the kinds ofjudicial
protection provided for the rights in the Covenant.3 12 The
Committee has also made it clear that its central function is to
clarify the core obligations of states that flow from the rights in the
Covenant, a function, albeit incremental, that will make many of the
3 13
rights more manageable for courts in the future.
A major part of this project of norm clarification involves
articulating specific procedural obligations (or obligations of
conduct) owed by states with respect to their general reporting
obligation under the Covenant. 14 The Committee's work also
involves elaborating the substantive normative content of rights
found in the Covenant. Its first step has been to issue a General
Comment 15 on Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, which, as described

interaction between social benefits and due process rights); see also Scott, supra note
59, at 860-69 (discussing how the case avoids the issue of due process and leaves it
open for future decision); id. at 876 (discussing how the Committee has interpreted
the right to life in Article 6(1) of the ICCPR to "require[] ... that States adopt
positive measures .... [e.g.,] to reduce infant mortality and to increase life
expectancy, especially in adopting measures to eliminate malnutrition and epidemics"). The Committee has not, to the authors' knowledge, yet been presented with
an individual communication seeking to test this general, interdependence-infused
principle in a concrete case. Cf Lubison Lake Band v. Canada, Communication No.
167/1984, reprinted in 11 HUM. RTs. L.J. 305 (1990); Dominic McGoldrick, Canadian
Indians, CulturalRights and the Human Rights Committee, 40 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 658,
661, 664-67 (1991) (arguing that the decision in Lubicon Lake Band displayed a
willingness to interpret Article 27's minority linguistic, cultural, and religious rights
in an interdependence-sensitive fashion that included importing considerable social
and economic content into Article 27).
311 See E.S.C. Res. 17, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 15, U.N. Doc. E/
1985/85 (1985) (designating an 18-member committee to oversee the ICESCR).
312 This interest has been evident since the second session of the Committee in
1988 and is reflected in the revised reporting guidelines the Committee agreed on
during its fifth session. These guidelines give detailed guidance to states on points
that the Committee requires to be addressed in state reports on compliance with the
Covenant. Six separate points touch upon judicial protection of social rights. See
Revised Guidelines, in Report on the Fifth Session, supra note 260, Annex 4, at 89; see
also General Comment No. 3, in Report on the Fifth Session, supra note 260, at 84
("[T]he Committee would wish to receive information as to the extent to which these
rights are considered to bejusticiable .... ").
313 See Alston, Out of the Abyss, supra note 57, at 351-55.
314 See supra text accompanying notes 270-74.
315 Report on the Fifth Session, supra note 260, 11 1-14.
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previously,3 16 imposes a duty on states to take steps to progressively realize all the social rights listed in the Covenant. Of
particular interest is the Committee's development of the concept
of "minimum core obligation":
[T]he Committee is of the view that a minimum core obligation to
ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential
levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party.
Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant number
of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential
primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or the most
facie, failing to discharge its
basic forms of education is, prima
s17
obligations under the Covenant.
In response to the claim that a core obligation would involve
prohibitive financial costs, the Committee is of the view that a state
making such a claim "must demonstrate that every effort has been
made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort31to
8
satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations."
Consistent with its focus on the need in state reports for indicators
and disaggregated data that take seriously the special priority of
attention of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups such as womstate that process-oriented
en,3 19 the Committee is careful to
3 20
obligations of conduct are absolute.
As stated, unlike the Human Rights Committee under the
ICCPR, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is
limited to supervision of state reports. However, there are signs of
260-65 and accompanying text.
317 Report on the Fifth Session, supranote 260, 1 l0; see also LimburgPrinciple, supra
note 254, 1 25, at 3 (describing states' obligation "to ensure respect for minimum
subsistence rights for all," regardless of the level of economic development).
318 Report on the Fifth Session, supra note 260, 1 10. The Committee adds that
"even in times of severe resource constraints whether caused by a process of
adjustment, of economic recession, or by other factors the vulnerable members of
society can and indeed must be protected by the adoption of relatively low-cost
targeted programmes." Id. 1 12.
319 See supra note 255 and accompanying text. For a list of eleven "especially
vulnerable or disadvantaged groups" (in addition to women) with respect to the right
to adequate food, see Revised Guidelines, in Report on theFijfh Session, supranote 260,
Annex 4, at 100; see also Simma, supra note 300, 84-85 (remarking that "[o]ne could
go so far as saying that concern for the particularly vulnerable and disadvantaged
of society lies at the heart of the Committee's entire 'philosophy.'").
members
320
See Report on the Fifth Session, supra note 260, 1 11. ("[T]he obligations to
monitor the extent of the realization, or more especially of the non-realization, of
economic, social and cultural rights, and to devise strategies and programmes for
their promotion, are not in any way eliminated as a result of resource constraints.").
316 See supra notes
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an embryonic willingness and ability to indicate whether or not a
21
state is in compliance with its obligations under the Covenant.
As the Committee struggles with its own procedures and the
normative content of Covenant rights, it has not been unknown for
individual Committee members to indicate that in their view a right
3 22
has not been respected.
As early as the second session, there was an elliptical indication
that the Committee as a whole considered Zaire not to have
complied with the Covenant, including Article 13's obligation to
provide free primary education.3 23 This observation was offered at
the final stage of the evaluation of a state report known as "concluding observations" which are now, in the practice of the Committee,
presented by one Committee member on behalf of the Committee
as a whole.3 24 In its fifth session, the Committee indicated unambiguously, for the first time, that a State, the Dominican Republic,
had violated Article 11 of the Covenant. 25 In the words of the
Committee:
The information that had reached members of the Committee
concerning the massive expulsion of nearly 15,000 families in the
course of the last five years, the deplorable conditions in which the
families had to live, and the conditions in which the expulsions
had taken place were deemed sufficiently serious for it to be
considered that the guarantees in article 11 of the Covenant had
3 26
not been respected.

321 See LimburgPrindples,supra note 254,1 72, at 8 (outlining the potential range

of violations that the Committee could find).
32 See Alston, supra note 115, at 89.
323 "It was recalled, in this connection, that the members of the Committee had
expressed particular concern with regard to certain issues related to the implementation of the Covenant in Zaire such as the problem of Zairian refugees, the question
of equality between men and women, the enjoyment of trade-union rights and the
abolition of free primary education." Report on the Second Session, U.N. ESCOR, 2d
Sess., Supp. No. 4, Agenda Item 3, 1 303, U.N. Doc. E/1988/14; E/C.12/1988/4
(1988); see also Alston, supra note 115, at 89 (discussing the development by the
Committee of "other techniques by which it might better contribute to an understanding of the normative content of the various rights").
324 See Simma, supra note 300, at 83.
325 See ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 11, 993 U.N.T.S. at 5 ("The States Parties to
the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of
living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing
326 Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17
of the Covenant, in Report on the Fifth Session, supra note 260, 1 249.
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This "concluding observation" reveals the importance of receiving
information from actors in addition to governments themselves and
it illustrates how such information can be determinative in measuring states' performance of their obligations. This is not to suggest
that an ad hoc and indirect consideration of individual circumstances is adequate. Significantly, the Committee has begun discussions
on the possibility of encouraging states to draft an Optional
Protocol for the ICESCR that would allow for a right of individual
petition similar to that which exists for the ICCPR.s2 7 At its sixth
session in 1991, the Committee began to address ways to render
some or all of the rights in the Covenant justiciable at the international level.8 28 This complements the Committee's consistent
concern to learn about justiciability within states' domestic systems,
a concern which has culminated in the Committee setting out a nonexhaustive list of rights found in the Covenant which "would seem
to be capable" of being immediately justiciable 3 29 In its discussion
-27 See Review of Methods of Work of the Committee, in Report on the Fith Session,
supra note 260, 1 285; see also U.N. ESCOR, 4th Sess., 3d mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. E/
C.12/1990/SR.3 (1990) (discussing the possibilityof providing for a petition system).
For more detail on the way in which an Optional Protocol came to be discussed
within the Committee, see Alston, supra note 115, at 91-93; Simma, supra note 300,
at g0.2 8
3 See Report on the Sixth Session, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 6th Sess., 1 360, U.N. Doc. E/1992/23, E/C.12/1991/4 (1992). A
discussion note prepared by committee member Philip Alston on an optional protocol
to the ICESCR resonates with some of the key themes of this article and received the
following response:
The members of the committee.., supported the drafting of an optional
protocol since that would enhance the practical implementation of the
Covenant as well as the dialogue with States parties and would make it
possible to focus the attention of public opinion to a greater extent on
economic, social and cultural rights. The Covenant would no longer be
considered as a "poor relation" of the human rights instruments. Members
stressed that the doctrine of interdependence and indivisibility of human
rights should form the basis of any work done by the Committee on
drawing up such a draft.
Id. 1 362; see also U.N. ESCOR, 6th Sess., 1st mtg. at 61, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1991/Sr.1

(1992).

3
2 Report on the Fifjh Session, supra note 260, 15. Included in the Committee's list
are Articles 3 (gender equality with respect to all rights in the Covenant), 7(a)(i)
(equal pay for equal work, inter alia), 8 (various trade-union rights, including the right
to strike), 10(3) (special measures of protection and assistance for all children and
young persons, namely protection from economic and social exploitation including,
inter alia, legislation establishing age limits below which child labour is to be
prohibited), 13(2)(a) (compulsory and free primary education), 13(3) and (4) (parental
liberty rights with respect to education of children in private schools and religious
and moral education), and 15(3) (freedom ofscientific research and creative activity).
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of justiciable rights, the Committee highlights the unequivocal
justiciability of Article 2(2)'s right to non-discrimination with
3
respect to the rights found in the Covenant. 30
B. The Council of Europe Experience

The fracturing of civil and political rights from social and
economic rights also finds expression in two documents governing
the European community. The European Convention on Human
Rights35 1 and the European Social Charter3 2 were adopted by
the Council of Europe, which was established by western European
states to promote European political unity.33 3 The European
Convention on Human Rights in many ways mirrors the ICCPR,
guaranteeing a number of civil and political rights and establishing
a European Court of Human Rights for purposes of interpretation
and enforcement. The Social Charter, by contrast, is akin to the

ICESCR. It contains a number of social rights, including rights to
the protection of health, social security, social and medical
assistance, and social welfare services. Supervision has been based
on a reporting system, which, as will shortly be seen, has been able
to develop an extensive and relatively detailed case law even in the

absence of the concrete focus that an individual petition procedure
would supply.
The European Court has relied forcefully, if still only implicitly,
on the principle of the interdependence of human rights in its
reasoning in Airey, the case discussed above 3 34 that dealt with the
positive duty of Ireland to provide free civil legal aid to a woman
petitioning for judicial separation:

Two points can immediately be seen from this non-exhaustive list. First, the
rights in the Covenant are not limited to rights traditionally imagined as positive.
Second, rights with significant positive obligations are seen by the Committee as
immediately justiciable. See Limburg Principles,supra note 254, 1 8, at 1 (discussing
progressive versus immediate justiciability).
ss0 This has, of course, been confirmed in recentjurisprudence under Article 26
of the ICCPR, as was discussed above. See supranotes 301-10 and accompanying text.
531 ECHR, supra note 41. See generally P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1984) (discussing
the European Convention on Human Rights).
332 ESC, supra note 42. See generally HARRIS, supra note 109 (discussing the
Charter at length).
333 See generally F. Tennfjord, The EuropeanSocial Charter:.An Instrument of Social
Collaborationin Europe, [1961] 9 EUR. Y.B. 71 (Council of Europe) (discussing the
drafting of the ESC).
" See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
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The Court is aware that the further realisation of social and
economic rights is largely dependent on the situation-notably
financial-reigning in the State in question. On the other hand,
the Convention must be interpreted in the light of present-day
conditions ... and it is designed to safeguard the individual in a
real and practical way as regards those areas with which it deals...
Whilst the Convention sets forth what are essentially civil and
political rights, many of them have implications of a social and
economic nature.... [T]he mere fact that an interpretation of the
Convention may extend into the sphere of social and economic
rights should not be a decisive factor against such an interpretation; there is no water-tight division separating that sphere from
the field covered by the Convention 3 5
In so holding, the court made explicit what in our view is implicit
in the nature of the relationship between civil and political rights
and social rights: namely, that each category is indispensable to the
realization of the other. However, this case is notorious among
international human rights lawyers who follow European Court
jurisprudence in that it has been as scrupulously absent (even by
way of general citation) from subsequent case law as it was shining
in its promise of an adventurous new jurisprudence.3 3 6
For
instance, the court has failed to rely on the "Airey principle" in two
cases in which it would have bolstered the reasoning and strengthened the hand of the majority. Both cases, mentioned earlier, dealt
with Article 6(1)'s due process protections for social benefits. 3 7
Indeed, the majority in these two cases seemed intent on avoiding
basing (or being perceived as basing) the decision on the importance of procedural protections for these kinds of social rights. 3 8
Two recent freedom of expression cases also seem to reflect a
working principle diametrically contrary to that advanced in
Airey. 3 9 In each case, teachers were dismissed from their jobs on

335

Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14-15 (1979).

If there is any doubt about the potential radical implications of this passage,
despite the more modest result on the facts, one need only note the eloquent but
somewhat alarmed response from one of the dissentingjudges: "The war on poverty
cannot be won through broad interpretation of the Convention...." Airey, 32 Eur.
Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 26 (Vilhjalmsson, J., dissenting).
7
ss
See Deumeland v. Germany, 100 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21-30 (1986);
Feldbrugge v. The Netherlands, 99 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11-18 (1986); supra text
accompanying note 148.
338 See Scott, supra note 59, at 861-62 & n.331.
339 See Kosiek v. Germany, 105 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18-21 (1986); Glasenapp
336

v. Germany, 104 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22-27 (1986).
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the basis of the German authorities' evaluation that they were not
loyal to the Basic Law and its principles of a free democracy; one

was linked with the extreme left,- 40 and the other with the extreme right.3 4 1 They each claimed a breach of their right to free
expression under Article 10 of the Convention, but the court found
either that freedom of expression was not at issue or that it was not
sufficiently affected to have been breached.342 In any case, the
court cast the issue as one of equal access to public service
employment and held that such a right was deliberately omitted
during the drafting of the Convention, as compared to its express
inclusion in the Universal Declaration and the ICCPR.M3 As the
court stated in Glasenapp v. Germany, "[t]his is not therefore a
chance omission from the European instruments; as the Preamble
to the Convention states, they are designed to ensure the collective
enforcement of 'certain' of the rights stated in the Universal
44
Declaration."
Such compartmentalization does not walk on the same landscape
as Airey. It is not simply that the court failed to take account of
either applicant's employment interests, nor that it did not consider
that freedom of expression should be jealously protected. It is more
that the court was so ready to interpret the omission of what could
be viewed as a kind of social right as having covered the field to the
extent that freedom of expression was not viewed as implicated at
all. Each applicant (particularly Glasenapp) essentially had to trade
off a civil liberty for a job in his or her chosen profession of
teaching. Whatever substantive analysis may have justified limiting
freedom of expression, such analysis was avoided and the implicit
3 45
message of the case might well be described as "shut up and work."
340 See Glasenapp, 104 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11-13 (1986) (Glasenapp vocally

supported the German Communist Party's (KPD) policy of setting up an "international people's kindergarten" in her city).
341 SeeKosiek, 105 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 11-13 (Kosiek belonged to the neo-fascistNPD,
which advocated "extreme nationalism and a racist ideology").
342 The judgments are not entirely clear on this point.
34s See Glasenapp,104 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27 ("[A]ccess to the civil service lies
at the heart of the issue submitted to the Court. . . . That being so, there has been
no interference with the exercise of the right protected under paragraph I of Article

10.").
344 Id. at 25.
345 Added to this collective forgetting of Airey must be a reminder that the only
court decisions to have actively considered the relationship between the Convention
and the Charter, a trilogy of pre-Airey trade union cases, resulted in the court using
as one basis for its decision the fact that the European Social Charter itself does not
provide the protection claimed under the Convention by the applicants. This is all
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Compared to the limited inspiration coming from the European
Court, the bodies of the European Social Charter have been slowly
and practically building the case for the justiciability of social rights.
Supervision of the Social Charter is implemented through a
cumbersome review process.346 Furthermore, the body actually
the more significant given the fact that in these cases interdependence-sensitive,
detailed and creative arguments were presented to the court, including arguments
that first used the notion of related and organic rights relationships. See Schmidt v.

Sweden, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1976); Swedish Engine Drivers' Union v.
Sweden, 20 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1976); National Union of Belgian Police v.
Belgium, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1975).

Much like the laterJ.B. v. Canada,Communication No. 118/1982, reprintedin 2
under the ICCPR, these cases all involved
applications by trade unions or members to have various rights related to collective
SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 302, at 35,

bargaining recognized as falling within Article 11(1) of the European Convention.
Most of the rights in question were found in some form in Articles 5 and 6 of the
European Social Charter. In Swedish Engineand BelgianPolice, the court relied in part
on the fact that, as phrased in the European Social Charter, the claimed rights (to be
consulted and to have a collective agreement concluded with the union) were phrased
with such "prudence" that they did not count as "real" rights, and therefore could not
be implied into the Convention even if the court had been willing to do so. See
Swedish Engine at 15; Belgian Police at 18. In Schmidt, on the claim that post-strike
retroactivity of benefits should be read into Article 11(1), the court noted that "[s]uch
a right, which is enunciated neither in Article 11(1) nor even in the Social Charter...
is not indispensable .... " Schmidt at 15. At least with respect to certain rights found
in the Social Charter, we have the makings of an interpretive Catch-22: one cannot
borrow a right that is not in the Social Charter, and one cannot borrow a right that
is in the Social Charter (at least to the extent it is not "real").
In any case, the basic result is that the Charter is used as a kind of interpretive
foil which places a ceiling on what can be read into the Convention. Thus, the
Charter covers the field, so to speak, notwithstanding the Charter's own statement in
Article 32 that "[t]he provisions of this Charter shall not prejudice the provisions of
... any ... multilateral treaties, conventions or agreements which are already in
force, or may come into force, under which morefavourable treatmentwould be accorded
to the persons protected." ESC, supra note 42, art. 32, Europ. T.S. No. 35 at 18
(emphasis added). Article 32 must be reconciled with the following passage in the
Appendix to the Charter relating to Part III: "It is understood that the Charter
contains legal obligations of an international character, the application of which is
submitted solely to the supervision provided for in Part IV thereof." ESC, supra note
42, ap., Europ. T.S. No. 35 at 27.
6This involves a complicated system of reporting by, and committee evaluation
of, member states. These states are required to submit reports on their compliance
with those terms of the Social Charter that they have agreed to follow. A report
based on these reports is prepared by the Committee of Independent Experts (CIE)
and then submitted to the Governmental Social Committee of the Council of Europe.
On the basis of these conclusions, the Governmental Committee drafts a report which
in turn is submitted to the Committee of Ministers which, together with the
Parliamentary Assembly, decides whether "recommendations" to member states in
question are appropriate. See ESC, supra note 42, arts. 21-29, Europ. T.S. No. 35 at
14-17.
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creating most of the jurisprudence, the Committee of Independent
Experts (CIE), sits on the lowest rung of a process that, in technical
s47
legal terms, can only result in non-binding recommendations.
Despite the weak nature of the Charter's control machinery, the
CIE has been able to establish a dialogue with social policy-makers
in governments. Over a period of twenty years it has been able to
generate a wealth of conclusions that demonstrate the possibility of
assessing with considerable precision whether or not a state has
lived up to its international obligations in the social rights
field. 48 In its 1992 report, the CIE found violations of the
Charter by all seven states examined. s49 Some examples from the
5 0°
case law will illustrate
One area of jurisprudence constante involves the Committee's
interpretation of Article 13(1), dealing with the right to social and
medical assistance for those in need, 51 as creating a positive
obligation on the state.35 2 The main element of this case law is
the Committee's determination that social assistance must be a
claimable right in domestic law:
[I]t is compulsory for those states accepting the article to accord
assistance to necessitous persons as of right; the Contracting
Parties are no longer merely empowered to grant assistance as they
347 See generally HARRIS, supra note 109, at 222-34 (outlining the procedure and
impact of CIE recommendations). For the details of a new reporting system under
Article 21 which would require states to report each year to the Committee on half
of the "hard-core" Charter provisions (those which all states must accept), and on a
quarter of the other articles, which represents a procedural change from the former
practice of requiring a full report every two years, see COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN
SOCIAL CHARTER, REPORT SETTING OUT A PROPOSAL FOR A CHANGE IN THE
REPORTING SYSTEM PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 21 OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER,

Charte/Rel (92)19 (May 27, 1992).
" To date, the Council of Europe has published three annotated article-by-article
digests of the jurisprudence of the Charter. Although the digests report on all of the
Charter organs, most entries come from CIE reports. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra
note 100; COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CASE LAW ON THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER (Supp.
1986); COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CASE LAW ON THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER (Supp.

No. 2 1987).
s 9 The "score" was: Denmark (non-compliance with respect to 5 provisions;
unable to say due to inadequate or inappropriate information with respect to 2
provisions); Greece (15; 19); Iceland (6; 3); the Netherlands (11; 5); Norway (3; 6);
Sweden (5; 5); United Kingdom (12; 3). See CIE, CONCLUSIONS XII-1, supra note 100,
at 257, 268-69, 286, 295-96, 309, 320, 331-32.
3" See also supra note 100 (discussing the controversial case law surrounding
Article 8(1) on maternity leave benefits).
351 See ESC, supra note 42, art. 13, Europ. T.S. No. 35 at 10.
35 2

See COMMITTEE OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER,

CONCLUSIONS X-1, at 115 (1987) [hereinafter CIE, CONCLUSIONS X-1].
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think fit; they are under
an obligation, which they may be called
35
on in court to honour.
Several countries have applied this basic principle on a number of
occasions,354 and many have required a right of appeal as well.3 55
Although the Committee does press governments on adequacy of
benefits under Article 13(1), it appears to have made a strategic
decision to concentrate its efforts on requiring states to make the
level of benefits subject to domestic judicial evaluation, presumably
so as to make case-by-case evaluations of need systematic and to
harness local knowledge and the greater institutional resources of
3
domestic legal systems. 5
A second area involving the level of protection is that dealing
with compulsory education, as guaranteed by Article 7(3) of the
Social Charter. For example, the Committee criticized an Irish
order which permitted children to do up to thirty-five hours a week
of light, non-industrial work during holidays. The Committee held
the restrictions on children's work to be "insufficient" and criticized
Ireland for its failure to provide a list of permitted and prohibited
57
types of work.
353 COMMITTEE OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER,

CONCLUSIONS I, at 64 (1969-70) [hereinafter CIE, CONCLUSIONS I]. The Committee

ties the Charter requirement that there be a court-enforceable domestic legal right
to a view that the Charter involved an "attempt... to break away from the old idea
of assistance, which was bound up with the dispensing of charity." Id.
35 See, e.g., CIE, CONCLUSIONS X-1, supranote 352, at 115 (it was not enough that
in Greek law social assistance constituted a state obligation; such obligation had to be
enforceable as of individual right); see also COMMITTEE OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS OF
THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER, CONCLUSIONS VII, at 75-76 (1981) [hereinafter CIE,
CONCLUSIONS VII] (despite an "innovatory" reorganization and decentralization of
activities in the Italian health sector which "seems likely to result in better protection

of the rights to social and medical assistance," such substantive protection was not
enough
without "a genuine subjective right to social assistance").
55
3 See COMMITTEE OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER,
CONCLUSIONS XI-2, at 119-21 (1991) [hereinafter CIE, CONCLUSIONS XI-2] (Italy and
Spain); CIE, CONCLUSIONS XII-1, supra note 100, at 188, 192 (Greece and United
Kingdom).
f56 See CIE, CONCLUSIONS X11-1, supra note 100, at 190-92 (indicating that the
United Kingdom's benefits scheme was deficient because it was overly discretionary);
see also CIE, CONCLUSIONS X-1, supra note 352, at 121 (finding Spain in violation of

the requirement to provide assistance as of right and "express[ing] concern" at the
underinclusiveness of the social assistance laws).
357

See COMMITTEE OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER,

CONCLUSIONS IX-2, at 52-53 (1986) [hereinafter CIE, CONCLUSIONS IX-2];see also CIE,
CONCLUSIONS XI-2, supra note 355, at 84-85 (criticizing Italy for noncompliance with
this provision of the charter); CIE, CONCLUSIONS XIIo-, supra note 100, at 135-36
(finding that the Netherlands violated Article 7(3) for allowing 15 year olds to work
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A third significant area of case law that shows a much more
confident level of inquiry concerns the right guaranteed by Article
4(1) "to a remuneration [sufficient for] a decent standard of living."
In this area the Committee has established a "decency threshold" by
which to judge the situation of different groups in the wage
economy, placing considerable emphasis on the situation of
vulnerable sectors of society. The Committee has stated that the
lowest wage actually paid in an economic sector or occupation
cannot fall below 68% of the national average wage, with social
benefits and taxation factored in.3 58 This allows "member states
to meet the criteria of [Article 4(1)] by using- [fiscal and social
transfer] policies in those cases where wages alone were not
sufficient. " 35 9 For example, one recent Committee report found
that the United Kingdom was in violation of this "68% rule." It
concluded that at least 25% of all workers, and at least 50% of all
6
female workers, earned less than the "decency threshold."1 1
A final example involves Article 19(6), which the Committee has
used to take a particular interest in the housing situation of foreign
workers.3 6 1 It has interpreted the provision to oblige the state to
take special measures to assist foreign workers in finding accommodation for their families, unless conditions on the housing market
render this unnecessary. It has persisted with this interpretation
despite the insistence of governments that their specific housing
obligations vis-4-vis foreign workers require them only to treat
3 62
foreign workers no worse (or better) than their own nationals.
forty hours per week during holidays and to deliver newspapers after 6 a.m. on school
days and reasoning that "the main purpose of holidays is to let young people rest
after a year of study in order to derive greater benefit from the next year's course").
358 See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 100, at 29-30 (describing how the
Committee moved away from very open-ended country-specific evaluations

and came

to adopt studies of poverty by the Council of Europe and the OECD as the
foundation of its work). Apart from tax and social benefits entering in as a regular
part of the equation, the Committee gives itself some latitude to raise or lower the
percentage somewhat based upon whether there is a general trend towards "excessive
widening of income distribution," on the one hand, or "an effort on the part of the
government of a country to ensure sustained progress in the social field for workers,"
on the other hand. Id.
359 CIE, CONCLUSIONS XII-1, supra note 100, at 93.
M Id. at 92.
36 See ESC, supranote 42, art. 19(6), Europ. T.S. No. 35 at 13 ("[T]he Contracting
parties undertake ... to facilitate as far as possible the reunion of the family of a
foreign worker permitted to establish himself in the territory.").
32 These governments assert that a separate subsection of art. 19 exhaustively sets
out their obligations in this matter. See id. art. 19(4)(c), Europ. T.S. No. 35 at 13
(requiring states to secure for foreign workers "treatment not less favourable than

1992]

ROPES OF SAND

On this reading, if the state has no housing program at all, foreign
workers would not be receiving "less favourable" "treatment" than
nationals. The Committee's interpretation seems to recognize the
special vulnerability of foreign workers in contemporary Europe by
requiring the state to provide active assistance in bringing families
together. By insisting on housing as crucial to the reunification of
families, the Committee has also demonstrated on many occasions
that it is prepared to find that states have not done enough. s63
For two decades, governments and legal scholars have discussed
whether more individualized protection mechanisms within the
Council of Europe system for social rights are necessary. Proposals
have alternated between adding a social rights protocol to the
European Convention on Human Rights and enhancing the
machinery of the European Social Charter through a protocol to
that treaty.5 64 Recently, the movement towards justiciability for
that of their own nationals in respect of... accommodation[s]"). For a summary

view of the mutual resistance of governments and the Committee to each other's
interpretations, see COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 100, at 163-68.
3 See, e.g., CIE, CONCLUSIONS VII, supra note 354, at 105 (stating that the
Swedish housing shortage, particularly of multiple-family dwellings, hindered foreign
workers' ability to find accommodations, necessitating that "practical measures be
taken with a view to remedying the situation").
3 See Alston, supra note 115, at 82 (surveying the proposals of various
commentators on the topic of improved protection mechanisms in the social rights
arena); F.G. Jacobs, The Extension of the European Convention on Human Rights to
Include Economic,Social and CulturalRights, 3 HUM. RTS. Rnv. 166 (1978) (discussing
the appropriateness of incorporating a social rights protocol into the Convention).
However, there have been other kinds of proposals. An Austrian proposal in
1990 suggested the enactment of an entirely new treaty on economic, social, and
cultural rights that would provide for individual claims but which would subject such
claims to a conciliation procedure instead ofjudicial or quasi-judicial scrutiny. See
Klaus Berchtold, Councilof EuropeActivities in the Fieldof Economi4 Socialand Cultural
Rights, in THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, supra note 300,
at 355.
Others have proposed that the system of supervision currently in place in the
Social Charter be replaced, or complemented, with rights of petition and the
establishment of a European Court of Social Rights. For example, the European
Parliament asserted:
Verification of... [compliance with] the Social Charter should no longer
be based only on the periodical submission by governments ofall-embracing
national reports. A system of petitions and complaints must be devised,

possibly with ultimate rulings to be given under an authority similar to that
of the European Court of Human Rights.
Resolution 967 on Renewal of the Council of Europe's Social Charter,EUR. PARL. Ass.
TEXTS ADOPTED 43d Sess. 2 (June 28, 1991); see also Recommendation 839 on the
Revision of the European Social Charter,EuR. PARL. Ass. TEXTS ADOPTED 30th Sess. 2
(Sept. 28, 1978) (advocating individual petitions to the Committee of Independent
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social rights has proceeded rapidly. First, the Council of Europe
adopted and opened for ratification an additional Protocol to the
European Social Charter. The Protocol, by amending Article 24 of
the Charter, explicitly endorsed the current practice of the CIE.
The amendments included the addition of a new subsection:
With regard to the reports referred to in Article 21, the Committee of Independent Experts shall assess from a legal standpoint the
complianceof nationallaw and practicewith the obligationsarising from

the Charter for the Contracting Parties concerned.

r5

This amendment represents a critical acknowledgement. Put
simply, if the Charter now accepts that "compliance" can be assessed
by the Committee of Independent Experts, some assessments could
just as easily be initiated by an individual petition. As David Harris,
a current member of the CIE, has argued, even the present findings
of violations are "juridically no different from any such finding as
might result from the operation of a system of petitions [and have]
66
presented no inherent difficulties."
Indeed, developments have not stopped with this amendment.
The institutional competence that has gradually built up through the
Committee's experience interpreting the Charter has proven
sufficiently impressive for the Council of Europe to have decided to
forge ahead with a complaints procedure. The same conference that
adopted the new Protocol recommended that a draft Protocol
providing for a system of collective complaints be opened for
signature soon. Additionally, the conference advocated that work
continue on how to improve the effectiveness of the Charter's
3 67
supervisory machinery.
Experts and the establishment of a Court of Social Rights); David Harris & Teun
Jaspers, The System ofSupervisionof the EuropeanSocial Charter-Problemsand Optionsfor
the Future, in THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL POLICY 11, at 30-36 (Lammy Betten
ed., 1989) (advocating the introduction of a right of petition into the Charter system
of enforcement); C. Villars, Social Security Standardsin the CouncilofEurope: The ILO
Influence, 118 INT'L LAB. REv. 343, 353 (1979) (supporting the concept of a European
Social Court); Comment, Social Charter The State of Play, 209 EUR. IND. REL. REV. 22
(1991).
365 Protocol Amending the European Social Charter, Oct. 21, 1991, art. 2, Europ.
T.S. No. 142 at 4 [hereinafter Protocol] (amending ESC, supranote 42, art. 24, Europ.
T.S. No. 35 at 15) (emphasis added).
366 HARRIS, supra note 109, at 269. Harris is a recently added member of the
Committee
of Independent Experts and a leading proponent of a petition procedure.
67
3 See Recommendations (a) and (c), FinalResolution of the Conference,Council of
Europe Ministerial Conference on the European Social Charter, Turin, 21-22
October, 1991.
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In the most general terms, a draft Additional Protocol Providing
for a System of Collective Complaints 368 provides for organizations-not individual persons-to submit complaints. Thus this
treaty will deal with collective complaints.3 69 The CIE, as the
"adjudicative" body, will accept complaints in writing and solicit
information from the parties. It will have the option of calling a
hearing into the matter but such a procedure is not mandatory.
The CIE will produce a report regarding each complaint. This reply
will be sent directly to the Committee of Ministers who must vote
by two-thirds majority on a recommendation to the state in question
if the CIE has found that the Charter has not been "satisfactorily applied." 7 0 The Draft Protocol also contains a provision which
links the recommendation to the report procedure under Article 21
by mandating that states report to the CIE on what measures they
have taken to conform to the recommendation. In this way, some
3"All
documents with respect to the Additional Protocol are classified as
"Confidential" and thus are unavailable to the public. However, the authors have
spoken to government and Council of Europe officials about the contents of the
Protocol, including the tentative numbers assigned to its various provisions. They are
confident, as are we, the editors, that the following is an accurate description of the
Draft Protocol in the form it was sent to the Committee of Ministers from the
Charter Relations Committee on May 20, 1992. We expect that the new Protocol to
be o en for signature in late 1992.
3 Significantly, potential organizations are not limited to the international trade
union or employers organizations which have traditionally been the "social partners"
of governments within the Charter's structure. See ESC, supra note 42, art. 27(2),
Europ. T.S. No. 35 at 16 (stating that members of international trade unions and
employers' organizations may constitute alimited number of the Governmental Social
Committee's Sub-Committee).
Under certain conditions both international and national non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs") can bring complaints. International NGOs must have
consultative status and be placed on a special list decided by a two thirds majority of
the Governmental Committee following application. Criteria for being on the list will
not, apparently, appear in the Protocol itself but observers indicate that the
Committee of Ministers will be asked to promulgate rules of procedure and criteria,
among which will be the requirement that the international NGO illustrate, through
detailed documentation, that it has access to authoritative sources of information; will
be able to carry out reliable verifications; and will have the capacity to put together
reliable complaint files. See id.
70 The precise legal status of the CIE's "conclusions" in the draft Protocol on
whether the Charter has been satisfactorily applied remains a matter of textual
ambiguity as this Article goes to press. This ambiguity should be compared to the
wording of the Amending Protocol of October 1991 which emphasized the "legal"
function of the CIE in "assess[ing] ... compliance" under the report procedure. See
Protocol, supra note 365, art. 2, Europ. T.S. No. 142 at 4. The legal status of these
conclusions may determine the degree of deference afforded to CIE pronouncements
by domestic courts. In turn, a substantial amount of deference may translate into
domestic remedies for aggrieved individuals.
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symbiosis, including a structured follow-up procedure that is novel
even to domestic law, may develop between the complaints cases
and the CIE's over-all treatment of a state report.
Sustenance for this symbiosis will be found, it seems, in the
Protocol's travaux pr6paratoires(preparatory work) which likely will
reflect an understanding that a "collective" complaint refers notjust
to the character of the complainant but also to the nature of the
situation described. The situation which is the subject of the
complaint must involve a question of the compatibility of a law or
practice with the Charter at a general level. According to this Draft
Protocol, organizations will not be permitted to submit complaints
seeking specific conclusions regarding individual cases. If successful, this approach will not prevent the CIE from hearing illustrative
evidence of individual situations, and situations of particular societal
groups, in order to judge compliance in terms of how a law is
actually working. Without evidence culled from individual situations, the complaints procedure could easily degenerate into the
kind of overly abstract dialogue that currently plagues report
procedures. Stories of individual suffering woven into a broader
narrative about the general impact of a law or practice, especially
when used by sophisticated nongovernmental organizations
("NGOs"), could actually be an improvement over a purely individual petition procedure because it may be more likely to produce
complaints focusing on systemic or otherwise widespread violations.
Exclusion of individual situations should thus be limited to
precluding the Committee's specification of individual remedies.
Even this limitation would, however, have its costs. It would
complicate the attempts of social action organizations to generate
a broader politics out of the cases being heard before the Committee. A case without a name and a face will have some trouble
capturing the imagination of the media and society at large.
Caveats aside, the Draft Protocol is nothing short of a landmark,
one which sends the unequivocal message that general claims of the
nonjusticiability of social rights are deficient and that the legitimacy
of the values underpinning social rights permit the exploration of
uncharted terrain.

3 71

371 For references that suggest that the principle of interdependence may have
played a role in helping to muster the institutional and interstate will of the Council
of Europe to move so quickly after such a long period of relative procrastination, see
Xavier Dijon, La Convention europienne et le droits de l'homme le plus dimuni, 107
JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 716 (1988); P.H. Imbert, Droitsdes Pauvres,Pauvre(s)Droit(s)?
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C. The Inter-American System

The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man was
adopted by the member states of the Organization of American
States in 1948, prior to the Universal Declaration. 72 Like the
Universal Declaration, the American Declaration guarantees not
only civil and political but also social and economic rights, the latter
including such rights as health care, food, clothing, housing, and
education, as well as the more general right to life. The InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, an organ established by
the OAS Charter, is granted a general mandate to both promote
and protect human rights as well as broad powers to determine its
37 3
own structure, procedures and jurisdiction.
One function that the Commission assumed early on in its
existence was that of conducting investigations and compiling
special country reports as well as including commentary on the
human rights situations of particular countries in the Commission's
annual report to the OAS General Assembly. Perhaps not surprisingly in the context of Latin America, the Commission has paid a
considerable amount of attention to social rights in its country
reports.3

74

While not often specific in its recommendations, it

has been willing to conduct an analysis which condemns in general
terms the lack of protection accorded to such rights, and links
3 75
violations to the economic structure of the country in question.
Riflexions sur lea droits iconomique, sociaux et culturels, 1989 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC
ET DE LA SCIENCE, POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ET A ETRANGER 739, 748-50;J.M. Verdier,
Les droits iconomiques et sociaux: rhlanceau Conseil de l'Europe?, 4 DRoIT SOCIAL 415,
418 para. 22 (1992). Imbert is the Assistant Director for Human Rights in the
Council of Europe and closely involved with the Social Charter. He undoubtedly had
a hand in preparing a recent informational book that emphasizes the indivisibility of
human rights on the first page. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL
CHARTER: ORIGIN, OPERATION AND RESULTS 1 (1991).
3 72
See American Declaration, supra note 43, reprintedin BUERGENTHAL & NORRIS,
supra note 43, pt. 1, ch. IV, at 1.
373 See Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T.
2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 48 [hereinafter OAS Charter], amended by Protocol of Buenos
Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607.
374 The Commission hangs its jurisdictional hat on an amalgam of the rights in the
American Declaration, supra note 43, ch. I, arts. XI-XVI, reprinted in BUERGENTHAL
& NORRIS, supra note 43, pt. 1, ch. IV, at 3-4, on the very general Article 26 in the
American Convention, supra note 44, art. 26, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 152; and on the OAS
Charter generally, supra note 373, art. 32, 2 U.S.T. at 2399, 119 U.N.T.S. at 60-62.
375 See, e.g., Report on the Situation of Human Rights in El Salvador, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., OEA/ser. L/V/II. 46, doc. 23 rev. 1, at 162-67 (November 1978), reprinted
in THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, ET AL., PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS:
SELECTED PROBLEMS 154, 157 (3d rev. ed. 1990). These reports do not languish in
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Of considerable interest with respect to the principle of interdependence is the following statement of the framework the Commission
claims to utilize:
When examining the situation of human rights in various
countries, the Commission has had to establish the organic
relationship between the violation of the rights to physical safety
on the one hand, and the neglect of economic and social rights
and suppression of political participation, on the other. That
relationship, as has been shown, is in large measure one of cause
and effect. In other words, neglect of social and economic rights,
especially when political participation has been suppressed,
produces the kind of polarization that then leads to acts of
terrorism by and against the government.
The essence of the legal obligation incurred by any government in this area is to strive to attain the economic and social
aspirations of its people, by following an order that assigns priority
to the basic needs of health, nutrition and education. The priority
of the 'rights of survival' and 'basic needs' is a natural conse3 76
quence of the right to personal security.
By interpreting the Declaration to be incorporated into the
general human rights provision of the Charter of the Organization
of American States, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights has empowered itself to hear individual petitions and render
recommendations to individual states on the basis of the Declaration. In the Yanomami case, 3 7 7 a petition against the Government
of Brazil was presented by several human rights groups, alleging
violations of the rights of the Yanomami Indians. Thousands of
Yanomami Indians had been forced to abandon their homeland
after a plan, approved by the Brazilian government, to exploit the
natural resources of the Amazon region was implemented. The plan
led to the construction of a highway which cut through the
Yanomami's territory and to the discovery of rich mineral deposits
in the area. It was alleged that the massive penetration of outsiders,
from prospectors to mining companies, had devastating consequences for the Yanomami Indians, including the disintegration of

compl1ete obscurity. See id. at 157, 165 (responses of criticized governments).
3 6 Annual Report (1979-1980), Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser. L/V/II.50, doc.13
rev. 1, at 2 (1980), reprinted in BUERGENTHAL, supra note 375, at 167.
-77

Resolution No. 12/85, Case No. 7615 (1985) (Brazil), reprinted in 1985 INTER284, at 264.

AM. YEARBOOK, supra note
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traditional social structures, the introduction of prostitution, and
the spread of epidemics and disease.
The Commission held, inter alia, that the failure of the Brazilian
Government to take "timely and effective measures" on behalf of
the Yanomami Indians resulted in violations of their rights to life,
liberty and personal security, rights to residence and movement, and
rights to the preservation of health and well-being as guaranteed by
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.3 78 It
further recommended that the government continue to take
"preventive and curative health measures to protect the lives and
3 79
health of Indians exposed to infectious or contagious diseases."
Despite the fact that the Commission only has the power to issue
recommendations, the Yanomami case illustrates the fact that social
rights can be adjudicated by quasi-judicial bodies. By viewing the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man as containing
non-enforceable secondary duties to protect and tertiary duties to
fulfill certain social rights, the Commission in effect recommended
that the government take steps to ensure the well-being of the
Yanomami people.
While the above case is one example of the American Declaration having been interpreted as involving justiciable social rights in
addition to civil and political rights, the Declaration is still considered second in importance to the American Convention on Human
Rights. In part, the lower status of the Declaration is due to the fact
that, unlike the American Convention, it is not a treaty. As well as
being a treaty, the American Convention also has particular
procedures and control machinery, notably the possibility of cases
reaching the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.3 8 0 Like the
United Nations' instruments and the experience of the Council of
Europe, the American Convention does not expressly permit
individualized judicial or quasi-judicial scrutiny of alleged social
rights violations.
However, the Inter-American Court has addressed, at an abstract
level, the extent to which social rights could be subjected to quasijudicial or judicial review, and whether an instrument providing for
such review should be a separate convention. It did so in response
to a request to give its opinion on what was then a draft protocol to
the American Convention dealing with social rights.3 81 On both
378 See id. at 276.
3

79

Id. at 278.

38 See American Convention, supranote 44, arts. 52-53, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 157-61.
381 See Observations of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the Draft
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issues the court tied its reasoning to the principle of interdependence. Its approach to the justiciability of social rights relied on a
relatively fluid conception of justiciability, one that does not
embrace a sharp distinction between civil and political, and social
and economic rights, and that acknowledges that the boundaries of
justiciability are fluid ones. In admitting that justiciability is a
moving target, the court advocated looking, inter alia, to the
experience under the European Social Charter. Furthermore, it
advocated that the instrument be a protocol rather than a separate
convention in order that changes in the justiciable status of rights
over time could be accommodated within a single unified framework. In sum, the court appealed to the interdependence principle
to emphasize both the importance of social rights and the urgency
of securing more effective protection for them, 382 as well as to
support their view that the Protocol should be seen as part of the
basic civil and political rights convention and not set apart in the
38 3
manner of the Covenants.
The instrument that was eventually adopted was, following the
court's recommendation, a Protocol to the Convention, the
preamble of which contains a formulation of the interdependence
principle.3 84 Despite the hints by the court that there are a
number of rights which it would have considered justiciable, only
two provisions in the entire Protocol are incorporated by reference
into the American Convention's complaints procedures by Article

Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights, in INTER-AMERICAN
COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS & INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, INTER-

AMERICAN YEARBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
1986, at 440 (1988). The court's
"observations" represent not only the highest level consideration of the issues
discussed in this article, but also the court has been the only judicial body to have
faced the questions so directly.
382 "In this regard, the Court fully shares the conviction that those are authentic
fundamental human rights. As the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, the
people have determined 'to promote social progress and better standards of life in
a larger freedom .. . because since human rights and fundamental freedoms are
indivisible, the full realization of civil and political rights without the enjoyment of
economic, social and cultural rights is impossible." Id. at 442 (citing Declarationof
Teheran, International Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41
(1968)); see also id. at 448 (tying the enjoyment of all human rights to effective
democracy).
383 One of the reasons for the court's determination was "the essential unity,
interdependence and mutual conditioning of all human rights." Id. at 444.
384 See Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Nov. 14, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 161 (1989)

(recognizing the "dose relationship that exists between economic, social and cultural
rights and civil and political rights") [hereinafter Additional Protocol].
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19(6) of the Protocol. Those are the right of workers to organize
trade unions (Article 8(a)) and the right to education (Article
13).385
Even though petitionable claims are limited, Article 19(7) of the
Protocol still leaves considerable room for interpretive development
by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights.
The
Commission "may formulate such observations and recommendations as it deems pertinent concerning the status of the economic,
social and cultural rights established in the present Protocol in all
or some of the States parties."3 8 6 Still, the Inter-American Protocol, while a beginning, does not seriously challenge traditional
conceptions of justiciability and, in light of the draft European
Social Charter Protocol, the Inter-American organs may feel
compelled eventually to revisit their own Protocol.
The above examples are not offered to romanticize the international law experience. The principle of interdependence has been
marginalized from international jurisprudence ever since the
decision was made to split the Universal Declaration into two
Covenants. International legal discourse continues to draw a
distinction between civil and political rights, and social rights. Such
a distinction discriminates against the poor since they are the ones
who most need respect for economic and social rights in order to
3 87
breathe life into liberty.
385 Article 13 includes a whole series of positive rights, some phrased in ways
which suggest more or less immediate duties to fulfill, e.g., Article 13(3)(a) on
primary education, and some of which are much more programmatically worded, e.g.,
Article 13(3)(d) on basic education. See id. at 165. However, Article 19(6) conditions
claims with the requirement that the right in question be "violated by action directly
attributable to a State Party" which seems to characterize the right in negative terms.
Id. at 168.
" Additional Protocol, supra note 384, art. 19(7), 28 I.L.M. at 168.
387
SeeJackman, supra note 59, at 335-37 (discussing how the distinction between
rights categories discriminates against the poor).
An eloquent and forceful statement of this perspective was advanced at the 1987
session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights by the leader of
International Movement ATD Fourth World, a nongovernmental organization known
for its work with the poorest of the poor and for its philosophy of empowerment:
[T]he situation of families living in extreme poverty shows that the lack of
economic, social and cultural rights compromises the civil and political
rights which are considered a priori as the easiest to guarantee. Their
situation forces us to make a closer study of the question of the indivisibility
of human rights....
...How does it happen that human rights to which, in principle, all
human beings are entitled, become in reality rights that cannot be exercised
without a minimum of means?
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While current international jurisprudence or supervisory
procedures cannot be viewed as anything even approaching a place
of refuge for the poor and underprivileged, this is in part because
the original principles underlying the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights have been ignored. The principle of the interdependence of human rights is at the core of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and cannot be ignored by any state interested in
questions of constitutional design. If South Africa were to constitutionalize social rights alongside classical civil and political rights, it
not only would be resurrecting the principle of interdependence,
but it would also be acting in accordance with the original vision of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Such a constitution
might also actively embrace a methodology of "looking to the
bottom"38s in order to fill social rights with the emphatic insight of
context.3 8 9 For the glimmerings of such a methodology, we turn
now to the Indian story.
V.

THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF

HUMAN

RIGHTS AND THE

INDIAN EXPERIENCE

The interdependence of human rights finds recognition,
implicitly and explicitly, in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
of India surrounding public interest litigation and the Indian
Constitution. The illustration of India is instructive since it
illustrates that judicial competence is a function of effort and will.
... The [UN] Commission on Human Rights should have access to the
experience of the most underprivileged populations, not only because this
is standard democratic procedure but also because the most poverty-stricken
experience situations and draw conclusions that are beyond the conception
of persons in a different situation.
Joseph Wresinski, Extreme Poverty: A Human Rights Challenge of Our Time, U.N.
ESCOR, Human Rts. Comm'n, 43d Sess., Agenda Item 8, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
1987/NGO/2 (1987).
38 Matsuda, supra note 14, at 323.
389 Many authors have argued for a methodology of creating human rights
meaning from the standpoint of historically oppressed groups. See, e.g., Upendra
Baxi, From Human Rights to the Right to be Human: Some Heresies, 13 INDIAN INT'L
CENTRE Q. 185-86 (1986) (discussing how classical human rights "ignore the entire
problematic of human needs"); Upendra Baxi, TakingSufferingSeriously: SocialAction

Litigation in the Supreme Court of India, in JUDGES AND THE JUDICIAL POWER: ESSAYS
IN HONOUR OFJUSTICE V.R. KRISHNA IYER 289, 291-305 (Rajeev Dhavan et al. eds.,

1985) (describing the emergence of social action litigation in Indian jurisprudence);
White, supra note 11, passim (drawing on radical education theory). This argument
has also been made as an interpretive methodology in the international human rights
context. See Scott, supra note 59, at 789 (drawing on liberation theology).
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The Indian experience may also be useful for South Africa given
that each country is characterized by an economically-privileged
minority and oppressive poverty for the vast majority of the
populace. It is also relevant in that India's constitutionalization of
the functions of a social state grew out of a struggle against colonial
domination and a more socialist philosophy which that struggle
engendered. 39° Beyond these very general considerations, Indian
case law is of interest because it demonstrates an embryonic judicial
willingness and capacity to address aspects of social rights in
a way
91
that challenges many received notions of the judicial role.
"Public interest litigation" in India has been described by former
Chief Justice Bhagwati as "a strategy evolved by the Supreme Court
of India with a view to securing observance of the law by the State
and its agencies and reaching social justice to the large masses of
underprivileged persons in the country." 92 Originally, public
interest litigation referred to what has now come to be known as
epistolary jurisdiction, ajurisdiction forged by the court's interpretation of Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, according to which
traditional rules of procedure are waived or modified as regards
claimed violations of the rights of the poor or other socially
oppressed groups. It is now possible to move the court with a
simple letter which can be sent not only by affected individuals but
by public interest groups or other citizens on their behalf. 393 The
term "public interest litigation" in India has now come to refer
more generally to the substantive body of constitutional human
390 See de Villiers, supra note 4, at 30 (stating that the "directive principles of state
policy and fundamental rights in the Constitution originated during the struggle
against British rule").
391 See id. at 32-33 (illustrating that human rights directives can no longer be
ignored by the courts).
392 P.N. Bhagwati, PublicInterest Litigation,2 COMMONWEALTH LAW. 61, 61 (1986).
In Bihar Legal Support Soc'y v. ChiefJustice of India, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 295, 297, the
Indian Supreme Court stated that the poor are entitled to "preferential consideration."

See generally S.K. AGRAWALA, PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN INDIA:

A

CRmQUE (1985) (criticizing the history and future of public interest litigation in
India); G.L. Peiris, Public Interest Litigation in the Indian Subcontinent: Current
Dimensions,40 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 66, 66 (1991) (stating that public interest litigation
represents a "bold but controversial response to the perceived implications of social
inequality and economic deprivation").
93 For a discussion of this procedural innovation, see Cassels, supra note 59, at
499; P.P. Craig & S.L. Deshpande, Rights, Autonomy and Process: Public Interest
Litigation in India, 9 OXFORDJ. LEGAL STUD. 356, 361 (1989); Peiris, supra note 392,
at 67-68.
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rights law that
has emerged as a result of the court's jurisprudential
94

initiatives. 3

The most significant aspect of Indian public interest litigation
is the manner in which the Directive Principles of State Policy in
Part IV of the Constitution have been creatively relied upon by the
court in the process by which meaning has been given to entrenched constitutional guarantees. For our purposes, entrenched
constitutional guarantees are referred to in the Indian Constitution
as Fundamental Rights, and roughly correspond to the civil and
political rights set out in the ICCPR. By contrast, the Directive
Principles are roughly akin to those cultural, economic and social
rights listed in the ICESCR. 95 By Article 37 of the Constitution,
96
the Directive Principles are expressly non-enforceable in court.3
The court has shown a marked tendency, however, to take the
principle of the interdependence of human rights seriously and to
interpret entrenched constitutional guarantees in light of the
Directive Principles. 3 97 It should be noted from the outset that
the Indian illustration is still one step removed in terms of the
issues of legitimacy and competence from what would be the case

It should be noted that the Indian judiciary has not always been associated with
this approach and had previously been known for remaining true to its elite and
propertied origins by vigorously resisting legislative initiatives in the areas of land
reform and other redistributive measures through the right to property. The
development of a radical rhetoric by the court can be understood as at least in part

a conscious attempt to retrieve lost legitimacy and relevance. See Cassels, supra note
59, at 510-11 ("The newjudial activism may... be understood as part of the courts'
effort to retrieve a degree of legitimacy... ."); see also UPENDRA BAXI, THE INDIAN
SUPREME COURT AND POLITICS 188 (1980) (discussing how "well-considered moves on
the part of the Court will add to a source of legitimation").
T15 See de Villiers, supra note 4, at 34 (stating that the Fundamental Rights/
Directive Principles division does not correspond exactly to the civil and political
rights/economic, social and cultural rights division).
396 INDIAN CONST. art. 37 ("The provisions contained in this Part shall not be
enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless
fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall'be the duty of the State to
apply these principles in making laws.").
397 De Villiers divides his study into three chronological stages ofjurisprudence
concerning the relationship between the two parts of the constitution. "Initially
fundamental rights were 'sacrosanct' and sovereign to directive principles. Later, the
courts stressed the interpretative harmony and nexus, and for the past decade they
have tended to uphold legislation which, even though it may limit fundamental rights,
furthers the ideals of the directive principles." de Villiers, supra note 4, at 40.
Whatever the merits of this chronological classification, our focus is better described
in terms of a fourth "stage," in which not only are directive principles used as a shield
against certain challenges based on fundamental rights, but also used in sword-like
fashion to infuse the interpretations of those fundamental rights.
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if South Africa gave a meta-democratic, constitutional mandate to
the judiciary to involve themselves in social rights adjudication. The
Supreme Court of India's embryonic jurisprudence has been, to a
significant degree, fashioned against the constitutional grain of
India's constitution. The mediating variables of the bifurcated
structure of the Indian Constitution and the presence of Article 37
need not be present in a new South African constitution.
A number of cases illustrate the borrowing process between the
two parts of the Indian Constitution and provide examples of how
social rights can be susceptible to judicial determination. Perhaps
the best known cases are those interpreting the right to life in
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution so as to protect a spectrum of
social rights found in the Directive Principles of State Policy. In
Frances Mullin v. Union Territoy of Delhi,398 a British national
detained on smuggling charges was allowed only restricted access to
a lawyer and members of his family. A right to counsel is not listed
as a Fundamental Right in the Constitution, yet the court found that
the right to life includes a right to consultations with friends, family,
and legal counsel.
From this unlikely beginning, the court laid down wide-ranging
principles on the meaning of the right to life. The court asserted
that the right to life was the "ark of all other rights" and therefore
had to be interpreted in an expansive manner to prevent it from
becoming "atrophied or fossilized." 3 99 In the court's view:
[T]he right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and
all that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessaries of life such
as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for
reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely
moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human
beings.... Every act which offends against or impairs human
dignity would constitute deprivation pro tanto of this right to live
and it would have to be in accordance with reasonable, fair and
just procedure established by law which stands the test of other
40 0
fundamental rights.
In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. India,4 °1 the court took its first
step toward integrating the above principles with the Directives of
State Policy. A letter from a social action group 40 2 moved the
398 [1981] 2 S.C.R. 516 (India).
399 Id. at 528.
400 Id. at 529.

401 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 67 (India).
402 The letter was from the Bonded Labour Liberation Front. See NoteJudicial
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court to consider the working conditions of quarry workers. The
petitioners alleged that the lack of enforcement of certain social
welfare and labor statutes by various levels of government violated
the constitutional right to life. Justice Bhagwati first paid close
attention to the lived experience of bonded laborers, stating that
"[tihey are non-beings, exiles of civilization, living a life worse than
that of animals ....

Not having any choice, they are driven by

poverty and hunger into a life of bondage[,] a dark bottomless pit
from which, in a cruel exploitative society, they cannot hope to be
rescued."4 "3 Citing the expansive definition of the right to life
provided in FrancesMullin, he then found that the right to live with
human dignity "derives its life breath from the Directive Principles," 4°4 particularly, the right to protection of workers' health
and strength, just and humane conditions of work, the provision of
facilities for workers' children to develop and be educated in a
healthy and dignified manner, and maternity relief for female
workers. In so doing, the Justice embraced the principle of the
interdependence of human rights without, however, mentioning that
principle by name.
The court also took some tentative steps toward delineating how
such a broad interpretation of the right to life could be enforced by
the judiciary:
Since the Direc[t]ive Principles... are not enforceable in a court
of law, it may not be possible to compel the State ... to make
provision by statutory enactment or executive fiat for ensuring
[that] these basic essentials [are not threatened] but where
legislation is already enacted by the State providing these basic
requirements to the workmen and thus investing their right to live
with basic human dignity, with concrete reality and content, the
State can certainly be obligated to ensure observance of such
legislation for inaction on the part of the State in securing
implementation of such legislation would amount to denial of the
right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21 .. .. "405
The court took some care not to appear to be enforcing the
Directive Principles directly. Its requirement that the state live up
to its legislative commitments is an illustration of the minimal role

Application of the Rule ofLaw: Bandhua Mukti Morcha (Bonded Labour Liberation
Front) v. Union of India and Others, 36 INT'L COMM'N OFJURIsTS REV. 69, 69 (1986)
(discussing the contents of the letter sent to the court).
403 BandhuaMukti Morcha, [1984] 2 S.C.R. at 91.
404 Id. at 103.
405 Id.
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that the courts can play in adjudicating social rights, one which
would not stray far from traditional principles of the rule of law. In
such cases, constitutional social rights would serve as judicial
triggers for overseeing the implementation and enforcement of
statutes, rather than as vehicles by which legislation is held
unconstitutional. Such an approach would permit the judiciary to
claim with some justification that it is not usurping legislative
authority but simply holding government to its own statutory

promises. In the court's view, this approach stresses cooperation
over adversarialism, and gives the government the opportunity "to
examine whether the poor and the down-trodden are getting their
40 6
social and economic entitlements."
Some might respond to the judgment in BandhuaMukti Morcha
by claiming that a lot of rhetorical effort was expended to arrive at
the obvious conclusion that statutes ought to be enforced. This
underestimates the value of a constitutional confirmation of the
views expressed by Justice Bhagwati concerning the nature and
scope of the right to life and the methodology adopted by the court
in seeking to give voice to the concerns of the underprivileged.
Moreover, the order given by the court should not be underestimated. The distinction between a statute's nonenforcement and a
statute's nonexistence can be a slim one indeed, especially from the
perspective of those who require assistance. Ordering the enforcement of a statute is very much akin to ordering legislative or
executive action; in both cases, the judiciary is making the substantive judgment that individuals need assistance. In the former case,
the judiciary is able to shield itself from a charge of illegitimacy by
claiming that it is giving effect to legislative commitments, and from
a charge of incompetence by using these legislated standards,
however general the wording, as its baseline. 407 Such an order
nonetheless carries with it an implicitjudgment that the government
408
should be doing more to secure conditions of social justice.
406 Id. at 102.
407 This is not to say that such a position will silence critics.
India being a welfare state, legislation already exists on most matters ....
If the Court starts enforcing all such legislation under the sp[e]cious plea
that non-enforcement is violative of article 21, perhaps no state activity can
be spared from the purview of the Supreme Court as a [public interest
litigation] matter. Its logical extension could mean the taking over of the
total administration of the country from the executive by the Court.
AGRAWALA, supra note 392, at 37.
4
08 See Craig & Deshpande, supra note 393, at 368 (linking BandhuaMukti Morcha
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The right to life was given an even richer content by the court
in the recent case of Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corp.4 °9 Olga
Tellis dealt with a claim on behalf of certain Bombay sidewalk
dwellers that their right to life would be violated if they were evicted
from their rudimentary shelters without being provided an alternative site by the state. 4 10 The petitioners claim was not that a right
to shelter could be read into the right to life. 4 11 Instead, it was
argued, and accepted by the court, that the petitioners had "chosen"
a pavement or a slum near their place of work to avoid the time and
prohibitive cost of commuting, and that eviction would deprive
them of their right to livelihood and their right to work as protected
by the Directive Principles:
If there is an obligation upon the State to secure to the citizens an
adequate means of livelihood and the right to work, it would be
sheer pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content
of the right to life. The State may not, by affirmative action, be
compellable to provide adequate means of livelihood or work to
the citizens. But, any person, who is deprived of his right to
livelihood except according to just and fair procedure established
by law, can challenge the deprivation as offending the right to life
conferred by Article 21.412
According to Article 21, deprivation of the right to life can be
justified if procedural due process was provided to the street
dwellers. In Olga Tellis, the ultimate issue was whether the city
authorities of Bombay had respected the sidewalk dwellers' right to
be heard prior to the eviction decision, particularly in light of the
fact that notice had not been given. 4 3 The court held that the

to the recent writings of Joseph Raz on the relationship between autonomy and
collective goods). Also ofimportance in the case is its broad conception of procedure
in interpreting Article 32 to allow public interest standing to groups or persons not
directly affected by alleged violations, and the appointment of two commissions of
inquiry to assist the court in investigating the facts and suggesting remedial solutions.
SeeBandhuaMuktiMorcha,[1984] 2 S.C.R. at 101-12; see also INDIAN CoNST. art. 32(1)
("The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the
enforcement of the rights conferred ... is guaranteed.").
401 [1985] 2 Supp. S.C.R. 51 (India). Olga Tellis is also commonly known as The
Bombay Pavement Dwellers Case.
410 See id. at 52.
411 No right to shelter appears among the Directive Principles.
412 Olga Tellis, [1985] 2 Supp. S.C.R. at 80-81; see also id. at 73 ("The right to live

and the right to work are integrated and inter-dependant and, therefore, if a person
is deprived of his job as a result of his eviction from a slum or a pavement, his very
right to life is put in jeopardy.").
413 See Olga Tellis, [1985] 2 Supp. S.C.R. at 94 (requiring that notice be given to
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proceedings before the court itself retroactively satisfied all that was
to be heard and that the city could
required by way of the right
4 14
proceed with the evictions.
Despite drawing a distinction between the duty to respect and
the duty to promote a social right and claiming that the right to a
livelihood and the right to work do not involve affirmative obligations on the state to attend to the shelter needs of the sidewalk
colonies, Chief Justice Chandrachud fashioned a remedy replete
with positive duties on the Government. It ranged from the
provision of alternative and equally close sites to programmatic
415
duties to begin or implement certain non-statutory programs.
Never expressed as a consent order, the court's decision nevertheless seems to have been intended to elicit assurances from the
Government to address broader and systemic aspects of the shelter
crisis. Olga Tellis is an illustration of how the judiciary can attempt
to engender political dialogue over issues that otherwise might
remain hidden from sustained legislative and general political scrutiny. 16
satisfy justice); see also id. at 91 (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65

(1970)).
414 See id. at 94.
4' The court hinted that the state was under a constitutional duty to promote the
right to a livelihood and the right to work. Under the guise of divining what the city
commissioner would or should have decided "had he granted a hearing to them and
heard what we did," the court passed an order "which... he would or should have
passed." Id. at 94-95. The actual order appeared to contain only one formally
binding condition: the evictions should not take place until after the end of the
current monsoon season. See id. at 94. Such a condition can be seen as simply
another aspect of the primary duty to respect the right to a livelihood and the right
to work. However, by adding the words "and, thereafter, only in accordance with this
judgment," the court also seemed to treat a long passage in the opinion as a separate
hortatory order containing elements of a tertiary duty on the state to promote those
rights:

[T]he assurances given by the State Government in its pleadings... must
be made good. Stated briefly, [1] pavement dwellers.., should be given,
though not as a condition precedent to their removal, alternate pitches...;
[2] slums which have been in existence for.., twenty years or more, and
which have been improved and developed will not be removed unless the
land on which they stand or the appurtenant land, is required for a public
purpose, in which case, alternate sites or accommodation will be provided
to them; [3] the 'Low Income Scheme Shelter Programme' ...
will be
pursued earnestly, and, [4] the 'Slum Upgradation Programme (SUP)' under
which basic amenities are to be given to slum dwellers will be implemented
without delay.
Id. at 98.
416 For a concrete illustration of the linkages between social rights litigation and
social change in another context of homelessness, see Robert M. Hayes, Homelessness
& the Legal Profession, 35 LOY. L. REV. 1 (1989). Hayes discusses the value of
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G.L. Peiris has noted that the court acts pragmatically in relation
to its own institutional limitations when "provid[ing] definitive
solutions to ... broad policy problems in such areas" as are covered
by social rights. 4 17 The court has emphasized a co-operative
dialogue between the judiciary and the executive and legislative
branches, as opposed to the standard separation of powers
conception based on watertight jurisdictional functions. 418 In his
view,
[t]he courts have chosen... to... [collaborate] with other organs
of government rather than to pursue a benevolent policy in
isolation. The intricacies of public interest litigation have necessitated the forging of a refreshingly novel apparatus directed
towards fruitful co-operation among legislature, executive and
judiciary in pursuit of social justice.
One of the by-products of the interlocking mechanisms which
have evolved in response to the urgent need for a concerted and
co-ordinated approach to problems of daunting complexity is the
instrumentality of directions issued by the courts to the executive
branch of government. These directions, encompassing a wide
spectrum of nuances and gradations, range from sparse indication
of tentative guidelines to elaborate formulations. The degree of
particularity has tended to depend on the nature of the subject
matter and the extent to which settled conclusions could be
arrived at suitably by the courts on their own responsibility.4 19

litigation around Article 17 of the New York State Constitution which provides: "The
aid, care and support for the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the
state." Id. at 2 (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, cl. 1). In Hayes' words, "the biggest
victory is not these terrible institutions called shelters, but... the push that resulted
in the City of New York to spend [sic] hundreds of millions of capital tax dollars to
rebuild abandoned buildings for permanent housing.... [which would] become an
infrastructure for a new neighbourhood for a community." Id. at 9.
417 Peiris, supra note 392, at 81.
418
See MINOW, supra note 14, at 158-59. In commenting on the preoccupation of
the legal process school of constitutional adjudication with separation of powers and
overly rigid notions of "competence," Minow observes:
It is a world concerned more with distinctions than with connections, a
world using bounded spheres as the components of conceptual order ....
And it is a world that view[s] as relatively unimportant issues of marginality,
degradation, and exclusion on the basis of group membership.
Id. at 159.
419 Peiris, supra note 392, at 81-82. Peiris points to cases in which the court has
immersed itself in an exceptional degree of administrative detail on matters of
shelter, clothing, nutrition, and health. See Baxi v. Uttar Pradesh, 1987 A.I.R. (S.C.)
191; Narain v. Bihar, 1986 S.C.C. 576. Both Indian cases involved situations of
confinement by the government, in a mental hospital and in a foster care home for
children, respectively.
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Azad Rickshaw Pullers Union v. Punjab,420 exemplifies this
cooperative approach to court orders and is also indicative of the
workability of a constitutional duty to take steps to promote social
rights. The State of Punjab had passed a statute which created a
licensing scheme for drivers of cycle-rickshaws that was intended to
eliminate the "exploitation of rickshaw pullers by ...

middle-

men." 42 1 The statutory scheme provided financial assistance that
would allow rickshaw drivers to buy their own rickshaws but its
provisions proved inadequate and some rickshaw pullers complained
that they were unable to free themselves from the rickshaw
middlemen. 422 They challenged the constitutionality of the Act,
asking the court to strike down the statute. 4 23 It is unclear from
the judgment upon which Fundamental Right the petitioner
rickshaw drivers relied.42 4 The remarkable aspect of the case is
As part of an argument that United States' caselaw is not precedent for widerangingpositive rights, Currie distinguishes similar cases of imposing positive duties
upon the government in the United States in prisons, mental hospitals, and similar
confinement contexts as being legitimate because of the prior deprivation of liberty
by government which incapacitates the petitioners from attending to their basic
needs. See Currie, supra note 131, at 873-74, 886-87. This position was recently
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept
of Social Servs. in which the Court observed:
The rationale for [the imposition of positive duties on the government]
is simple enough: when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power
so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for
himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needse.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety-it
transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989).
420 [1981] 1 S.C.R. 366.
421 Punjab Cycle Rickshaws (Regulations of Rickshaws) Act, No. 41 (1975)
(Punjab), quoted in Azad Rickshaw Pullers, [1981] 1 S.C.R. at 368.
" Exactly what the gaps were is not clear from the judgment. Justice Krishna
Iyer tells us only that "[slome hitch somewhere prevented several desperate rickshawdrivers getting the benefit, which drove them to this Court." Id. at 368. This may
imply that these individuals were caught by a ban in the statute on licensing for nonowner rickshaw drivers. See id. at 368, 371.
4 The court may have suspected that the petitioning rickshaw pullers were mere
fronts for middlemen:
The challenge in these writ petitions compel us to remind ourselves that
under our constitutional system courts are havens of refuge for the toiler,
not the exploiter, for the weaker claimant of social justice, not the strong
pretender who seeks to sustain the status quo ante by judicial writ in the
name of fundamental right.
Id. at 367.
424 For instance, it could have been brought as an equal protection claim. See
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the way in which the court refashioned the remedial issue from the
request to strike down a law in violation of a constitutional
guarantee, to an expansion, and indeed re-drafting, of a statute. In
doing so it brought under the statute's rubric those whose exclusion
would violate the state's positive social rights obligations alluded to
in Article 38 of the Directive Principles, 425 and enlisted all parties
in the case in this new cooperative venture.
Justice Krishna Iyer described this unorthodox re-working of the
case in the following terms:
No higher duty or more solemn responsibility rests upon this court
than to uphold every State measure that translates into living law
the preambular promise of social justice reiterated in Article 38 of
the Constitution. We might have been called upon to examine
from this angle of constitutionalised humanism, the vires of the
... Act ....
But negative bans, without supportive schemes, can
be a remedy aggravating the malady.... [Therefore, j]udicial
engineering towards this goal is better social justice than dehu4 26
manised adjudication on the vires of legislation.
The court issued a court-mediated negotiated order, which included
detailed directives as to time schedules, amounts and procedures for
securing and repaying loans, none of which appeared in the
legislation or regulations.
The judgment also extended beyond a re-writing of the Act so
as to allow the Act to meet its immediate purpose of financially
supporting the drivers' acquisition of and licensing of rickshaws.
The Municipal Commissioner was obligated to work out a group
property and life insurance scheme in consultation with the drivers'
unions. Also, specific mention was made of the occupational health
problems associated with rickshaw driving (notably tuberculosis) and
the State was ordered either "progressively" or "by stages" to
replace rickshaw pulling with mechanized cycles and to consider any
4 27
projects that seek to replace pulling with motor scooters.
Finally, until the scheme was implemented, non-owner rickshaw
pullers would be allowed to continue to operate. In sum, the court

INDIAN CONsT. art. 14.
425 Id. art. 38 ("The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by
securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social,
and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life.").
economic
42 6
Azad Rickshaw Pullers, [1981] 1 S.C.R. at 367-68.
427 See id. at 371.
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of
envisaged an interactive relationship among the branches
428
justice.
of
system
effective
most
the
produce
government to
A final point to note about this aggressive cooperative paradigm
is that the court has, at least partially, a vision of cooperation that
is not confined to official give-and-take between the branches of
government. The remedy in Azad Rickshaw Pullers involved all
counsel as well as the rickshaw pullers' unions. 429 Similarly, at the
stage of investigating alleged rights violations, Bandhua Mukti
Morcha involved commissions of inquiry drawn from civil society,
with the court also ordering that the government cooperate with
social action groups in ensuring the implementation of various Acts
and the detailed orders of the court related to those Acts. 430 In
committees have also been
other cases, independent monitoring
43 1
used to monitor court orders.
Moreover, the cooperation paradigm, while emphasizing the
statutory expression the government has given to the Directive
Principles of State Policy, has not precluded the court from crossing
over the line with respect to affirmative obligations alluded to in the
428 A rhetorical flourish brought the judgment to a close, capturing the nature

of the courts vision of the interactive relationship between it and the other branches:
The State by exercising its legislative power alone, could not produce justice
until this formula was hammered out. The Court with its process ofjustice
alone could not produce a viable project. But now,justice and power have
come together and, hopefully, we have fulfilled the words of Blaise Pascal;
"Justice without power is inefficient; power withoutjustice is
tyranny. Justice and power must, therefore, be brought together,

so that whatever isjust may be powerful, and whatever is powerful
may bejust."

Id.

429 The court noted collaborative remedial efforts:
Court and counsel agreed on this constructive approach and strove through
several adjournments, to mould a scheme of acquisition of cycle rickshaws
by licensed rickshaw pullers without financial hurdles, suretyship problems
and, more than all, that heartless enemy, at the implementational level of
all progressive projects best left unmentioned. Several adjournments,
several formulae and several modifications resulted in reaching a hopefully
workable proposal.
See id.
430 See Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 67, 146
(ordering the government to take assistance from non-political social action groups
for implementing provisions in contention).
431 See, e.g., Sheela Barse v. Union of India, [1986]

3 S.C.R. 443, 448-49 (directing
a committee to oversee compliance with provisions in prison manuals), discussed in
Peiris, supra note 392, at 83 (stating that such committees must be strengthened by
enforcement machinery); see also Cassels, supra note 59, at 506 (establishing a
committee to monitor a power plant).
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right to life cases and from interpreting positive obligations into
Fundamental Rights in the absence of a statutory framework. In
one case, the court went beyond giving content to statutes already
in force by ordering the executive to bring child protection
legislation into operation which was on the statute books but not yet
brought into force. 43 2 In several pollution cases, notably one
involving pollution of the river Ganges by tanneries, the court
invoked Directive Principle 51-A(g) 43 3 to direct public schools to

teach environmental awareness one hour per week and the central
government to produce and distribute free school texts on the
environment.

43 4

The court has also read Directive Principle 39(d) mandating
equal pay for equal work as forming part of Fundamental Right 14's
guarantee of equality.43 5 Similarly, in HussainaraKzatoon v. Home
Secretaiy, the court interpreted the Article 21 due process right to
include Directive Principle 39A's obligation on the government to
provide free legal aid for the poor and "strongly recommend[ed] to
the Government... that a comprehensive legal service programme
[be] introduced in the country." 43 6 Without ordering the state to
432 See Sheela Barse, [1986] 3 S.C.R. at 448 (stating that particular care should be
taken to observe child prisoners living in unacceptable conditions). Peiris notes that
the court made this order on the basis of compelling practical need despite
acknowledging that "[o]rdinarily it is a matter for the state government to decide
when a particular statute should be brought into force." Peiris, supra note 392, at 73.
In another case, the court admonished a lower court judge for abandoning his
legitimate judicial role when he ordered the government to initiate legislation on the
practice of "ragging" incoming university students. See Himachal Pradesh v. Parent
of a Student of a Medical College, Simla, [1985] 3 S.C.R. 676, 682-84 (noting that the
Supreme Court cannot assume a supervisory role over the lawmaking activities of the
executive and the legislature).
433 INDIAN CONST. art. 51-A (Directive Principle directing the state to educate the
public about pollution).
434 See M.C. Mehta III v. India, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 471, 491 ("Children should be
taught about the need for maintaining cleanliness.., of the streets in which they
live."). In Mehta, the court also made several other orders of a highly positive nature.
See Cassels, supranote 59, at 506 n.54 (observing that the court in Mehta also ordered
the public authorities to complete proposed work on sewage treatment in a timely
fashion and to refuse new licenses without proof of adequate waste management
facilities). However the constitutional basis for the orders was blurred by the
existence of an under-enforced statutory framework, as well as common law nuisance
authority. See Craig & Deshapande, supra note 393, at 369-70 (stating that it is not
clear from the Supreme Court's reasoning which rights of the petitioner were
affected).
131 See Randhir Singh v. Union of India, [1982] 3 S.C.R. 298, 304 (stating that
directive principles must be read into the Fundamental Rights as a matter of
interpretation).
4'6 H-ussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, [1979] 3 S.C.R. 532, 542 (India).

1992]

ROPES OF SAND

go about providing the collective good of a legal aid system, the
court did order the government to provide a lawyer at its own cost
within six weeks.43 7 An interesting feature of HussainaraKhatoon
is that the court also read the right to a speedy trial into Fundamental Right 21's "reasonable, fair and just" procedure4"' and then,
borrowing from United States case law, imbued it with wide-ranging
43 9
positive obligations.
A final chapter in this narrative involves another instance of the
statutory compliance paradigm. In People's Union for Democratic
Rights v. India,440 at issue was private parties' non-compliance
Directive Principle 39(a) had been added in a 1977 constitutional amendment two
years prior. See INDIAN CONST. art. 39(a). The relatively recent vintage of the
decision to put legal aid into the constitution as an unenforceable state duty did not
prevent the court from seeing it as part of the petitioner's enforceable fundamental
right.
437 See HussainaraKhatoon, [1979] 3 S.C.R. at 541. It should be noted that this
order reflects the way in which respecting one's social rights (including the right to
legal aid) often requires the provision of a collective good, usually through legislative
action. Yet, in an individual case, a court can focus on an individual remedy and
thereby avoid ordering the legislature and executive to provide for all. If generalized,
the necessary implication of the individual remedy is some collective goods scheme,
but the court can defer to other branches of government to generate an appropriate
solution. See, e.g., supra note 162 (individual order led to establishment of legal aid
system) & text accompanying note 194 (individual order led to legislative creation of
new cause of action). One middle ground position would be for the court to allow
class actions and to adopt streamlined procedures to allow new plaintiffs to sue on
the precedent. See Scott, supra note 59, at 836-37 (describing how an individual child
benefits remedy might be translated by the political process into a generalized
statutory response).
438 HussainaraKhatoon, [1979] 3 S.C.R. at 542.
439 See id. at 543. The court stated that:
The State cannot avoid its constitutional obligation to provide speedy trial
to the accused by pleading financial or administrative inability ....
It is
also the constitutional obligation of this Court... to enforce the fundamental right of the accused to speedy trial by issuing the necessary directions to

the State which may include taking of positive action, such as augmenting
and strengthening the investigative machinery, setting up new courts,

building new court houses, providing more staff and equipment to the
courts, appointment of additional judges and other measures calculated to
ensure speedy trial.
Id. The court appeared to draw sustenance in its interpretation from an observation
that the United Statesjudiciary had viewed certain constitutional rights as entailing
positive duties in the area of prison conditions. See id. ("We find that in fact the
courts in the United States have adopted this dynamic and consructive [sic] role so
far as the prison reform is concerned by utilising the activist magnitude of the Eighth
Amendment."). For a discussion of positive obligations regarding prisoners' rights

found by courts in the United States, see supra text accompanying notes 205-10.
440 [1983] 1 S.C.R. 456 (India).
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with minimum wage legislation. The court interpreted Article 23's
banning of forced labor to include the positive duty on both private
persons and the state not only to avoid but also to alleviate the
compulsion of economic circumstances. Of immediate interest is
the way in which the court generated this interpretation. Beyond
having recourse to the interpretive spirit mandated by the Directive
Principles taken collectively, the court also explicitly invoked the
interdependence principle as it appears in international human
rights discourse and, in particular, in a document considered to
contain an authoritative, post-Universal Declaration revisiting of the
fundamental normative foundations of the United Nations' human
rights system, the United Nations Proclamation of Teheran of
1968.441
The court defined the expression "forced labour" in Article 23
in a way heavily imbued with the organic interdependence of the
Indian Constitution's values:
Any factor which deprives a person of a choice of alternatives and compels him to adopt one particular course of
action may properly be regarded as "force" and if labour or
service is compelled as a result of such "force", it would we
[sic] "forced labour". Where a person is suffering from
hunger or starvation, . .. he would have no choice but to
accept any work that comes him [sic] way, even if the
remuneration offered to him is less than the minimum
wage.... And in doing so he would be acting not as a free
agent with a choice between alternatives but under the
compulsion of economic circumstances and the labour or
service provided by him would be clearly "forced labour."
There is no reason why the word "forced" should be read in
a narrow and restricted manner so as to be confined only to
physical or legal "force". 442
441 In this light, the court stated:
There is indeed a close relationship between civil and political rights on the
one hand and economic, social and cultural rights on the other and this
relationship is so obvious that [the Teheran Proclamation] declared... :
"Since human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible, the full realisation of civil and political rights without the enjoyment of economic, social
and cultural rights is impossible."
People's Unionfor DemocraticRights, [1983] 1 S.C.R. at 468-69 (quoting Declarationof
Teheran, supra note 382, at 19).
442People's Unionfor DemocraticRights, [1983] 1 S.C.R. at 491-92.
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The court took the opportunity not only to enforce the minimum
wages laws but also to suggest the inclusion of a protective clause in
future government contracts which would prohibit the payment
of
443
wages through the particular system it had found suspect.
The above narrative suggests a potential role for a creative and
sensitive judiciary with respect to social rights. The Indian
experience shakes the traditional orthodoxy of a doctrine of
separation of powers as a necessary and determinate constraint on
the justiciability of social rights. It suggests instead the existence of
radical contingency over where those lines of separation can or
should be drawn 44 and reveals that there are more imaginative
and varied possibilities for constitutional design than the mere
entrenchment of classical civil and political rights.
With respect to the legitimacy of social rights the Indian
interpretive odyssey captures the insights of the principle of the
interdependence of human rights. The Indian Supreme Court has
grounded the legitimacy of its interpretive interventions on a
conception of human rights as being interconnected and on a more
integrated, holistic and inclusive vision of freedom and community
membership. Legitimacy is viewed by the court as involving both
the vindication of substantive values4 45 and a methodology that
attempts to interpret rights from the perspective of the socially
disadvantaged. Democracy is seen less as a countervailing value to
the judicial function than as being vindicated by it. This vision of
413 See id. at 494. This system involved payment through intermediaries known
as "jamadars"who skimmed off over 10% of the wage as a commission before passing
it on to the workers.
444 As Cassels summarizes his study of the Indian judicial experiment:
There can be little doubt that the Indian courts have penetrated policy
formulation and administrative operations to a much greater extent-or at
least in a more open fashion-than Western court-watchers are used to
seeing ... However, the doctrine ofseparation ofpowers, while suggesting
good reasons why ... lines must be drawn (judicial non-accountability,
institutional competence, etc.), does not of itself indicate precisely where
they should be placed .... Whenever a court is called upon to scrutinize an
official decision or operation it is immediately and inevitably engaged in
both policy analysis and the political exercise of determining its own
jurisdiction. Principles of standing, justiciability and judicial deference do
not remove so much as disguise this dimension. Where the lines may be
drawn is as much a matter of institutional capacity, practical politics and
popular support as of constitutional theory.
Cassels, supra note 59, at 513-14.
445 Cf. CAPPELLETTI, supra note 120, at 150-52 n.3 (advocatinga "value-protecting

approach" to judicial review in contrast to the process theory ofJohn Hart Ely).
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the judicial role is related instrumentally to a prior conviction that
both a more positive, fuller conception of freedom and a more
inclusive sense of community are fundamental to any vision of a
good society.
With respect to the institutional competence dimension of
justiciability, the Indian experience unsettles convictions that the
traditional account of separation of powers describes necessary
attributes of the constitutional universe.
While the judicial
imagination of public interest litigation as a cooperative process is
notable for its hopefulness, the Indian experience reveals an openended conception of the relationship amongst the branches of
government that emphasizes pragmatic interaction and contextual
determinations of the boundaries of judicial action. A matter of
substantial constitutional policy need not be the exclusive province
of one branch or another of government, but can involve a
"continuing interplay" 446 or conversation amongst the branches.
In short, the Indian experience suggests that it may be appropriate
to allow the judiciary to advocate certain solutions in order to prod
the other branches into general debates and concrete responses that
in the long run are more democratically legitimate and effective.
Some final comments putting the above account into perspective
are in order. The Indian jurisprudential tale has been deliberately
narrated with an eye to its difference from standard Western
accounts of constitutionalism, although the selection of cases from
the European and Canadian legal systems suggests that valueoriented and dialogical constitutional judging has a wider applicability. The purpose has been to illuminate the "possible" within
existing law. We acknowledge that such jurisprudence seems to
"exist in almost metaphysical isolation from social reality." 447 The
empirical data on the concrete and more generalized symbolic
effects of public interest litigation is limited, and what data exists is,
not surprisingly, contradictory.4 4 8 Such empirical analysis is
MINOW, supra note 14, at 372.
447 Cassels, supra note 59, at 515 ("It is hardly surprising... that while public
interest litigation may have secured a better life for some individuals, it has not ended
bonded labor nor found homes for the Bombay pavement dwellers."); see also S.P.
Sathe, Constitutional Law, in 22 ANN. SURV. INDIAN L. 359, 398 (1986) ("[T]he
decisions of courts remain confined to the parties who fight the litigation. The
government and the public sector organizations continue to flout them and the poor
men have unfortunately no resources for going to the court again and again."). One
might be forgiven for pointing to this as a likely scenario for constitutional dialogue
in a real world of oppression and domination.
448 See Cassels, supra note 59, at 517 ("The experience of both the social activists
446
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indeed desirable, but in the end will still have to be filtered through
theory-dependent prisms of value related to449what efforts count as
worthwhile and what risks are worth taking.
In our view, the rhetorical struggle is worth engaging in all fora,
including the courts, but we are under no illusions that the gains
from this strategy will be immediate or large, let alone measurable.
In any society, structures and relationships of oppression and
domination will exist regardless of idealistic commitment. A
plurality of modes and fora of constitutional inquiry is desirable to
ensure that the exercise of power, public or private, occurs in
conformity with basic ideals. As a result, constitutional design
matters. Close attention must be paid to textual and institutional
structures to enhance the democratic potential of rights-based
constitutional politics. With this in mind, in the final Part we offer
a number of suggestions relating to constitutional design.
VI. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ENTRENCHMENT OF SOCIAL RIGHTS
A. Layers of Protection
What follows is an outline of a variety of different ways in which
social rights and the values that underpin them can find expression
in a constitutional document, generated in light of the previous
analysis of international human rights law and the Indian experience. At a very minimum, courts can be given the responsibility for
"indirect protection" of social rights. That is, without resorting to
the explicit entrenchment of social rights, the values underpinning
and the beneficiaries of [public interest litigation] is no doubt a contradictory one.").
"" In this respect, we can do no better than reproduce the closingwords ofJamie
Cassels where he contrasts two equally (progressively) critical "reads" on Indian public
interest litigation, one which sees this process and case law serving legitimation
functions for a supremely unjust social order and the other which emphasizes the
potential to rhetorically exploit the hypocrisy of that order:

By exploiting the limited autonomy of law [from the immediate requirements of the political and economic elite], the courts become an arena of
social struggle wherein the stakes may be largely ideological and only
incrementally material. In this view, the function of social activism is to
"expose the false rhetoric of the State, exploit its contradictions..., and
realign its social base along class lines rather than traditional factions." The
crucial question remains whether this ideological function will serve to
expose and alter pathological social arrangements, or simply paper over the
abyss which separates formal legal promises from Indian social reality.
Id. at 518-19 (footnote omitted) (quoting Rajeev Dhavan, ManagingLegal Activism:
Reflections on India's Legal Aid Programme, 15 ANGLo-AM. L. REv. 281, 292 (1986)).
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social rights can be indirectly protected by the constitutionalization
of more traditional rights against the state.
For example, a
constitution can acknowledge the importance of values underpinning social rights yet permit the state to infringe those interests if
infringements correspond to norms of procedural justice.450 In
Canada, for example, "[elveryone has the right to life, liberty and
security of the person, and the right not to be deprived thereof
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." 45 1 Thus even if a South African constitution were to permit
state infringement of a right to education, for example, it could
nonetheless provide for protection to ensure that infringements
conform, at a minimum, to notions of procedural fairness and
justice. Similarly, equality rights could be drafted so as to require
the state to adhere to principles of equality in relation to the
provision and deprivation of social services. The minimum form of
protecting values underpinning social rights, in other words, is to
permit the legislature to pass laws that infringe those values, but
require that such laws accord procedural protection to affected
individuals and respect notions of relative equality.
If it is decided not to protect interests underlying social rights
beyond providing indirect protection, it would be important to
enact a savings clause as a shield against interpretations of rights
that would prevent redistribution programs or affirmative action
programs by government. For example:
Nothing in this Bill of Rights shall detract from the power of the
legislature or government to engage in or promote affirmative
action programs, programs for the redistribution of wealth, and
programs designed to fulfill the social rights of all South Africans.
How the interpretation of generally worded rights like "due
process," "liberty," or "equal protection" could result in social
welfare laws being struck down by the courts is of concern. 452 It
may be sufficient to insert a savings clause which explicitly says that
45 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1970) (discussing the
potential to terminate government benefits with a pre-termination evidentiary
hearing); In re Webb, 22 O.R.2d 257, 266 (Ont. Ct. App.) (1978) (holding that the
Ontario Housing Corporation treated a tenant "fairly" before terminating her lease,
and thus satisfied the procedural protection afforded to recipients of welfare
benefits).
451 CAN.CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 7.
452 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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nothing in the constitution shall be interpreted as implying classical
rights to freedom of contract and private property.
To deepen the constitutional commitment to the values
underpinning social rights, the constitution could expressly give the
courts power to enforce existing statutes that the state has enacted
in the field of specified social rights, whether or not there is
provision for such enforcement in the statute itself. In this way, the
court's role would be tied to the legislature's own commitments and
45
the judiciary could hold the legislature to those commitments.
It would be desirable, in tandem with seeing social rights in terms
of locus standi, to provide for an interpretive clause calling for
judicial interpretation of legislative and regulatory initiatives
consistent with the constitutional commitment to social rights
protection.
Such an interpretive clause would facilitate the
establishment of an inter-branch dialogue over the appropriate
boundaries of legislative, executive and judicial action. Jurisprudence from the Indian Supreme Court outlined earlier represents
454
a fledgling illustration of this form of social rights recognition.
At a higher level of judicial involvement, the constitution can
provide for express constitutional protection of social rights.
Within this level, a spectrum of possibilities exists. The weakest
version of express recognition and protection of social rights
conforms to the primary obligation to respect social rights as set out
4 55
in the United Nations structure of obligations discussed earlier.
That is, the constitution could expressly provide that the state is not
entitled to directly interfere with specified social rights. Even the
duty not to take away limited existing means could have the
potential to increase enjoyment of social rights if courts were to
order and supervise alternative provision under their remedial
capacity. A stronger version of express constitutional protection of
social rights conforms to the secondary obligation to protect social
rights in relationships in which the state is not directly involved. A
duty to protect social rights would place an obligation on the state
to ensure that private actors do not infringe social rights.
453

A phenomenon of regulatory gutting has been identified in the United States
in the 1980s, whereby legislation is undermined by administrative action, thus
avoiding amendment by the legislature. See generally Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation
andJudicialReview, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1985) (discussing the increased role of
administrative action accompanied bya decreasinglevel of legislative amendments in
the area of deregulation).
454 See supra text accompanying notes 390-449.
455 See sura note 21 and accompanying text.
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The strongest version of express protection of social rights
would be to require the state to fulfill social rights. In this regard,
the constitution could require the fulfillment of a core set of
immediate entitlements and impose a duty on the state to take steps
to fulfill other aspects of social rights. 45 Core minimum entitlements could be expressed in relatively open-ended terms to leave
room forjudicial responsiveness to individual circumstances and for
4 57
the development of flexible substantive and remedial case law.
The duty to take steps could be expressed in terms of collective
goods to be realized progressively. Courts could thereby be vested
with the role of prodding other branches of government in the
event of unreasonable failures to act or in cases of inadequate
action. The judiciary would be charged with the responsibility of
enforcing a constantly-expanding level of provision or baseline.
Finally, it would be desirable to entrench process and participationoriented duties to provide, for instance, for a periodic public forum
to scrutinize and turn a constitutional spotlight on governmental
efforts to date. Such a forum could be structured so as to permit
individuals and groups to present arguments on the adequacy or
inadequacy of the progress of reform and to highlight places where
individuals have been falling through cracks in the system.
B. Strategies to Maximize the DemocraticPotentialof
JudicialReview
It is our view that the constitutionalization of social rights is one
essential component to the realization of social justice for South
Africans. Arguments based on a perceived lack of institutional
competence on the part of the judiciary should not prevent the
entrenchment of social rights. Furthermore, the exclusion of social
rights from a new South African constitution on the basis that it is
illegitimate for courts to engage in substantive review of democratic
decisions would result in the devaluation of the values underpinning
56 Cf. Sachs, supra note 27, at 25-26 (listing array of options including.
constitutional silence with respect to social rights; a constitutional framework ofsocioeconomic development; provisions permitting legislation to advance a progressive
agenda; interpretive presumptions sympathetic to a progressive agenda; and providing
general civil and political constitutional guarantees with interpretive room for the
advancement of values associated with social rights).
457 Seesupra text accompanying notes 252-57 (noting that individual remedies can
serve to spark generalized legislative solutions).
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social rights and would work to establish a constitutional discourse
limited in imaginative possibility.
The dangers attendant upon the entrenchment of social rights
in a new South African constitution, and indeed upon the entrenchment of any constitutional rights against the state enforceable by a
non-elected institution, cannot be ignored. Inherent in the
recognition of a third branch of government responsible for
ensuring that legislative and governmental action conforms to
constitutional standards is the possibility that judicial power can be
exercised in a way that threatens central features of democratic
governance. 458 Vesting a judiciary with the power to strike down
laws passed (or to require that laws be passed) by democratic
institutions takes power out of the hands of the many and places
power in the hands of the few. Constitutional scholars for years
have endeavored to provide justifications for judicial review of
democratic institutions. 459 Some have argued that judicial review
ought to be exercised so as to further democratic values and that
460
democracy should not be equated with simple majoritarianism.
Instead, the democratic impulse includes a respect for the views and
interests of minorities who are not adequately represented in the
458 There are several aspects to this threat. For further discussion of the view that
judicial review is a "counter-majoritarian force," which by its nature requires
justification in a system of government deriving its legitimacy from the consent of the
governed, see BICKEL, Supra note 9, at 16-23. The accusation ofcounter-majoritarianism is often coupled with an argument that the judiciary expresses an elitist

professional perspective. See, e.g., PHILLIP B. KURLAND, POLITIcS, THE CONSTITUTION,
AND THE WARREN COURT 204 (1970) ("[T]he Court is not a democratic institution,
either in makeup or in function. This should be seen for what it is, even at the cost
of that grossest of contemporary epithets, 'elitist.'"); Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts
as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 949, 966 (1978) ("[The insulation of
judges] makes judges particularly susceptible to the views of a specific, relatively
small, elite group of the society."). Finally, relying upon the judiciary to resolve
fundamental moral issues in national politics can arguably lead to an impoverishment
of legislative discourse and political debate. See e.g., Brest, supra note 10, at 181-82
("If the judges exercise a monopoly over constitutional decisionmaking, then other
citizens and their representatives are excluded in what are among the polity's most
fundamental decisions.").
419 See supra notes 45-75 and accompanying text.
460 See e.g., CHOPER, supra note 51, at 6-7 (stating that the judicial limitation on
majoritarian power is not contrary to, but is the essence of, democracy); ELY, supra
note 51, at 73-104 (discussing a need for intervention when the political process is
undeserving of trust and arguing that the judiciary is in the best position to assess
objectively when a democratic malfunction has occurred); see also Frank I. Michelman,
The Supreme Cour 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv. L. REV.
4, 16-17 (1986) (noting that the republican tradition points away from the countermajoritarian difficulty as the true focus of democratic concern).
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democratic process. For these theorists, a constitutional bill of
rights is necessary to ensure that the majority treats underrepresented minorities with the equal concern and respect that they
deserve. 461 This Article is not designed to provide justifications
for the establishment of a constitutional democracy in South Africa.
Its task is much more modest, and is premised upon the acceptance
of the need for constitutional protection of minority interests
through judicial review. If South Africans are committed to at least
entrenching civil and political rights in a new constitution, in our
view it is essential that such a constitution also protect social rights
from state interference, lack of protection and failures to fulfill.
The dangers associated with judicial review, however, which are
not restricted to the entrenchment of social rights but which also
accompany the entrenchment of civil and political rights, are
numerous. First, law operates in a technical and specialized
language. It is a site of politics that is open only to those capable
of mastering its codes, or who have the economic power to purchase
persuasive spokespersons. 462 Because of the expensive nature of
litigation, access to the courts is easily dominated by those interests
which stand to gain by the continuation of the status quo of South
African society. 463 Those who are disadvantaged and disempowered in contemporary society cannot afford to launch expensive and
time-consuming litigation strategies, which will tie up already scarce
resources.
Second, even the most progressive constitutional
language cannot wholly constrain future interpretive activity by the
judiciary. Constitutional guarantees, by their nature, are vague and
indeterminate. In the process of giving meaning to constitutional
guarantees in the context of concrete cases, judges may be guided
by non-threatening and traditional ideological understandings about
relations between individuals, groups, and the state, and may tend
to reproduce rather than transform the status quo."
The fear
461 See, e.g., RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTs SERIOUSLY 133

(1977)

("The

Constitution, and particularly the Bill of Rights, is designed to protect individual
citizens and groups against certain decisions that a majority of citizens might want to
make, even when that majority acts in what it takes to be the general or common
interest.").
462 See Bourdieu, supra note 6, at 821-26 (analyzing the relative power and
motivations of the different kinds ofjuridical capital); Petter, supra note 6, at 486-90
(addressing the institutional barrier created by money, and its resulting impact on
rights and freedoms).
463 See Petter, supranote 6, at 488-90 (analyzing the impact of lawyers' andjudges'
beliefs and backgrounds on the process ofjudicial interpretation of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
464 See supra text accompanying notes 66-68 (concerning the relationship between
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is that rights discourse and meanings generated by the judiciary will
be captured by powerful, non-disadvantaged actors. 465 Third,
judicial review creates the possibility that the legitimacy of democratic institutions will be challenged. Important matters of state and
citizen will ultimately be decided not in institutions that provide
individuals with democratic voice and participation, but rather in
the cold halls of an institution far removed from the pulse of the
nation. 46 If democratic institutions require the judicial stamp of
approval, democracy cannot claim to be the voice of the people.
In light of South Africa's pre-existing commitment to the
establishment of some form of constitutional democracy, the
constitutionalization of social rights helps to reduce some of the
dangers associated with the judicial enterprise. Such a bill of rights
will provide a text for futurejudicial interpretation predicated upon
equal recognition and respect in constitutional discourse for the
values underpinning social rights. South Africans ought also to
consider other strategies in order both to obviate the dangers of the
constitutionalization of rights and to enhance the positive qualities
of using the courts as fora for vindicating fundamental societal
values. The following sets out some strategies for consideration.
1. Constituent Assembly
A precondition for the entrenchment of constitutional rights
may be to convene a Constituent Assembly, with representation of
all interests and groups in society and with the participation of
vulnerable and relatively powerless groups being actively encouraged and financially supported by the state. Such an Assembly
would ensure that the values in the constitution reflect the aspirations of the people and not just those of the elite. In the words of
Albie Sachs, "the people affected by the Bill must be involved in the
ideology and adjudication).

4 See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculationson the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 97-124 (1974) (explaining why repeat
players, comprised mostly of governmental entities, large businesses and insurance
companies, will triumph more often in adjudications); Petter, supra note 6, at 487
(predicting that greater exposure to, and frequency in courts of, business claims in
relations to freedom of expression will causejudges to favor corporate interests over
those of consumers, employees, and other less-well represented segments of society).
46 See generally Brest, supra note 10 (discussing society's over-reliance on the
Supreme Court for determining our most important public moral issues, and the false
assumption that only the Court is authorized and capable of deciding constitutional
questions).
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process of its formulation, so that they see it as their own, as
something they have struggled for and will defend, even if in a
particular case its immediate application is inconvenient to many of
them." 467 The Assembly should operate in a series of sessions, so
that its members can consult with their constituencies between
sessions, and so that common ground can be more likely reached.
This process will also enable the drafting of proposals which seek to
capture the evolving sense of the Assembly and bring to bear some
expertise as to the best formulations and how the various values
should be interrelated. A Constituent Assembly is a crucial starting
point if constitutional discourse is to serve its community-building
function.
2. Legislative Override
South Africa may wish to consider the enactment of a provision
which permits legislatures to override rights contained in the
constitution. In Canada, for example, legislatures are entitled to
declare that statutes shall operate notwithstanding the fact that they
may infringe on certain constitutional guarantees. 468 Taken to its
extreme, a legislative override negates the very reason behind
constitutional guarantees. However, a legislative override can be
restricted to certain guarantees, 469 or require certain additional
procedural steps that a legislature must take before it is entitled to
override constitutional guarantees. The override in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, for example, is insufficiently
demanding as it allows omnibus overrides (i.e. inserting override
clauses in one piece of legislation that applies to a whole group of
other statutes). It was not drafted, nor has it been interpreted, in
467 Sachs, supra note 27, at 16.
468 See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms), § 33.
469 Some rights might be made "non-derogable," following the model of some
international human rights treaties. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 38, art. 4(2) at 174
(exempting from derogation, inter alia, freedom from torture, recognition as a
"person", and freedom of thought, conscience and religion); ECHR, supra note 41,
art. 15(2) at 232; American Convention, supra note 44, art. 27(2) at 152 (exempting
from derogation inter alia, right to life, right to humane treatment, freedom from
slavery, rights of the family, right to a name, and rights of the child).
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such a way as to fully exploit the rich potential
for institutional
47 0
dialogue between the courts and the legislature.
At a minimum, it would seem desirable to require the government to pass separate amending acts to override specified rights, or
sections in a statute, with a requirement for a higher degree of
publicity than mere publication in the parliamentary journal (e.g.,
notifying the population through the press of the government's
intention to override). Another option would be to require periodic
renewal of the override. Limited provision for legislative override
of this sort permits the reassertion of the democratic will in the face
of judicial intransigence or serious error, while ensuring that such
an action occurs in the context of public knowledge and potential
debate.4 71
3. Limitations Clauses
Thought should be given to clearly worded limitations clauses,
either tailored to specific rights or applying generally to all rights,
that convey to the public at large the notion that most rights are not
absolute (except perhaps those that are non-derogable) and that
rights sometimes must be considered in relation to other important
values. The constitution should be clearly structured in such a way
that people comprehend both that certain encroachments upon
rights can be legitimate, and that a right cannot be considered
violated until carefully circumscribed justificatory arguments are
analyzed.4 72

470 See generally Lorraine E. Weinrib, Learningto Live With the Override,35 MCGILL

L.J. 541 (1990) (discussing override clauses, and the role these clauses do and could
play in an interbranch institutional dialogue).
471 The ANC Draft Bill of Rights has what might be seen as a very soft notwithstanding clause, which may be more likely to foster dialogue than § 33 of the
Canadian Charter, which has a conversation-cutting quality to it. In Article 16 of the
draft, it is made clear that all rights in the bill, including the Article 10 social rights,
arejusticiable. See ANC WorkingDraft, supra note 1, at 122-23 (Art. 16(1)-(5)); see also
id. (Art. 16(7)(14)) (stating the supervisory role envisaged for a Human Rights
Commission and an Ombudsman).
The Draft Bill of Rights goes on to say that "Parliament shall have a special
responsibility for ensuring that the basic social, educational, economic and welfare
rights set out in this Bill of Rights are respected." Id. (Art. 16(6)). There are some
dangers in this formulation. The main danger is that "special" may be interpreted to
mean "exclusive" rather than "primary," which is not what we understand to be the
intention behind the draft. See Sachs, supra note 1, at 198-200. A broader concern
is that this soft version of an override clause only applies to the Article 10 rights.
472 See ANC Working Draft, supra note 1, at 122 (Art. 15(2)).
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4. Amendment Procedure
The means by which a constitution is amended is intimately
related to the threat to democracy posed by an activist judiciary.
The more complex and difficult an amending procedure, the more
difficult it is to overturn judicial interpretations of constitutional
provisions. 4 73 A balance is required so that the amending formula is not so flexible as to transform it into an open-ended legislative
override, but not so inflexible as to make it impossible to put
474
constitutional law on a new course.
5. Standing and Intervenor Rights
The extent to which participation is open to persons and groups
not intimately connected to the dispute is also critical to the ability
to avoid some dangers associated with judicial review, notably the
problem of polycentricity. 475 As the account of Indian constitutional jurisprudence indicates, 4 76 liberal standing and intervention
rules permit a greater degree of participation in debates concerning
the potential interpretation of constitutional guarantees. 477 A
new South African constitution should permit relaxed standing and
intervention rules, so that the judiciary may hear as many divergent
views as possible in order to minimize the risks of exclusion.
Related to such concerns regarding hearing different perspectives on polycentric issues is the desirability of organizing the
judicial system so as to permit public interest actions to proceed as
class actions. 478 Often a social right will, in effect, involve individ47

3 See Michael G. Calantvano, Comment, The Revision of American State
Constitutions: Legislative Power,PopularSovereignty, and the ConstitutionalChange, 75
CAL. L. REv. 1473, 1510-11 (1987) (noting that making constitutions difficult to
change deprives popular majorities and legislatures of the power to overturnjudicial
decisions).
474 See Corbett supra note 35, at 198 (stating that "it is essential that the court
maintains a fine balance between.... the need to protect constitutional rights and
liberties.., and the danger of a too great interference in the affairs of the executive
and legislative branches.... ."). But see Calantvano, supra note 473, at 1510-11 ("The
federal and state constitutions contain many safeguards against tyranny of the
majority. These provisions would provide little protection for minorities if they could
be repealed readily by a popular majority.").
47See Fuller, supra note 9, at 394.
476 See supra notes 36 & 117 and accompanying text.
177 For a classic discussion of broad standing rules as part of the public law
judicial paradigm, see Chayes, supra note 9, at 1288-1302; see also CAPPELLETTI, supra
note 120, at 272-308 (discussing the problem of standing in relation to diffuse
individual interests).
478 For a discussion of public interest actions in the context of statutory social
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ual claims of right to collective goods (such as a hospital and its
related human and physical infrastructure) which are either lacking
or inadequate due to government inaction, or which have been
discontinued as a result of government action. It is all too common
for administrative authorities in the statutory social rights context
to require each individual complainant to establish a separate case,
even if there are many in a similar position, particularly in cases
involving the state's failure to provide a benefit or its discontinuation of an existing benefit.4 79 A similar result could be achieved
through a process of generalizing an individual case through a
judicial remedy. Such an approach, however, loses certain advantages of class actions, which include the empowerment of the claimant
through association with others in similar straits, and the ability to
situate the individual case as part of a larger narrative of systemic
48 0
deprivation.
6. Legal Aid
Another way to minimize the exclusion of disadvantaged
individuals and groups from expensive constitutional litigation is to
provide state-financed legal assistance. Current legal assistance
4 81
programs in South Africa face serious underfunding problems.
In 1987, eighty percent of all criminal defendants were unrepresentrights, see CAPPELLETrI, supra note 120, at 27 ("[I]f... a social benefit is discontinued, such governmental action may be detrimental to large communities of people
and can be effectively attacked only by means of class, collective, test, or 'public
interest'
litigation.").
47
See, e.g., White, supra note 14, at 869 (noting that individuals challenging the
New York City welfare system had a right to a hearing, but they had relatively "little
political muscle to back up their [common] demands"). Another method of
vindicating social rights exists through qui tam actions, in which a penalty for the
omission or commission of an act, established in one action, brought also on behalf
of the state, becomes recoverable by a plaintiff in a civil action, with a portion going
to any
plaintiff bringing suit, and a portion to the state.
4
See Gilbert Marcus & Dennis Davis,Judicial Review Underan ANC Government,
7 S. AFR.J. HUM. RTs. 93, 98 (1991) ("The collective nature of the ANC's draft Bill
makes it essential that there be express provision for public interest actions as well
as class actions...."; see also Schneider, supra note 14, at 649 (discussing empowerment through class action in relation to the women's rights movement).
481 See Albertine R. van Buuren, Note, Insufficient Legal Representationfor the
IndigentDefendant in the CriminalCourts ofSouth Africa, 17 BRooK.J. INT'L L. 381,395
(1991); see also Lynn Berat, Legal Aid and the Indigent Accused in South Africa: A
Proposalfor Reform, 18 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 239, 273-77 (1988) (stating that
inefficient expenditure of funds by the Legal Aid Board, low publicity of legal aid
programs, rigid application procedures, and low income ceilings all serve as barriers
to the procurement of adequate legal assistance in South Africa).
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ed before the courts. 4 82 To promote effective public interest
litigation regarding entrenched social rights, those whose interests
are most at stake in the interpretation of such rights must be
provided with the means of ensuring that their voices are heard.
State assistance should not be restricted to individuals primarily
affected by the litigation in question, but should also extend to
interest groups to permit them to develop national litigation
strategies.
7. Lay Advocacy and Language
We have mentioned the dangers of law as a privileged discourse
and of rights being defined by a potentially exclusionary language. 4 8 3
To avoid such dangers, legal assistance programs
should be permitted to fund lay advocates. Such advocates might
be more likely to come from the same community as the victim and
to have experienced similar disadvantages, and might therefore be
484
better suited than many lawyers to argue a victim's case.
Whether funded by the state or not, South Africans should consider
a presumption operating in favor of leave for lay advocacy, which is
but an extension of the right of any individual to plead his or her
own case without a lawyer.
The court system should further be open to hearing cases
expressed in language and styles not necessarily tied to traditional
legal rights argumentation. Rights language and legal argumentation should not be considered so sacrosanct as to oust other ways of
describing injustice. 485 The benefits of lay advocacy and forms of
argumentation could be considerable. Lay advocacy, likely to merge
arguments about law and fact, would prompt appellate courts to be
more attuned to the actual experiences of those individuals whose
482 See N.C. STEYTLER, THE UNDEFENDED AcCUSED ON TRIAL at vii (1988).

483 See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
484 See Gerald P. L6pez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984) (linking lay
lawyering to the telling of stories of exclusion and victimization, with the lay lawyers
drawing on both their own experience and on "stock stories" that have general
resonance for those faced with the problems of the particular claimants); see also
Steven Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1051 (1970)
(discussing the need for lawyers to understand the difference between representing
poor and rich clients); White, supra note 11, at 765-66 (discussing the dangers of
lawyers speaking for those for whom they are acting).
85 See Plaintiffs' Opening Address in Uukw v. British Columbia (May 11, 1987), in
[1988] 1 C.N.L.R. 14, 56-57 (noting that traditional forms of narrative are more
natural for First Nations than legal discourse).
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cases they must decide, despite the need for considerable deference
to findings at trial.
8. Informal Petitions and a Proactive Court Support Staff
Another way to make courts more accessible is to relax, or at
least modify, some rules of procedure that may exclude people. For
example, ten years ago the Supreme Court of India began accepting
and acting on informal written communications from people who
felt that injustices were being perpetrated on them, but who lacked
the education to put their claims in constitutional discourse or
lacked the resources to hire a lawyer to perform the task.4 8 6
Rather than ignoring such communications, the court has established a committee to wade through such communications, extract
those which seem most serious, and initiate follow-up inquiries to
potentially bring the claim into the system. 487
South Africa
should consider some kind of innovation requiring a more handson, inquisitorial role for the courts. The adversarial processes of
the common law world are not necessarily the best in situations of
inequality among litigants.
9. Court-Appointed Commissions of Inquiry and Expert Advisors
If the judiciary is granted the right to act on third-party petitions
to address situations of extreme oppression and immediate and
obvious danger, it should also be permitted and prepared to require
that, as a rule, the petitioner demonstrate the consent and indeed
the involvement of those whose rights are at issue. 488 It may be
that a commission should be appointed by the court which could
proactively investigate at arm's length on behalf of those who are
the subjects of the claim. Another, perhaps preferable, option
would be for such a commission to enjoy a permanent status and
mandate to assume a proactive human rights role. Such a permanent commission would develop "expertise" in investigating claims
and trust among citizens; the court would be free to call upon the
4

1 See, e.g., Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 67, 157 (Pathak,J.,
concurring in the judgment) (discussing the growing practice of submitting a simple
letter of complaint which the court treats as a petition under Article 32).
487 See id. at 111.

488 See White, supra note 11, at 767-68 (describing how a lawyer's efforts to help
South African villagers frame their oppression in legal terms resulted in a community's coalescence); cf. MINow, supra note 14, at 306 (advocating practical steps to
enable courts effectively to guard children's interests).
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commission to exercise this role. It would be unwise to make such
a commission the exclusive gatekeeper of the courts due to the
48 9
danger of bureaucratic appropriation of people's claims.
Again drawing on the Indian innovations, South Africa might
consider giving the courts the power and the administrative budget
to appoint commissions of inquiry to gather facts and report to the
court, both as a follow-up to potentially meritorious informal
communications and in response to cases before them in which the
court is not satisfied with the quality of the information presented.
South Africa might also consider granting the courts power to
appoint advisors when the court believes the parties' experts and its
own expertise are not up to the task at hand.
10. Judicial Appointments
Intimately related to many of the possibilities suggested above
49
is the question of who becomes a judge and who selects judges. 0
First, if constitutional interpretation is an exercise in world-making,
its judicial participants ought to be selected by individuals and
groups representing all aspects of South African society: citizens
and politicians, women and men, non-lawyers and lawyers, blacks
and non-blacks, solicitors and barristers. 491 Second, those doing
489 See ANC Working Draft, supra note 1, at 123 (Art. 16(7)-(8)) (calling for the
establishment of a Human Rights Commission to investigate patterns of violation of
constitutional guarantees, to receive complaints and to institute court proceedings).
490 This general question relates to the more particular question of whether South
Africa should create a new constitutional court or reform the existingjudiciary. This
is a critical issue given the ideological underpinnings of the current South African
judiciary:
Simply reforming the presentjudiciary would mean that it would take years
before the interpreters [sic] of a Bill of Rights was in the hands of a racially
heterogeneous bench, let alone one representative of women and the
subordinate classes. This is where a separate constitutional court has
advantages. It would allow greater democratisation of the appointment
process. Without changing the system for ordinary judicial appointments
and without giving professional politicians any greater a role, one could
consider giving a role in the appointment of the constitutional court to
individuals and organizations more intimately connected with human rights
issues, such as trade unions, the Black Sash, Nicro.
Donald Nicolson, Ideology and the South AfricanJudicialProcess-Lersonsfrom the Past,
8 S. AFR.J. HUM. RTs. 50, 72-73 (1992). The ANC Draft appears to have left the issue
somewhat open. See ANC WorkingDraft,supra note 1, at 121 (Art. 14(7)) (stating that
"the judiciary shall be transformed in such a way as to consist of men and women
drawn from all sectors of South African society").
491 See D.D. Mokgatle, The Exclusion ofBlacks From the South AfricanJudicialSystem,
3 S. AFR.J. HUM. RTS. 44,46 (1987) (noting that although a black man was appointed
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the selecting should be required to avoid the cult of expertise and
to select worthy individuals from a wide pool of qualified applicants. 492 At minimum, the pool of applicants should not be
restricted to members of the corporate bar but rather should draw
from practitioners and legal academics with a range of interests,
expertise and outlooks; those involved in family law, legal aid work,
criminal law, and constitutional advocacy, to name but a few areas,
should play at least as great a role on the bench as traditional
appointees. Ideally, constitutional interpretation should not be the
exclusive domain of the legal elite. Serious consideration ought to
be given to whether nonlawyers, such as social workers, poets, and
activists from the non-governmental organization sector, ought to
serve as members of the judiciary.
What is certain is that creativity is required in restructuring the
judiciary. By way of example, a modest effort in Ontario, Canada
has begun to change the face of the judiciary with regard to the
appointment of judges. 493 Lawyers interested in a position must
apply in writing to a committee, comprised mainly of non-lawyers. 494 This system has increased the diversity of backgrounds
to the Natal Supreme Court in 1987, "it is widely recognized that there is a serious
need to appoint blacks to the bench in order to maintain (restore?) confidence in the
South African judiciary").
In the words of Nelson Mandela during one of his trials:
The White man makes all the laws, he drags us before his courts and
accuses us, and he sits in judgement over us.
It is fit and proper to raise the question sharply, what is this rigid
colour-bar in the administration ofjustice? Why is it that in this courtroom
I face a White magistrate, confronted by a White prosecutor, and escorted
into the dock by a White orderly? Can anyone honestly and seriously
suggest that in this type of atmosphere the scales of justice are evenly
balanced?
Why is it that no African in the history of this country has ever had the
honour of being tried by his own kith and kin, by his own flesh and blood?
NELSON MANDELA, No EASY WALK TO FREEDOM 127 (1965); see also Higginbotham,
supra note 7, at 510-11 (discussing thejudicial discrimination and harassment faced
by Nelson Mandela as a practicing attorney in 1956).
492 See Mokgatle, supra note 491, at 45.
41- See Peter H. Russell & Jacob S. Ziegel, FederalJudicial Appointments: An
Appraisalof the FirstMulroney Government's Appointments and the NewJudicialAdvisoy
Committees, 41 U. TORONTO L.J. 4, 32 (1991) (noting that "specially constituted
appointments Committees in Quebec and Ontario... have the responsibility not only
of weeding out bad candidates but also of advising the provincial or territorial
minister on the best candidates for the provincial or territorial courts").
494 See id. at 30.
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among lawyers recently appointed to the bench,
and has virtually
495
eliminated the role of political patronage.
11. Parliamentary References
In Germany, it is possible for a member of the opposition in
Parliament to refer a constitutional question (usually involving the
constitutionality of draft legislation) to the constitutional
courts;4 96 forms of constitutional pre-view also exist in other
European constitutions. In Canada, such a right of reference is the
exclusive preserve of the executive.4 97 South Africa might wish
to consider a similar system for Parliament, which would enhance
the dialogue between the courts and elected representatives, and
encourage scrutiny of government laws or policy in terms of
constitutional rights. The fact that such a process can lead to
abstract litigation, that is, legislation that is challenged without the
benefit of a concrete case, can be obviated to an extent by liberal
intervenor rules allowing the courts to evaluate the constitutional
question based on representative concrete cases presented by the
intervenors.
12. Remedies
A South African constitution should grant the judiciary broad
remedial powers when faced with an unconstitutional law. A broad
remedial power will permit the judiciary to fashion remedies with
the participation of those affected by the outcome. For example, a
court ought to be able to delegate a degree of responsibility for
determining the appropriate remedy to affected individuals and
groups; this will permit democratic participation in the fashioning
of remedies and offset some of the concerns associated with judicial
power. In other contexts, a court may find it more appropriate to
simply declare a violation of a right for enumerated reasons, leaving
it up to the government (at least initially, as the court can retain
jurisdiction to review the government's measures) to fashion the
best means of achieving a result. This approach also respects
democratic participation by elected representatives and has the
495 See id. at 20.
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added benefit of generating cooperative dialogue which will
enhance the community-building function of rights litigation.
13. Interpretive Clauses
As discussed in Part II, textual rights do not come with
perspective attached. Given the purpose of social rights in fighting
poverty and related disadvantage, it is desirable to adopt certain
interpretive clauses that expressly embrace a methodology of
looking and listening to those at the margins of society and
responding to suffering and remedying disadvantage. 498 It must
also be made clear that the bill of rights is not to be interpreted in
a way that deprives or limits a person's other rights and freedoms
in the name of, or as a condition of, ensuring her or his social
rights. Consideration could also be given to a clause which makes
clear that judicial interpretations in the area of positive social rights
may not be invoked by government as a ceiling for their independent responsibility to constantly expand and enhance the fulfillment
of those rights.
CONCLUSION

This Article has advocated the inclusion of justiciable social
rights in a new South African Constitution. In our view, social
rights are an indispensable tool for the realization of social justice
in South Africa. Arguments against their non-justiciability based on
the judiciary's lack of institutional competence overlook the fact
that competence is a function of experience. Moreover, such
arguments underestimate the particular institutional advantages of
courts as an important forum for telling the stories of those whose
humanity and place in the community are marginalized. More
fundamentally, charges of judicial competence are based on an
overly rigid assumption that governmental functions must be
compartmentalized.
Such assumptions obscure the fact that
constitutional discourse is capable of stimulating a valuable dialogue
in the community at largeoand, more particularly, among the various
branches of government. Jurisprudence under international human
rights instruments and the Constitution of India illustrates that the
498
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judiciary can successfully adopt a promotional role in protecting the
interests underlying social rights.
Arguments against the justiciability of social rights based on the
lack of legitimacy associated with judicial review of democratic
decisionmaking stress the dangers of arming the judiciary with
dispositive power. Having decided to move toward a constitutional
democracy with judicial review of legislative decisions, however, it
would be more dangerous for South Africa to vest the judiciary with
the authority to enforce only civil and political rights. Selective

constitutionalization overlooks the constitutive dimension of
constitutional discourse. The absence of social rights from a new
South African constitution would risk the development of a
constitutional discourse that would marginalize the values underpinning social rights, and implicitly, but nonetheless powerfully,
deem those values to be illegitimate aspirations of modern governance. Nonetheless, the institution of the judiciary and the
processes ofjudicial review as currently organized and conceived fit
uncomfortably with the imaginative and progressive role they would
be called upon to play under a constitution that contains social
rights. For that reason, we have outlined several institutional and
textual strategies which will help maximize the democratic potential
of constitutional law in a post-apartheid South Africa.

